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INTRODUCTION
The title of this work discloses its subject-matter
to be aspects of public policy in the Conflict of Laws.
The seven specific topics dealt with are listed on page
iii and a short summary of what is covered on each topic
is provided by the abstract on pages vii and viii.
Conflict of Laws or Private International Law, its
other popular name, is a branch of private law - its con¬
cern, broadly speaking, is with the rights of private
individuals, the State's interest in this field generally
being, as Kegel has expressed it, altruistic rather than
1
egotistic - the State's concern in this sphere is more in
seeing that justice is done to those living or litigating
within its jurisdiction than with the protection of its own
direct interests. However, state interests, or the inter¬
ests of society or the community, legitimately intrude to
a significant extent into a number of fields of Private
International Law. In such fields the approach of the
courts may be said to have been substantially influenced by
consideration of public policy. It is with these fields,
or some of them, that this work is concerned.
As a result of the influence of public policy, rules
in these fields are not always easy to understand. Some
of them seem to deny justice to the parties to a dispute
favouring, instead, some rather abstract or amorphous State
interest. An obvious example of this is the rule denying
effect to the laws of unrecognised governments which can
cause undeserved hardship to individuals. Again it may not
be easy to comprehend why a "taxpayer" should be able to
1. Kegel, (1964) II Hague Recueil 183 quoted in Anton,
Pri\Ate International Law (1967) 33.
escape his fiscal obligations by removing himself and
his assets to another country.
I have obviously not attempted, in this thesis,
to deal with all the fields of Conflict of Laws in
which state interests have been an important or dominant
factor in the formulation of rules of law. Thus, for
example, I have not dealt with sovereign immunity nor
with trading with the enemy, save incidentally. How¬
ever, I have dealt with a number of the more important of
these topics including that perhaps the most important,
the external public policy rule. Kahn-Freund has said
that the external public policy principle "... is of such
fundamental importance that it would be possible to write
a separate book on its significance and ramifications."1
With this I agree save that I doubt whether one book
would suffice to deal with all aspects of this principle.
The external public policy rule itself provides a
further unifying factor in respect of most of the topics
treated in this work. It is the main subject of the
first chapter and the rule on foreign revenue laws, that
on foreign penal laws and the rule requiring the appli¬
cation of the lex fori in delict (tort) the topics dealt
with in the second, third, fourth and sixth chapters,
have all been described with some justification, if not
with complete accuracy, as crystallisations of the
external public policy rule. Then Chapter 5 is
1. Kahn-Freund, General Problems of Private International
Law (1976) 281.
principally concerned with the question whether laws,
particularly statutory provisions, can be said to embody
principles of external public policy.
I made the point earlier that there is no attempt
in this work to deal with all the fields of Conflict of
Laws in which state interests have been of substantial
influence. I should also add that I have not tried
to say my final words, let alone the last word, on any
of the topics with which I have dealt - my aim has merely
been to contribute something useful to the gigantic
1 2
literature on the notorious difficult subject of Conflict
of Laws. I am aware that this is made even more
difficult by the very high standard of much of the exist¬
ing literature.
I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor E.M.
Clive, for his encouragement, advice and assistance and
Mrs. M. Schofield and Mrs. B. Ferguson for their industry
and patience in the typing of the text.
1. ICahn-Freund, op. cit. supra. 2.
2. Morris, The Conflict of Laws (1971) 8.
ABSTRACT OF THESIS
This thesis deals with seven topics in the general
sphere of public policy and the Conflict of Laws. These
all concern fields where state or community interests
intrude to a substantial extent into Private International
Law.
The first chapter examines the external public policy
rule and its role and functions in the Conflict of Laws.
Then follows, in the next two chapters, investigations of
the rules on the non-enforcement of foreign revenue laws
and on the non-enforcement of foreign penal laws. The
fourth chapter briefly considers to what extent these two
rules can be said to be derived from the external public
policy rule and whether they can be generalised into a
broader rule that foreign public laws will not be enforced
The subject matter of Chapter 5 is external public
policy and the field of operation of laws. The main
question considered here is whether rules of law,
particularly legislative rules, can be said to embody
principles of external public policy and whether there is
any point in having such a category of laws.
In delict (tort) Scottish and English judges will not
allow a claim arising out of a foreign delict unless it is
actionable by the lex fori, This is in order to protect
the interests of the forum. If these judges were to
abandon this requirement and were to apply the proper law
in delict, what means would still be available to them to
protect these interests? The sixth chapter is concerned
with /
with the answer to this question.
In the last chapter the problem of the laws of
unrecognised governments is considered. Here again
important state interests are involved. There have been
significant developments in this field in recent years,
mainly as a result of the Rhodesian U.D.I., and these
developments are reviewed in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 1
PUBLIC POLICY IK Til : CONFLICT OF LAV/0 with special reference to the
functions of the external public policy rule.^
Meanings of the expression and their relevance to Conflict of Laws.
Usually when it is said that a natter involves public policy this
means that it concerns the public interest and "public" here means
"relating to the state or to the community". However the term "public
policy" has more than one meaning in law and this can cause confusion.
For example, the law of the forum uses two significantly different
concepts of public policy, that applied where the apposite legal system
in a case is the lex fori and that used where the lex causae is a foreign
system. These two concepts are distinct and it is unfortunate that they
are not given different appellations. For present purposes they may be
designated internal public policy and external public policy. It is
this second type of public policy which is of particular relevance in
conflict of law situations. Stated in general terms and somewhat crudely,
1. The textbooks on Conflict of Laws deal with this topic and, in addition,
the following articles are of particular relevance: Holder, (1968) 17
r.C.L.Q. 926; Kygh,(1964) 13 1C.L.Q. 39; Paulsen and Sovern,(1956)
36 Col.L.R. 969; Katzenbach1(1956), 65 Yale L.J. 1087; Kahn-Freund,
(19547 39 Tr. Grotius Soc. 39; Nussbaum (1939) 49 Yale L.J. 1027.
See also, Lloyd, Public Policy. A Comparative Study in English and French
Law^53fOf particular interest is his exposition in chapter V of the
French approach to external public policy. It is said that the external
public policy rule is used more frequently by continental judges than by
English and American judges. On this see Nussbaum, op.cit. supra, 1029
and 1039 and Kahn-Freund, op.cit. supra. 42 _et seq. On public policy
in the U.O.S.R. see Garnefsky, Public Policy in Soviet Private
International Law (2nd ed., 1970)•
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this external public policy rule operates, where a foreign legal system
is indicated by the choice of law rules of the forum as governing an
issue, to deny effect to any applicable law of that system which is
repugnant to the fundamental policy of our law in cases with foreign
elements. In Scots law and unglish law external public policy is a
common law concept in origin but it is used in legislation too. Thus,
for example, section 8 of the Recognition of Divorces and Legal
Separations Act 1971 provides, inter alia, that an overseas divorce may
be denied recognition if "its recognition would manifestly be contrary
to public policy".^ Here the external public policy provision probably
has its common law meaning but the provision, when it appears in
legislation or international conventions, obviously need not have that
meaning. The term is used in the E»K.C. Convention on Jurisdiction
2
and Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters which is likely, in the
near future, to be given legal effect, in the United Kingdom, by
legislation. The meaning given to the term in this context may well not
be identical to that which it has under the common law and, of relevance
here, is the fact that interpretation of the provisions of the convention
1. The need to provide for this exception in legislation was overlooked
in relation to 3.5(4)(f) of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977.
2. Article 27•
3
is a task for the European Court.^
The term ,public policy' is also used in Article 48 of the E.E.C.
Treaty. This article provides for freedom of movement and employment
within the member states of the Community. However, under this provision,
member states are allowed to impose limitations justified on grounds of
public policy, public security or public health. There is no reason why
•public policy* in this context should be given the same meaning as it
bears in the E.E.C. convention mentioned above; the different contexts
may justify different meanings. Prom the cases decided on Article
48 by the uropean Court Lord Mackenzie Stuart concludes: "The trend
in these cases is quite clear. Prom being purely national concepts,
by the successive intervention of the Council, the Commission and the
European Court, there are gradually being developed Community concepts of
2
public policy and public employment." This statement must, of course,
be read in its context. It is not a proposition of general validity.
However, the rowth of a general concept of Community public policy is
an intriguing if unlikely possibility. No doubt it is possible in a
1. For illustrations of this see LufttrcnsiortunternehaenGmbH & Co. K.G.
v* Eurocontrol. (case 29/76); [1976] E.C.R. 1541; [197^ 1 C.L.L.R.
88; Ilandelskwekerij G.J. Bier B.V. and Ltichtung Reinwater v. Lines
de Fotaa'se d'Alsace L.A., (case 21/76); [197^] .C.R. 1735; J1977)
1 C.II.L.R. 284.
2. 1976 J.L.3. 40.
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federation for there to be a federal public policy as well as distinct
3tate concepts of public policy.
The public policy rules of a foreign lex causae can also be relevant
in a conflicts case. Thus, for instance, a contract may be void because
it is contrary to the internal public policy of the foreign proper law.
Indeed in this field of contract and, no doubt, in others, the internal
public policy doctrines of two separate foreign systems may be involved.
Thus, if parties specifically select a proper law in their contract, then
the contract will not be valid if it is rendered illegal and void by that
system, either because it is contrary to a mandatory provision of that
system or because it falls fjul of that systems doctrine of internal public
policy. But even where suc.i a contract is valid by the selected proper
law, it may be void for illegality if it offends against some mandatory
provision of the proper law, objectively ascertained, or against the
internal public policy of that systemJ
The sphere of operation of the rule
The proper sphere of operation of the external public policy rule
is difficult to discover and -this is aggravated by the fact that, in some
1. Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws (9th ed., 1973) 778-779 and
North, Cheshire's Private International Law (9th ed., 1974) 207.
But see Anton, Private International Law (19&7) 192.
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cases, the exact relevance to the decision of the references to public
policy in the judgment is not clear.* Then, as public policy is a
2
matter of law, not fact, no evidence is led on this matter.
This problem is further exacerbated try "the subtle emergence of
3
what might be called public policy considerations in other forms".
Choice of law rules that refer matters to the lex fori, such as the rule
that procedural matters are governed by the lex fori, protect the
interests of the forum and render unnecessary the operation of the
external public policy rule within their spheres. Then certain choice
of law rules are, Holder and others claim, "judicially created substitutes
for public policy".'1'' "Among these substitutes and crystallising into
1. Holder, op. cit. supra, 928,
2. "The legal machinery is at present inadequate it seems, for both
proof of the general norm and content of public policy and also the
impact of a particular decision on that policy. Being treated
as a question of law not fact, no proof is offered. The option,
then, has been made to trust the variable environmental and
predispoeitional qualities of the judge rather than demand from
the court an honest attempt at articulation of the public policy
that is offended and how" - Holder, oja. cit. supra, at 952.
3. Holder, or;, cit. supra. 929.
4. Holder, at 929.
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concrete rules would be included: non-recognition of penal and revenue
laws, the determinate effect of diplomatic recognition and technical
rules controlling the recognition of foreign marital status."^ A
court may be more willing to use one of these legal rules to protect
public policy interests rather than bluntly to invoke the public policy
rule.^
Other features of the operation of the external public policy rule
add to the difficulties of ascertaining it3 proper sphere of operation.
For instance, the external public policy rule performs a number of
separate functions. Then, whether or not the rule is applied is
influenced by the number of contacts the case ha3 with the country of
the forum - "the doctrine of relativity according to contacts, as
distinguished from the compara ively less important relativity of public
policy in space and time which latter simply means that views on public
3
policy change with territories and epochs." Both these features are
discussed later in this chapter.
1. holder, at 929. See also Kahn Freund, op. clt. supra. 45-59» and
Holder, at 949. This crystallisation can lead to a loss of flexibility
and the application of the new rule in inappropriate circumstances.
On crystallisation see too this chapter at p.jl anu also chapter g
at P- 137.
2. Holder, at 929.
3. Nussbaum, a£. clt. supra, 1031.
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The external public policy rule and the repugnancy rule
There is a rule rather similar to the external public policy rule
found in Anglophonic Africa which dates from colonial times. This
African rule is of interest because it is sufficiently close in nature
to the external public policy rule for their comparison to be of value.
In these African states there is an imported western type legal system
but, in addition, one or more customary system, and often islamic law,
are also recognised. A customary system is applied in its designated
sphere subject to certain limitations, one being, to use the Southern
Rhodesian formulation, that the applicable rule of customary law must
not be "repugnant to natural justice or morality."^ There is considerable
variation from country to country in the wording of this repugnancy rule
2
but the idea behind the rule remains the same. The main function of
this rule is to prevent the application of customary laws repugnant in
1. The African Law and Tribal Courts Act of 1969, a.2.
2. For examples of the various formulations see Allott, New Essays in
African Law (1970) 158. "It is submitted tha „ the differences in
wording are irrelevant and have not influenced the behaviour of the
judges" - Allott, unsays in African Law (1962) 197.
Ky knowledge of the repugnancy rule is confined mainly to its operation
in Southern Rhodesia and it is from that country's legal system that
I have taken most of my examples. I have used in this chapter some
material from my unpublished thesis "The Recognition of Tribal Law in
Louthem Rhodesia" submitted in 1963 for the degree of LL.L. at the
University of Cape Tovm (supervisors Professor H.J. Simons). This
work will be referred to in this chapter as "the thesis".
Some material on the repugnancy rule in Southern Rhodesia may be
found in Goldin and Gelfand, African Law and Custom in Rhodesia
(1975) Chapter 7.
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their nature. It excludes laws that "inherently impress us with some
abhorrence or are obviously immoral in their incidence"^ or so outrage
2
"accepted standards of ethics as to create a sense of revulsion.' A
more recent and perhaps better formulation suggests that the law held
repugnant must be "essentially below the minimum standard of civilised
3
values in the contemporary world." Thus the Katabele law of slavery-
will not be enforced.^ Again the rule, or alleged rule, of .bona law
which denies a wife a divorce on the ground of the husband's impotence
5
also falls foul of the repugnancy rule."' But the rule of Shona tribal
law that a father is not responsible for the support of Ids illegitimate
child is not repugnant to natural justice or morality, for the child is
not left destitute; its mother's family is responsible for its support.'
1* Tabitha Chiduku v. Chidano, 1922 S.R. 55 at 56#
2. Katiyenga and Kamlre v. Chinamora and Others. 1958 S.R.K. 553; 1928-
19^2 S.R.K. 829.
3. T.O. lias, British Colonial Law (1962) 104.
4. Habigwa v. Katibini. 1946 S.R.N. 117; 1928-1962 S.R.N. 360.
5. Chawa v. Bvuta, 1928 S.R. 98.
There was apparently thought to be no provision for nullity for
impotence under* customary law either.
In re Robert. 1953 S.R. 47 at 50 (Thesis, 15).
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A close analogy can here be observed with the external public policy
rule operative in the international private law sphere.^ Both are
used to exclude immoral laws. However the external public policy rule
2
also he the function of protecting important state interests. But
it does not seem that the repugnancy rule is used in this way. This
is, no doubt, because it operates internally and not in the international
dimension.
It will be seen from its formulation that the repugnancy rule is
specifically aimed at laws repugnant to natural justice and, no doubt, such
laws would also fall foul of the external public policy rule. In the
international sphere, however, it is foreign decrees rather than foreign
laws that are likely to offend, and, in this context, a separate rule,
requiring that such decrees be not contrary to natural justice, has developed:
1. A sound and much quoted formulation of the external public policy
rule by Cardozo, J. is as follows:
"The courts are not free to refuse tc enforce a foreign right at the
pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion of expediency
or fairness. They do not close their doors unless help would violate
some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of
good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal." - Loucks
v» Standard Oil Co.. 224 N.Y. 99 at 111, 120 K.E. 198 at 202 (1918)
quoted in Dicey and Morris, at 70. This is a reasonably sound descript¬
ion but more emphasis is needed of the "state interest" aspect of public
policy. On this see North, at 153#
2. xamples are given in the next section of this chapter and see too,
Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia (1944) ltd.. L1958H A.C. 301 at 318-9 whore
Viscount imonds states that it is contrary to external public policy
"to enforce or to award damages for the breach of a contract which
involves violation of foreign law on foreign soil." His Lordship had
stated earlier, on 318, "When I say "foreign country" I mean a foreign
and friendly country and will not repeat the phrase."
3. See Dicey and Morris, Rules 187 and 188(l).
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The interests protected by the external public policy rule
That different types of interests are protected by the external
public policy rule^ means that there can be a conflict of such interests.
The rule that requires the non-recognition of foreign revenue laws is
srid to be based on external public policy. The proposition here is
that, if the courts were to enforce foreign revenue laws, some would
have to be refused enforcement as being contrary to external public
policy. But to declare the revenue laws of another state contrary to
external public policy may itself be contrary to that policy. For
example, a foreign revenue law may be immoral, discriminatory or
oppressive and thus contrary to external public policy, but to declare
it to be so may seriously damage relations between the foreign government
and ours, or so the argument goes, and this too could be contrary to
external public policy. The answer suggested by "those who put forward
this argument is to refuse to recognise all foreign revenue laws rather
than to risk the offence to foreign states which recognition subject to
1. Attempts have been made to formulate categories of external public
policy, (See, e.g., Eorth, 152-4; Nygh» 46-9), but only limited
success can be claimed for these attempts. Kot only are the
categories described in very wide and rather vague terms but these
efforts at categorising overlook the fact that the categories are
not relevant to all the uses of the external public policy rule.
A later section of this chapter is concerned with these uses.
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external public policy could entail.^
Even if one only considers state interests in this field of
external public policy there can be conflict. Thus a foreign country's
exchange control laws may be contrary to our country's interests to an
extent that would suggest that they should be declared contrary to
external public policy. However, against this must be set the possible
consequence of such a designation. It may disrupt relations with
the foreign state and lead to retaliation. Thus it may be thought wise
by the courts to refuse to invoke the external public policy rule in
such cases leaving it to the government to attend to the matter, perhaps
by international convention or local legislation or both. ifter all,
what methods do the judges have of ascertaining and assessing state
interests? This fear of judges that they may do harm by intruding into
the political sphere finds illustration too in the field of foreign
expropriatory legislation. Such legislation is generally allowed effect
within, but denied force outside, the territory of the enacting power,
but the better view is that the external public policy rule operates in
respect of the internal effect of the expropriatory law within its own
1. All this is discussed at some length in the chapter of this work
dealing with foreign revenue laws.
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country. Some deny this limitation on the ,ground that such use of
the external public policy rule could have undesirable international
repercussions. This matter lias been considered again recently in
the House of Lords in Oppenheim v. Cattcrmolc^ in the particular
context of discriminatory legislation of a foreign country depriving
some of its citizens of their nationality.
Dangers in the use of the external public policy rule
The point has often been made that the courts should be slow
to designate some rule of foreign law contrary to external public
2
policy. There is a real danger here of parochialism and of not
appreciating the real role of the foreign rule in its own system and
3
community. This too has been the experience with the repugnancy rule.
Indeed some foreign or customary rules designated as offending against
these exclusory rules have subsequently been found to be the same as
the rule of the lex fori, or the imported system, on the same matter.
1. [1976)A.C. 249, H.L.
2. dee, for example, Holden, 928 and Paulsen and Sovern, 970-971.
3. "An English court will refuse to apply a law which outrages its
sense of justice or decency. But before it exercises such power
it must consider the relevant law as a whole". - dcarman, J., In
re the Estate of Puld (No. 3). [196£)e674 at 698, quoted in Dicey
and Morris, at 70.
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Thus in one ifhcdesian case the rule of customary la;* that allowed a
husband who had condoned his wife's adultery to sue the other man for
damages was held to be contrary to the repugnancy rule.^ Hot long
afterwards it was held that the common law also permitted an action
2
in these circumstances. This is reminiscent of the :nglish case of
3
Kaufman v. Person in which it war ruled contrary to morality to enforce
a French contract because agreement had been obtained by duress. It
4
has subsequently been argued, for example in Dicey and Korrie, that
5
the conduct complained of did not amount to duress under English law.
1. R. v. T chenAr.ji and Chargwi, 1917 S.R. (>9. The reasoning of the
judge in this case read; as follows:
"Here, under the aegis of the law, or by native custom, it seems
that the husband can have damages without a divorce. It is only
human, though it may be degraded humanity, that the husband then
discovers his "wife" to be a money-making commodity - and keeps her
as such.
In view of that I have constantly and strenuously refused to
sanction the giving of damages alone without also dissolving the
marriage, even though it may be in accordance with native law and
custom, for such custom I hold to be repugnant to natural justice
and morality. I have, of course, excepted those cases where the
woman has not consented, But, generally speaking, where the
husband does not desire to be quit of his wife, he should have no
damages, becaiise he has suffered none. If he wants damages, the
marriage must be dissolved? otherwise he would be given an almost
irresistible opportunity of making money in the most dispicable and
degrading manner imaginable." - Beaufort, Acting J., at 71 and 72.
(Thesis, 16-17) fhi3 case was not followed in subsequent cases.
Viviera v, Kilian, 1927 A.D. 449. (Thesis, 16).
3. (l903 1 K'B* 591.
4. Dicey and Korrie, at 760-1.
5. For other suspect applications of the external public policy rule see
Kahn-Freund, General Problems of Private International haw (1976) at 202.
In this chapter this work will be referred to as "Kahn-Freund, General
Problems" to distinguish it from the article by Professor Kahn-Freund
cited in the first footnote of this chapter.
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The relationship between internal private law and external public policy
What is the relationship between the external public policy rule
and the internal laws of the system? Obviously, the mere fact that a
foreign rule is different to the domestic rule will not render the former
contrary to external public policy.1 - nor will a foreign rule automatically
escape being designated contrary to external public policy because the
2
forum has an identical or similar rule. Then it may even be that the
application of the lex fori may, in certain circumstances, be contrary
3 4
to external public policy. Some writers, notably Savigny, have
suggested that there are two types of internal rule, those that could
give way to a foreign rule and those that for reasons of public policy,
could not. This analysis is relevant at the stage of deciding which
system is the le^ causae, but it is not relevant to the problems here
1. Xahn-Freund, oj>. cit. supra. 41.
2. "A foreign law may run counter to the public policy of the forum,
albeit the forum possesses a similar law. Thus the Looge Eaad of
the Netherlands, for reasons of public policy, has denied recognition
to Canadian gold clause abrogation even though the Netherlands herself
had, at that time, abrograted gold clauses". - ITussbuura, at 1047.
3. dee, for example, Regazsoni v. } ,C. ethia (1944) ltd., [195*0 A.C. 301.
4. avigny (transl. by Guthrie), A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (2nd
ed., I860) 76-85. ee too, 1'ahn-FrevM, at 41-42.
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being considered, that is, whether a foreign law designated by our choice
of law rules as the lex causae should be denied application as being
contrary to external public policy. By this latter stage the potentially
applicable local law has already been declared to be inapplicable, the
question that remains is merely what degree of deviance from the local
rule by the selected foreign one is tolerable. In our system the age
of marriage is 16 but how young may a foreign system permit the bride to
be before affronting our external public policy rule? Fourteen?
Twelve? Or ten?^ This rulo of our system may be said to have a fairly
wide zone of tolerable deviation. If the foreign law falls within the
zone, it is not contrary to external public policy, but if it falls
without, it does so offend. This zone extends also in the other direction
here though not necessarily to the same extent. Thus, in the interests
of freedom to marry, would the external public policy rule be offended
by a foreign rule requiring the bride to be 18 years of age? What about
20? In the case of some internal rules, for example, those relating to
force and fear (duress), the zone of tolerable deviation may be very
2
narrow or totally absent. No such zones of general application can be
1 . The marriage in Nigeria of a girl domiciled there who was only 13 years
old was recognised as valid in I.ohamed v. Knott, (2.969? 1 .13. 1.
Girls could, of course, marry in : ngland (and Scotland) at 12 until
the age was raised to 1C by legislation of 1929.
2. Kahn-Freund, at 40.
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postulated nor can any simple classification of internal rules be made
on this basis.
Also relevant here is the "contacts" approach to the application
of the external public policy rule. This will be dealt with later,
but the basic idea of this approach, crudely stated, is that Hie mors
links a case governed by foreign law has with the forum, the more likely
is the court to use the external public policy rule. This would mean
that, where there is a zone of tolerable deviation, it contracts as the
total weight of the links with the forum increase ana expands as these
connections decrease in total weight. 2hus the rulo on the age of
marriage may be said to be surrounded by a zone of tolerable deviation
of elastio dimensions! One should perhaps also make the point that it
is not enough, for the suspect foreign law to be denied effect, that
it fell outwith the zone of tolerable deviation; the effect of its
application in the case in question must be contrary to public policy.
This point is elaborated later in this chapter.
Public policy in internal law and the external public policy rule
The sphere of operation of the public policy doctrine in internal
law is very limited. It is used principally by the courts to render
void certain agreements, purported testamentary dispositions and other
allegedly valid juristic acts which are objectionable but not contrary
to any specific rule of law. In theory it provides the courts with a
17
valuable tool, but its use is very limited in practice. Judges are
reluctant to make use of it. This is especially sc where there is no
direct precedent for its use in the particular eircumstances of the case
in question. Then there is a tendency for repeated applications of the
doctrine in a particular context to result in the development of a new
rule of law; particular applications crystallise into a specific law.
The position as regards the external public policy rule is rather
different. Here too there is a reluctance on the part of the judges
to use this weapon,^ and crystallisation, or something similar to it, is
2
said to occur, but it is clear that this latter rule has a very wide
sphere of potential operation; all relevant rules of all foreign
systems applied in the forum must pass its teats, though it may be that
only rarely a foreign law offends.
In another sense, the external doctrine can be said to be narrower
1. l.'uasbaum, at 1037 and 1046, discusses this reluctance at some
length. factors like the vagueness of the concept, difficulties
of ascertainment and the concepts extra-legal nature3no doubt,
contribute to this reluctance to ride the "unruly horse" but
Nussbaum sees the decisive factor as being the liberal tradition
of Hie common lav; courts. Thus; "Liberalism postulates international
-mindednem favourable to the recognition of foreign law; but also,
in accord with the doctrine of the division of powers, it strives to
keep courts clear of politics; and there is an element of foreign
politics in the conflicts - use of public policy." - at 1048-9.
2. See this chapter at
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than the internal. This is shovm by the answer to the question:
Will an agreement governed by a foreign law that would, if local,
be contrary to internal public policy, automatically fall foul of the
external public policy rule? The relevant cases suggest that it would
not, and this seems right in theory in view of the different contexts
ir. which the two public policy rules operate.^ case often cited in
2
this connection is Addison v. Tirown in which it was said that, although
an English agreement to exclude the jurisdiction of the joglish courts
would be contrary to internal public policy, a similar foreign agreement
excluding the jurisdiction of foreign courts need not be contrary to
English external public policy. This type of approach was al30 recognised
3
as valid in Tinas v. Lricol where Goldin, J, said, "I do not overlook
the fact that cases exist in which the Courts have not applied their
4
ideas of public policy to foreign contracts."
Public policy and the determination of the proper acope of laws
c
As has been pointed out by Nussbaum, public policy considerations
1. Ceo hahn-Freund, op. cit. supra. 41-2.
2. p.954] 2 All E.H. 213.
3. 1968 (l) 8.A. 299 00.
4. At 300.
5. (l939) 49 Yale L.J. 1027.
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may be very relevant when the scope of application of a law, particularly
an enacted law, is being determined. Times v. ! ico1, mentioned in the
last section, provides an example of this. In that case the plaintiff
sued the defendant in southern Rhodesia for gambling debts valid under
Zambian Law, their proper law. It was, however, held that the proper
law had to give way to the mandatory provisions of the lex fori. The
relevant provision of the lex fori, the rule of Soman Dutch Law that
gambling debts are- not recoverable, was "of an overriding nature" and
was "based on principles of public policy". It was, therefore
"applicable in all actions".^
One must distinguish twe rules that limit the application of
a selected foreign lex causae. The one is to the effect that such a
foreign systan's provisions must give way to en applicable mandatory
rule of the lex fori. In determining the scope of a rule of the lex
fori, public policy considerations may be relevant. The second rules
requires that a foreign law be not enforced if it is contrary to the
1. Timms v. Nlcol, at 300. It is interesting to note that there was
an alternative ground of decision in this case. It was that
gambling debts are rendered unenforceable by toman Dutch law and
this being a procedural rule is applicable to all such claims
brought in Southern hodesia whatever their proper laws. The
point was made too that systems with similar rules on gambling
debts may characterise them rather differently and Dicey and
Morris, (7th ed., 1958) at 760, was referred to in this context.
See too, Clayton v. Clayton, 1957 S.C. 6l9»
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external public policy of the forum. These too rules are quite
distinct and Times v. Iiicol is an example of the application of the
first, not the second. On the other hand, it may be that legislation
is based on public policy considerations strong enough to prevail over
an inconsistent foreign rule. In such a situation, the foreign rule
may be denied application even though the municipal enactment is not
directly applicable on the grounds that the foreign rule is contrary
to the important public policy considerations of which the municipal
enactment is a particular expression. This is all discussed more fully
in the chapter on public policy and the scope Xaws • • Lata t
Policy evaluation approaches adopted to solve conflict of laws
problems in the United States of nmerica can be and have been confused
with application^ of the external public policy rule. To examine the
policies behind the relevant rules of competing systems in an attempt
to solve an apparent conflict between them in order to decide which
system to apply, is a very different process from that of enquiring,
once tixe foreign lex causae has been selected, whether its relevant
provisions should not be applied as being contrary to the external public
policy of tho forum. A cause of talis confusion is that, the first
process, the ascertainment of the field of operation of the potentially
relevant internal rules of the lex fori, may involve the assessment of
public policy considerations.
1 . They are sometimes confused. See, for example, Kahn-Freund,
General Problems, 281.
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The various uses of the external public policy rule
Despite doubts about the proper limits of the external public
policy rule and other criticisms, also a certain reluctance by judges
to use it, predictions that it would decline in use have not proved
true.^ It remains a useful and flexible weapon in the .judicial armoury.
Indeed, a number of different functions of the public ]jolicy rule have
been distinguished. Holder,*^ listing uses described in earlier
writings, sets out three "converging functions," The first function
is that of preventing the application of foreign laws repugnant in their
nature. An example of such a law would be one creating an incapacity
to marry on religious or racial grounds. The repugnancy rule, ac already
noted, operates in the same way. This function of the external public
policy rule may be positive in effect as where a marriage prohibited by
1. Holder, op. cit. supra, 928, commented in 1968 that these predictions
had not come true and added:
"Nor can it be ignored that the flourish to independence of the
new States has introduced a dynamic element into the international
legal order which villi be reflected in the private international law
systems. It may be, therefore, that the machinations of private
international law may no longer claim the universal acceptance of
Western values. Consequently, it is predictable that there may be
an enlarged demand for the employment of the strictures of public
policy in that 'Revolutionary and destructive legislative inroads
into national and international economics have shifted the focus of
public policy to the conflicts area'. There is, in addition, a
secondary and complementary influence, in that the new States display
increasing demands to legislate and have enforced in appropriate
circumstances their jjolicies relating to events, people and resources -
demands which are subject to the normal international pressures."
(The internal quotation is from liussbaum, 0£. cit. sutra. 1038).
2. Holder, 949. dee too Paulsen and Sovera, oj>. cit. sr. ra, 972-980.
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the domiciliary law is permitted, or negative as where a contract,
valid under its proper law, is rendered void because it falls foul of
the external public policy rule. 'Phis is again true of the repugnancy
rule too.
Another use of the external public policy rule is to prevent
injustice in a particular case. Here it operates as a reserve equity
principle. Holder says: "In practice, public policy has a second
function, to prevent injustice in the circumstances of the particular
case be-fore the court. The concept provides protection not from an
especially repugnant foreign law, but rather from its harsh application.
It is not here so much the rule of foreign law that is objectionable but
the consequences of its application in the particular case before the
court that are unacceptable. Holder gives no specific example but
3
considers that several matrimonial status cases like Gray v. Formosa
illustrate this use.^ His approach here, no doubt, is that the rule of
1. There has been much discussion and criticism of this use of the
external public policy rule as a reserve equity principle. See,
for example, Korth, o£. cit. supra, 154-9; Dicey and Morris, op.
cit. supra, 74-5; Nygh, 0£. cit, supra, 39; Paulsen and Sovern,
op. cit. supra, 1008-1010.
2. Holder, 949. See too Paulsen and Severn, 1008-101C and I'ahn-Freund
43.
3. [1963JE 259 at 268-9.
4. Holder, 945, 949-50.
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Maltese law that a Catholic may only marry in a Catholic church is not
objectionable when applied to Catholics, domiciled in Malta, who marry
there, but that it is offensive when applied to invalidate the registry
office marriage in England of a Catholic of Maltese nationality and a
non-Catholic English woman both domiciled in England.1
The repugnancy rule too is capable of operating as a reserve
equity principle. This is well illustrated by the case of Vela v.
Mandlniha and Kagutsa.^ Eere it was held that, although it is a rule
of Shona law that a husband may refuse to accept payments from the
natural father of his wife's adulterine children which payment would,
if accepted, give the natural father the right to the guardianship and
custody of the children, in the circumstancec of the particular cane,
1. In this case the offending Maltese rule came before the English
court indirectly - what was in question was the recognition of the
Maltese nullity decree. If the Maltese rule had come up directly
in an English case - for instance, if a Maltese Catholic had sought
to marry in England other than in a Catholic church and the question
of his capacity to do so had been raised - two weapons other than
the external public policy rule would have been available to the
nglish court. I1he Maltese rule could have been characterised as
one relating to formalities and thus only applicable where Maltese
law was the lex loci celebrationis, or, alternatively, the dubious
choice of law rule applied in cases such as Chetti v. Chetti,
L190^E6? and discussed later in this chapter (at p.28 T could,
perhaps, have been used to render the foreign incapacity inoperative
provided the other spouse was domiciled in England.
2. 1936 .R. 171♦ Other cases also illustrating this function of the
repugnancy rile are: Eamtunga labison v. iiatii.edza and Kadzima,
1953 2,E.I. 997; 1928—62" »>.R .1. 697; Sayimano v, ..rarlblatsc, 1931
S.R. 134.
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"... the husband would be acting contrary to natural justice if he
refused reasonable payment of cattle or otherwise..." by the natural
father. The relevant circumstances were that the vife had, some ten
years earlier, deserted her husband and had since lived with th© other
man. It was during her cohabitation with the latter that the children
were conceived and bom.
We have been considering the equitable use of the external public
policy rule where it is not a rule of foreign law that is objectionable
but its particular application which offends. There is, however, a
related situation where the rule itself offends but this is overlooked
because the result of a particular application of the rule is not
objectionable. Take the situation where a girl aged 9 end living in
a foreign country, marries. This is permitted by the relevant foreign
syaterns. Although a rule allowing tliio nay be contrary to external
public policy, our courts may still be prepared to recognise the
marriage in certain contexts, for example, for succession purposes.
Likewise polygamous marriages, though for long not recognised as marriages
for purposes of matrimonial relief, were recognised as valid in the
fields of legitimacy and succession. This must lead us to a re-aEsessment
of the first use of the external public policy rale discussed above.
That the rule of foreign law is contrary to external public policy in
the abstract is not enough, the question is, does its application in
25
the particular circumstances of this care offend external public policy?
A foreign law states that girls nay marry at 9 but the girl in question
is l6. Here the law is objectionable, but the result of its application
to the particular case is not; that a girl aged if may marry does not
offend external public policy. Some nay argue that the applicable
foreign law in this case is that girls of If nay marry. However, that
is not the rule but an inference drawn from it.
A further related point arises. It can be illustrated by the
situation where a foreign system does not have rules in the field of
marriage providing for nullity or dissolution where there is impotence
and this is considered contrary to the forum's external public policy.
Here it is not a rule that offends but the absence of one. To say that
a system does not provide for nullity or dissolution of marriage for
impotence is not to state a rule of law but to draw an inference on what
does not render a marriage a nullity or dissoluble from the rules stating
what does. Again, one would assume that in this situation, the actual
result of the absence of the rule on the case in question must also be
contrary to external public policy.
The third use of the external public policy rule listed by Holder
is to act as a corrective to defective choice of law rules invoking, in
2
1. Dicey and Iloyris, 71 Kahn-Freund, General Problems, 282
2. Holder, 950.
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the view of the court, the incorrect system. The rule is usually
applied in this way to enable the court to apply its own law.^ This
use is suspect as the real cure for defective choice of law rules is
their modification or replacement, net their evasion.
This use is described by its main exponents, Faulsen and Govern,
in the following terms: "... "public policy" is one v?ay to avoid the
application of a choice of law rule which the forum wishes to avoid.
The objection of the forum, thus, is not to the content of the foreign
law but to ite own choice of law rule. Rather than to change or modify
the supposedly applicable rule the court may refuse on public policy
grounds to apply the law to which the rule makes reference. The closer
the tie between the forum and the facts of a given transaction the more
readily we may expect the forum to use its own laiv' to judge the matter
before it. In ~uch a view the "public policy" doctrine becomes a
kind of choice of law principle, imprecise, uncertain of application,
2
but nevertheless discharging a choice of law function."
■Z
Iden v. Ihilemon (1918) provides a rare example of the repugnancy
rule acting in this role as a corrective to defective "choice of law"
rules. Here the judge considered that he was enjoined by law to apply
1. Paulsen and overn, 980.
2. Ibid., 961.
3. 1918 S.R. 140.
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customary lav to a claim before him - one arising out of adultery in
respect of a marriage by civil rites - though he felt that the common
law should, in justice, be applied to the parties. He overcame this
difficulty by holding that, where an African had contracted a marriage
by civil rites, it would be repugnant to natural justice or morality
to apply customary law inconsistent with such a marriage. Consequently
he applied the common law.'
It has already been mentioid that this third application of the
2
external public policy rule is used principally to invoke the lex fori.
Hot infrequently a choice of law rule indicates a foreign system as
applicable where there are significant links between the case and the
country of the forum. In those circumstances, it has been suggested
that the court ia more likely to use the external public policy rule than
where there are no significant links with the forum. This, as mentioned
3
earlier, is the 'contacts' approach to the use of the external public
1. The particular point in issue here was whether a husband could 3ue
for adultery without divorcing the v:ife. This was possible under
customary law but it was thought not to be possible under Hie common
law, the system here applied. in this case the approach adopted in
R. v. I chenji and Charge!. discussed earlier in this chapter atp.lj
was net followed.
2. It ray occasionally bo used to prevent the operation of the lex fori,
ecf for example, Regazzoni v. R.C. ethia (1944) Ltd.. Hl958j A.C.
301.
3. On this approach see: Nussbaum, o£. cit. suora, 1030-2; Holder, op.
cit. surra. 951; Kahn-Freund, cm. cit. supra, 57-9.
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policy rule and it is relevant to all the uses of the rule so far
considered. The relevance of this approach to the third use, that of
correcting defective choice of law rules, will now be briefly investigated.
A choice of law rule of the lex fori indicates the system to
govern a particular matter which is thought to be appropriate to that
matter by the lex fori. The system is thought appropriate because the
matter in dispute is closely linked in some way with that system or its
country. Sometimes a centre of gravity approach is adopted, all
significant links with the competing systems are listed and evaluated in
order to ascertain the most closely connected system, but in other cases
one link is considered to predominate and, by itself, to indicate the
appropriate system. The objective proper law approach in contract
illustrates the first approach, the application of the lex loci delicti to
matters within delict (tort) illustrates the second. Where a foreign lex
causae is indicated by our choice of law rule there may be sufficient links,
nonetheless, with the forum or the lex fori or perhaps with some other
country or its law to induce the court to depart from the application
of the otherwise relevant choice of law rule. These contacts may
bring the case within an exception to the general rule. Thus there is
authority in both Scots and English law for the proposition that an
incapacity to marry imposed by a foreign domiciliary law, and thus
usually given effect by the forum, will be ignored if the incapacity is
unknown to the lex fori, the other party to the marriage is domiciled
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in the country of the forum and the marriage is to be celebrated in
1
that country. In other cases -where reform is required by the
replacement of the existing rule or by its modification by the recognition
of an exception or in some other way, the court may do none of these.
Instead, it may try to solve the immediate problem facing it by using
the external public policy rule to reach an acceptable solution. This
is the approach criticised by Paulsen and Dovera. Then, finally, there
is the situation where the choice of law rule is satisfactory and
re-quires neither replacement nor modification but the court feels that
it should not be applied in the particular circumstances of the case in
question. Here the external public policy rule has another equitable
use. "3ut here it is net being used to grant equitable relief from a
foreign law but from a choice of law rule of the forum.
2
An example is provided by Lorentzen v. Lydden & do. The
relevant facts are that the Norwegian government attempted in May 1940
Macbougall v. Chitnavis, 1937 ' .C. 390; -ottomayor v. ~Je Barros
(No. 2), (1079) 5 I.~ . 9<; Chetti v. Ohettl. jl90§P.67} Anton,
££. clt. supra, 280-1; Dicey and Morris, 0£. cit. supra, iOile 34
Exception 3; 91ive and 'ilson, The Law of Hushmd and Wife in
0Gotland (1974) 162-3. This rule is discussed by Kehn-Freund,
op. cit. supra, at 48-9 and 33-9. He sees it as an example of "the
premature crystallisation of decisions based on public policy into
independent rules which, in the proce; , lose their connection with
the flexible idea of public policy in vrhich they originated" - I'ahn-
Freund, at 45•
2. [1942J 2 K.3. 202
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to requisition by decree certain ships, including some still under
construction, and claims relating to such ships. It was questioned
whether this decree could be &iven extra-territorial effect the
general rule being that ownership of property is governed by the lex
situs. :.uch effect was allowed this law on the following grounds:
"It seems to me that the I'.nglish courts are entitled to take
into consideration the following matters: that this is not a
confiscatory decree that England and Norway are engaged together
in a desperate war for their existence, and that public policy demands
that effect should be given to this decree. To suggest that the
English courts have no power to give effect to a decree making over
to the Norwegian Government ships under construction in this country-
seems to me to be almost shocking."
The case did not in fact involve a ship under construction but the
right to enforce a claim for breach of a eharterparty allegedly
requisitioned by the same decree, and it is in this context that the
above quotation must be viewed. It can be argued that the general
validity of the choice of law rule that matters cf ownership and its
transfer are governed by the lex situs is not being challenged here
but that a departure from this rule, based on the particular
1. At 215-6
circumstances of the case, is being justified basically on public
policy grounds.
It may not be easy for a judge to decide whether, in the
circumstances of the case then before him, he should invoke the law
or use the external public policy rule to solve a problem. Thus
where the performance of a contract involves the commission of acts
in a friendly country illegal by the law of that country,
should the contract be rendered void by the external public policy
rule, or should the court propound and enforce a conflicts rule that
a contract is void if its performance is illegal by -the lex loci
solutionis?^ Here again too, we have the problem of crystallisation.
To summarise: This analysis of the contacts approach to Holder's
third use of the external public policy rule suggests that there is a
fourth use; the rule may operate as a reserve equity principle not
only in respect of generally acceptable rules of foreign law but
also in connection with the chcice of law rules of the forum. In
the case of the third use, the external public policy rule is used
where the choice of law rule of the forum is defective and requires
replacement, amendment or qualification by exception, but the fourth
1. On this 3ee Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia (1944) Ltd., [1958] A.C. 301.
It is interesting to note that in this case the operation of the
external public policy rule excluded the operation of the lex
fori.
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use is applicable where the choice of law rule is not defective, it
does not need to be changed, but the particular circumstances of the
case require that an equitable exception be made and some other system
invoked.
There is a use of the repugnancy rule which, as far as I am aware,
has not been suggested as a possible function of the external public
policy rule. It has already been observed that these rules are not
identical nor do they perform identical functions, but this function of
the repugnancy rule could, perhaps, have some relevance in the field of
conflict of laws.
Dealing with the repugnancy rule Professor Eentsi-Bnchill^ has
written as follows:
"It is submitted that on most of the few occasions when this rule has
been used as a justification for refusing to apply an alleged principle
or rule of native law, the Court was grappling with the difficult
problem of ascertainment, and refusing to accept the tendentious and
"unreasonable" contentions made on the part of one litigant or another
regarding the character or mode of application of die said principle or
rule.
1. (l969) 1(2) Zambia L.J. 1-30. I am grateful to Mr. T.V. Bennett,
B.A., LL.B., of the University of Cape Town, for drawing this article
to my attention.
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Take for example the established judicial doctrine regarding one
type of long possession, which was based on the repugnancy rule. The
alleged rule of native lav in regard tc which this doctrine has been
formulated was stated by the Full Court in the Bokitsi Case to the
following effect:
"The original owner of land who has not specifically divested
himself of this ownership can, after any length of time and under
any circumstances, obtain the recovery of his land from persons
setting up an adverse title, whatever may be the detriment caused
to such persons by the fact that the original owner slept on his
right."
This, let it be noted, is a peculiary tendentious and unreasonable
version of the rule; but this presumably is what was being urged on
the Court. That Court responded by declaring that if persons in
possession bad occupied the land "... under such circumstances ... as
would cause them to believe themselves to be the owners of the land,
and to incurr pecuniary responsibilities in consequence of that belief,
we think it is right to state that in our opinion it would be contrary
to the principles of equity to allow native law to apply in its
entirety."
The doctrine of repugnancy need not have been invoked at all
if the rule had been more reasonably stated, or if the Court had
34
advised itself as to the equitable procedures of adjudication and
dispute settlement that are part of native customary law."^
It will have boen observed that Professor Bentsi-Enchill is
critical of this use of the repugnancy rule but it is tentatively
suggested that it nay be that the external public policy could be
profitably used in this way to save time and expense. For instance,
surely it would be uneconomical in a case where the validity of a
contract is impugned on the grounds of force and fear (duress) to
allow the rules on the subject of the relevant foreign lex causae to
be x>roved where, even if the contract is valid under that system, it
will be declared void for being contrary to external public policy?
It would, perhaps, now be useful to summarise the different
functions of the external public policy rule which have been identified
and discussed in the previous pages.
The first use of the rule is to exclude from enforcement an
objectionable law of the foreign lex causae. It is not, however,
t. Bentsi- .nchill, at 20-21. The reference to the Bokitsi case
is given as 65 (1902) Sar. F.L.R. 148 at l60. This Gold Coast
(Ghana) case is also dealt with shortly in Allott, New Assays
in African Law (1970) 161. The formulation of the repugnancy
rule relevant in this case is "repugnant to natural justice,
equity and good conscience".
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enough that the rule of foreign law be objectionable, the actual
outcome of the case, if that law is applied, must also offend.
The rule finds a second use in the situation where the system
indicated is accepted as applicable and its relevant laws as generally
acceptable, but that an exception to their operation is thought
justified in the peculiar circumstances of the particular case in
qi^estion (the reserve equity principle).
The following two functions relate to the operation of the rule
in the context, not of foreign laws, but of the choice of law rules
of the forum. It may be thought in a case that that an established
choice of law rule indicates an inappropriate system. Here the
external public policy rule wxy be used as a corrective. The rule
may be used in circumstances where the choice of law rule is defective
and what is really required is its revision, or it may be used where
the forum's relevant choice of law rule is generally satisfactory but
an equitable exception to its operation is required in the peculiar
circumstances of the particular case in question. So the rule can
act as a corrective to defective choice of law rules or as a reserve
equity principle in respect of sound choice of law rules.
The final use suggested for Hie rule, as we have recently seen,




A matter which requires consideration is the question of which
rules should apply where the relevant foreign rules have been
exercised by an application of the external public policy rule. A
riailar problem exists as regards applications of the repugnancy rule,
us regards the operation of the external public policy rule, we are
only c nceraed at this stage with the situation where a rule of a
selected foreign lex causae is denied application as being contrary
to external public policy. -o are not here concerned with the situation
where the external public policy rule exercises its choice of law role.
The view seems to be that, in tiii? latter situation, the Invocation
of public policy is specifically directed at ensuring that the lex
fori will be applied,1 although, in theory, it ia not inconceivable
that public policy could demand the application of some foreign system
other than the foreign lex causae indicated by the usually applicable
choice of law rule of the forum. The use of the lex fori in these
situations cannot, however, be used to justify its use in the very
I
different situation where a rule of foreign law is denied application
as being contrary to external public policy. However, in these
1 • haulsen and overa, oj>. eit. supra, 51.
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circumstances too, it has generally been assumed that the gap should
be filled by the application of the lex fori.
I would suggest that in many cases there is no need to provide
rules of law to fill the gap. In many cases once the objectionable
foreign rule is ignored, an acceptable conclusion follows and there
is no need for substitute rules. Thus where there is a foreign
incapacity to marry, based on race or religion, this can be ignored
and the marriage allowed or recognised without substituting any new
laws. Some situations are, however, not this simple. For example,
if our courts applied the personal law of the parties in divorce actions,
it could happen that the relevant personal law in a particular case
does not allow divorce. This may be thought to be contrary to external
public policy, but what law is the forum going to apply to decide
whether a divorce is appropriate? It could be argued that the lex
fori is the obvious system to apply, but it may not be necessary to
apply any system; all that the court lias to rule is that it would be
contrary to external public policy to refuse a divorce in the particular
circumstances, it need not propound and apply any rules of law.
However, the court may well wish to apply rules of law in this situation
and the rules of the lex fori may be thought appropriate. It may also
be that, in some cases, although I cannot think of any, it will be
necessary to fill a gap, left by an application of the external public
policy rule, with a rule or rules of law. Again here the rules of
1. See, for example, the formulation of Rule 128 in Dicey and Morris.
2. See Kahn-Fre\;nd, General Problems, at 283.
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the lex fori may seem the obvious ones to apply.
There could, however, be incompatibility problems in some cases
if one attempted to fill gaps made in a foreign system by the application
of the external public policy rule with rules of the lex fori. As
mentioned earlier, this problem of filling the gaps is also present
where the repugnancy rule is used.^ Here the situation is significantly
different from that where the external public policy rule is used.
Here a gap is made in the internal rules of one of the branches of the
local legal system, not in some foreign lex causae. In these
circumstances, it is highly desirable that the gap be filled with
rules of law rather than having each case decided on its merits. For
example, if the customary law rule that marriage may be dissolved by
divorce by the agreement of the parties concerned without "just cause"
2
falls foul of the repugnancy rule, as has been held in Rhodesia, then
grounds justifying divorce must be found and laws giving effect to these
must be developed or borrowed by the courts or enacted by the legislature.
In view of the large number of divorces likely to be sought, and for
other reasons, it is clearly desirable that ruler should here be
propounded rather than leaving each case to be decided on equitable
grounds. Rules are here the aim, but they could, of course, be




Hhodesian case concerned vdth divorce for impotence it was held that,
where there was a gap of this sort in the customary law, it should be
filled by the imported system.^ However this is not the general
approach to divorce in respect of customary marriages in Rhodesia.
As already noted, such divorces without just cause have been held
repugnant, but the common law has not been invoked to provide these
"just causes"; the courts have developed new rules to deal with this
problem. They have used as an important guide in this task the rules
of customary law which determine fault for the purposes of the return
of marriage consideration on the break up of a marriage. " To blindly
follow the common law in these sorts of circumstances could lead to
incompatibility ond injustice. The same point can be made in respect
of the operation of the externul public policy rule. If gaps made by
the use of this rule have to be filled with rules of law, which must
rarely be the case, then the use of the lex fori for this purpose may
not always be appropriate. I should add that in Rhodesia since
legislation of 1969 it would seem that the courts there are to fill gaps
3
by applying "principles of justice, equity und goo-i conscience".
1. Chawa v. Bvuta, 1928 3.R. 98 at 100.
2. Goldin and Selfand, 0£. cit. supra. 148-150; Child, The History and
extent of Recognition of Tribal Law in hodesia, (1§66) 41-7;
Thesis, 23-4.
3. The African Law and Tribal Courts Act, 1969, ss.3(3) and 4. See
Goldin and Gelfand, o£. cit. supra. 63. On these principles see
Derrett. "Justice Lquity and Good Conscience',' in, Anderson, Changing
Law in Aeve'lo'ping Countries (1963). at 114-153.
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That finishes then this examination of the external public
policy rule and its functions. Other aspects of public policy in
conflict of laws will be considered in the chapters that fellow. This
external public policy rule has, undoubtedly, a very important role to
play in conflict of laws. A choice of law rule indicates the system
thought appropriate to solve a dispute, it is not "result-selective".
Thus a foreign system may be indicated as applicable by a choice of
law rule even though its actual solution to the matter in issue is
unacceptable to the forum. Obviously some device is needed to deal
with this situation and the one used is the external public policy rule.
Bot aurprisingly, then, the applications of the external public policy
rule are themselves concerned with results of cases in which foreign
law is applied rather than with the foreign laws themselves. Whether
the external public policy rule should also be allowed to exercise a
choice of law function is a controversial matter. This use is, no
doubt, undesirable, at least in principle, where what is needed is
reform of the relevant choice of law rule - one may excuse it where the
judge using the rule in this way is faced with an unsatisfactoiy choice
of law rule which he cannot change. The use of the external public
policy rule to give equitable relief in special circumstnces from
generally satisfactory choice of law rules is less easy to condemn.
In attempting to draw an appropriate balance between flexibility and
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certainty in the formulation and application of rules of law, it
may be appropriate in some branches of law, or in some parts of
some branches, to leave the courts with a residual discretion to
depart from the formulated rule in special circumstances. If this
is true, conflict of laws, or some fields within it, may well be
appropriate spheres for this approach.
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CHAPTER 2
THE NON-ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN REVENUE LAWS
"As to public policy one finds it difficult to see how non-recognition
of foreign revenue laws is to be founded on this "unruly horse". One
would have thought that it was public policy that persons should pay
their taxes and not evade such payment by escaping the covin try which
imposed them". - Vieyra, J,
There is now a great deal of judicial authority for the proposition
that our courts will not enforce foreign revenue laws and decrees. The
most important decision in this regard is undoubtedly that of the House of
Lords in Government of India v. Taylor (1955)but there have been a
2
significant number of other cases in recent years supporting this almost
3
universally adopted rule. This rule seems, on the face of it, a rather
strange one for it would appear to assist dishonest persons to evade their
1. (1955]a.C. 491,(H.L.); [>955.1 1 All E.R. 292 (H.L.).
2. Dicey & Morris, Conflict of Laws (9th ed., 1973) 75? Luf11ransportunterne-
hmen GmbH & Co. Jfct v- Eurocontrol* &977J 1 C.M.L.R. 88 (European Ct.);
Re Lord Cable (deceased). P1976 ; 3 All E.R. 417 (C.A.); Brokaw v.
3catrain U.K. Ltd.. [1971J 2 Q.B. 476 (C.A.)| 1971 2 All E.R. 98;
Bath v. British Malayan Trustees Ltd.. '1969J 2 N.S.W.R. 114, Scottish
National Orchestra Society Ltd. v. Thomson's Executor. 1969 S.L.T. 325;
Jones v. Borland. 1969 (4; 5.A. 29 (w); Weir v. Lohr, (1968) 65 D.L.R.
(2d) 717; Pye Ltd. v. B.G. Transport Service Ltd.. U1966./ 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 300; Commissioner of Taxes v. McFarlane, 1965 (l) 3.A. 470 (w);
U.S.A. v. Harden. (1964) 41 D.L.R. (2d.) 721; Rossano v. Manufacturers'
Life Insurance Co., [19631 2 Q.B. 352; Metal Industries (Salvage) Ltd."*"*
v. Owners of S.T. 'Harle'. 1962 S.L.T. 114.
3. Exceptions to the rule occur as between states of a federation (see ea
p. 56» infra.) and where an international convention applies. The fact
that both countries are in the Commonwealth does not effect the operation
of the rule - Government of India, supra.
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obligations and it is to consideration of the reasons for this rale that
I want to devote much of this chapter. The rule came into existence at
a time when many foreign revenue laws were clearly contrary to public
policy, but times have changed and the ingenious efforts to justify the
rule in present day conditions provide an interesting subject for study.
Before passing on to a consideration of the policy reasons for the
rule, it would perhaps be appropriate to set out shortly some of the
ancillary rules in this field. Thus, characterisation of a foreign rule
as revenue or not is a matter for the lex fori,^ though the rale should
2
be viewed in the context of its own system before the decision is made.
3
Many different claims and decrees have been designated as revenue in nature.
4
Indirect enforcement, as well as direct, will not be permitted. For
5
instance, in a Canadian case the court rejected the argument that a
compromise agreement in respect of a revenue debt altered the basis of
1. Metal Industries (Salvage) Ltd.. supra.
2. Anton, Private International Law (1967) 49.
3. Dicey & Morris, on cit. supra. 78. Some think the category is too wide.
This is discussed later in this chapter at pp. 46 and 67.
4. Horth, Cheshire's Private International Law (9th ed., 1974) 136.
5. U.S.A. v. Harden, supra.
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liability, making it contractual. The ban, it is thought, extends also
decree .
to ancillary orders, such as a^#watgm«ai for expenses. Although our
2
•courts do not sit to collect taxes for another country', this does not
mean that they will give no recognition to such tax laws. Thus a foreign
revenue law rendering a contract void will be recognized if the law is a
3
rule of the lex causae. Then an executor may be obliged to pay foreign
estate duty where otherwise the wishes of the testator, as regards the
paying of legacies to persons in the foreign country in question, would
be frustrated. Thus in the Scottish case of the Scottish National
1
Orchestra Ltd. v. Thomson's Executor Scottish executors were held to have
acted lawfully in sending £16,000 to the Swedish administrator for the
payment of Swedish inheritance tax, for, until this claim was met, legacies
paid to the Swedish legatees would have to have been recovered by the
local administrator and paid towards the satisfaction of the outstanding
inheritance tax.
The approach adopted in the Scottish National Orchestra case has
1. By analogy with the position relating to penal laws. See Attorney-
General for Canada v. William Schulze and Co..f1901) 9 S.L.T. 4.
2. Denning, L.J. in Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia (1944) Ltd.t[~1956 2 Q.B.
490 at 515 jtC.A.).
3. Dicey & Morris, op. cit. supra, 78; H. Mann.'Foreign Revenue Laws and
the English Conflict ofLaws* (1954). 3 I.C.L.Q. 465 at 472.
4. 19<>9 S.L.T. 325. Cf. Jones v. Borland, supra.
4b
received further extension in He Lord Cable (deceased)J The facts of
this case are rather complicated, but the first proposition in this
decision of relevance here is that the trustees of a foreign testamentary-
trust may remit trust funds from England to the foreign country in
question, in this case India, even though these are required to pay
taxes there and even though this may well prejudice the interests of
beneficiaries, where the failure to remit 3uch funds may lead to the
infliction of harsh penalties on the trustees under the law of that
2
foreign country. It was also conceded in this case, properly in the
view of the court, that, where trustees in a foreign trust had paid taxes
due by the trust in the foreign country, they have the right to be
indemnified out of trust assets even where these are situated in England.
This last proposition would be approved by North for he makes a similar
point in respect of the oase of Rossano v. Manufacturers' Life Insurance
Co.^ He summarises the facts of this case as follows:
1. [1976] 3 All E.R. 417 at 436 (Ch.D.).
2. A defect of this decision is that it would seem extremely doubtful
in the circumstances that the penalties would, in fact, be inflicted
on the trustees as they had acted throughout with the consent of the
Indian exchange control authorities.
3. Re Lord Cabjo. supra, at 435-6.
4. [1963.] 2 Q.B. 352
46
"The plaintiff was an Egyptian national resident in Alexandria;
the defendants were an insurance company with a head office in
Toronto and branches in many other countries. The action was
to recover money due under three policies of life insurance issued
by the defendants. The first two policies required payment in
London in pounds sterling; the third directed payment at New York
in dollars."^
North then continuesj
"One defence raised by the defendants was that two garnishee orders
had been served on three of their branches in Cairo which would
render them responsible for the payment of certain taxes alleged
to be due from the plaintiff to the Egyptian government if they
paid him before he had satisfied this fiscal liability. The
defence failed, for to allow the garnishee orders, which related
solely to taxation debts, to del'eat the plaintiff's cause of
action, would constitute an indirect enforcement of a foreign
revenue law. Therobvious result of dismissing the action would
be the recovery of the taxes by the Egyptian government.
It is questionable whether this ban on indirect enforcement
is not too rigid. If, for instance, in the Rosaano Case, the
defendants had in fact paid the taxes due to the government, would
not an action based upon the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff
2
have succeeded?"
North makes a similar point in respect of the case, Brokaw v. Seatrain




A useful starting point in our examination of the Justification
for the rule on foreign revenue laws is the relatively recent South
2
African case of Commissioner of Taxes v. KcParland. The reason for
this is that the Judge in this case reviewed the arguments usually put
forward in Justification of the rule.
In McFarland Vieyra, J. had to decide whether a final Judgment of
the High Court of Southern Khodesia against the defendant in respect of
taxes owing by him under legislation of the Federation of Rhodesia could
be enforced in South Africa. There was no South African decision on the
matter, so the learned Judge turned to the substantial authority on this
point available in other systems. He reviewed mainly decisions from
England and other English law countries, but also referred to the position
in other Jurisdictions. In the context of the prevalence of the rule
denying foreign revenue laws enforcement, he quoted the remarks of Lord
Somervell in Taylor?
'The appellant was ... in a difficulty from the outset in that,
after considerable research, no case of any country could be
found in which taxes due to State A had been enforced in the
3
courts of State B.'
1. North, 137.
2. 1965 (l) S.A. 470 (W).
3. [1955] 1 All E.R. 292 (H.L.) at 301. Quoted by Vioyrs^ J# &t 4-72#
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Having found a great deal of overseas authority for the rule against
the enforcement of foreign revenue laws and decrees, Mr. Justice Vieyra
turned to consider the reasons for the rule. Serious judicial attempts
to justify the rule on grounds of policy rather than authority are not
commonj there is a tendency to state the rule 'as if it were of long
standing and so well-established, so self-evident, as to require no
justification'Policy considerations, where mentioned at all, are
2
frequently confined to vague and superficial formulations. In Kahn's
view, '[wjhat reasons have been advanced appear to have been given a
3
posteriori, after the rule had become established'. However, the
reasons for the rule are essential to understanding its scope and applio-
4
ation, and the justification for the rule is far from self-evident.
Indeed, at first sight, the rule seems to be a negation of international
1. Kingsmill Moore, in Peter Buchanan Ltd. v. James KcVey,~19541 I.R.
89 at 105.
2. See, for example, the remarks of the judges in the Court of Appeal
Delhi Electric Supply and Traction Co, , fl954j Sh. 131» set out in
Kahn, 'Enforcement of Foreign Revenue Law'. (1954), 71 S.A.L.J. 275
at 277. E.F. Scoles,'Interstate and International Distinctions in
Conflict of Laws in the United States' (l966) 54 California L.R. 1599
at 1607 speaks of this rule as 'It'he often repeated but seldom
analyzed rule'.
5. Kahn, op. cit. supra. 277.
4. 'One trouble about a rule of law which everyone takes for granted is
that no judge ever bothers to state the reasons for it. A natural
consequence of this may be that the rule extends itself gradually, and
finally is applied to many new sets of facts to which the reason for
the rule, assuming that there is a reason for it, has no relation.' s
R.A. Leflar('Extra-state Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims'
(1932) 46 Harv. L.R. 193 at 196.
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comity^ and to assist taxpayers to evade their lawful obligations.
Mr. Justice Vieyra, relying, in part, on Professor Kahn's note
and other material provided by the professor, surveyed the arguments
2
usually given for the rule and found several unconvincing. The
arguments so designed were that the enforcement of foreign tax laws
would be against public policy, that it would be undesirable, in the
interests of international comity, for the courts to inquire whether
such laws were in accord with the policy of the domestic State, that
such laws are akin to penal laws, which are denied ex trap-territorial
effect, and, finally, that the courts would be reluctant to enforce
intricate foreign tax systems or to involve themselves generally in
3
the inconvenience of hearing foreign tax cases.
However, there was one explanation for the rule which seemed to
Mr. Justice Vieyra to bo 'fundamental and unexceptionable'. He quoted
with approval the dictum of Lord Keith in Government of India:
1. 'It can hardly be regarded as a matter of comity that the courts of
this country will not entertain a suit by a foreign State to enforce
its revenue laws': per Viscount Simonds in Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia
(1944) Ltd., [1958] A.C. 301 at 310 (H.L.).
2. Relevant arguments were listed in the Missouri Court of Appeals case
of State ex ral. Oklahoma Tax Commisaion v. Rodgers, (1946) 193 S.W.
(2d) 919, a case on the recognition of revenue laws of ' one state
of the United States in another. The case is discussed at length in
T.B. Stoel.'The Enforcement of Foreign. Non-criminal Penal and Revenue
Judgments in Cngland and the United States' (1967). 16 I.C.L.Q. 663
at 668, 675-7.
3. McFarland. supra, at 472-3.
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•One explanation of the rule thus illustrated may be thought to
be that enforcement of a claim for taxes is but an extension of
the sovereign power which imposed the taxes, and that an assertion
of authority by one State within the territory of another, as
distinct from a patrimonial claim by a foreign sovereign, is (treaty
or convention apart) contrary to all concepts of independent
sovereignties.•^
After citing further authority on territorial sovereignty Mr. Justice
Vieyra concludes;
•To allow a foreign State, whether directly or indirectly, to
obtain a judgment for taxes imposed on all those who in its eyes
share in the economic or social life of that State, in the courts
of another country, would be a judicial intervention in direct
2
derogation of that country's territorial supremacy.'
This approach iinds support, too, in the 1964 Canadian case of the United
3
States of America v. Harden. The dictum of Lord Keith set out above
A C
is quoted in this case also. It is also propounded in Dicey and Morris.3
1. Government of India.,L19551 1 All E.R. 292 (H.L.) at 299» quoted in
McParland, supra, at 473.
2. At 474.
3. (1964) 41 D.L.R. (2d.) 721.
4. At 724-5.
5* On. cirt. .supra, p.78.
I submit that this currently popular sovereignty argument for the
non-enforcement of foreign tax laws and judgments on which Mr. Justice
Vieyra places so much reliance, is fundamentally defective. Put at its
simplest, this argument merely propounds the uncontentious view that,
as every State has sovereignty over its own territory, it is under no
legal obligation to enforce the revenue laws or decrees of another State.
As a corollary, no State may claim legal effect for its revenue laws
within the territory of another State. There may, of course, be excep¬
tions, as, for instance, under tax conventions. No one, it can safely
be said, doubts the general validity of these propositions. But the
question here is not whether our State is obliged to apply foreign
revenue laws but whether it is desirable that we should give effect in
our own courts to these laws. Our courts apply foreign law to many
disputes coming before thsm that involve foreign elements. This is not
because international law compels this, but because our own sovereign,
if one may use Austinian terms, so commands through Ms choice-of-law
rules. Thus in the case of a person dying intestate domiciled abroad,
our courts will apply the deceased's foreign domiciliary law to determine
e
succession to his local movable estate. To do this voluntarily does not
involve a loss of sovereignty; our sovereign could, at any time, revoke
this rule. The question here, then, is: What should our sovereign
command Ms courts to do as regards the enforcement of foreign revenue
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laws? The sovereignty argument misses the point, and is irrelevant in
the present context.^ Savigny makes this point rather well. Of
conflicts problems he says:
"Jlany have attempted to determine these questions by the
principle of independent sovereignty alone, laying down the
two following postulates:
(1) Every state is entitled to demand that its own laws only
shall be recognised within its bounds}
(2) Ho state can reqxiire the recognition of its laws beyond its
bounds.
I will not only admit the truth of these propositions, but even
allow their extension to the utmost conceivable limits; yet I
2
believe they afford little help in the solution of our problems".
The fact that the sovereignty argument is not sound does not mean
that there are no other arguments worthy of consideration for refusing
to enforce foreign revenue laws. It is proposed now to examine each of
these arguments; the reader will be able to fox® his own opinion on the
correctness of Mr. Justice Vieyra's view that these other arguments are
generally unconvincing.
1. On the sovereignty approach generally, see A.E. Anton, Private
International Law (1967) 32.
2. Savigny, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, translated by Guthrie
(2nd ed., 1880) 68.
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One argument may be called *the expense and inconvenience' approach.
It is as follows: Our courts would spend valuable time in hearing foreign
tax cases, which could well involve complex questions of foreign law.
Such cases would involve the State in expense and bring unwelcome
additional work to the already often overcrowded courtsJ However, no
State would be likely to sue abroad if it could litigate in its own
2
courts, and the burden of hearing foreign tax cases would be offset,
at least in part, by the advantage of having certain of one's own revenue
3
actions heard abroad. If the burden became too heavy, steps could then
be taken to alleviate the position.^ In many other fields our courts
have to involve themselves in the complexities of foreign legal systems
because our choice of law rules so direct. To do so is, no doubt, an
inconvenience, but -this in itself is not a sound reason for refusing to
5
undertake such an investigation where considerations of justice require it.
1. Kahn, on cit, supra, 278; Stoel, op. cit. supra. 677; A. I. Albrecht
, 'The Enforcement of Taxation Under International Law1 1953 (30) B.Y.B.I.I
454 at 463; Leflar. op.cit. supra. 218; Lord Somervell in Taylor.
supra^at 301.
2. Leflar, op.cit. supra;218; Stoel op. cit. supra. 677.
3. Stoelj at 677.
4. Albrecht, op, cit. supra. 463; Leflar, op. cit. supra 219.
5. Albrecht, at 463; Leflar, at 218; Kahn, at 278.
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Another possibly onerous task for the courts, if foreign revenue
laws are to be enforced, is that of developing the appropriate choice-of-
law rules. If foreign revenue laws were to be enforced by our courts,
this would not mean that a foreign country could tax amy person, whether
linked to that country or not, in respect of assets, wherever situate,
and then expect that such taxes would be enforced by our courts. Rules
would have to be propounded by the courts defining the acceptable field
of operation for the country's tax laws.^ This may well prove a difficult
task, but here again, it is a task undertaken in other fields, and there
2
is no reason to believe it would be unduly burdensome.
As regards the defendant, it can be said that tax litigation abroad
would involve the delays, difficulties and expense of litigating outside
3
the country where the cause of action arose. S toel, however, makes the
1. 'There is no apparent limit to the revenue legislation which any
country may bring into operation, and if all revenue claims were liable
to be enforced in other countries the consequences would be, to put it
no higher, arresting': per Evershed, K.R. in Re Delhi electric Supply,
C1953J 2 All E.R. 1452 at 1456. The official report expresses the
same sentiment in more restrained language - 1954 [Ch»] 131 at 145*
ptftfc. That rules could be developed designating the proper scope of
tax legislation for purposes of external recognition and enforcement
does not seem to have occurred to Evershed, M.R.
2. Leflar, at 218. However, Scoles, op, cit. supra, at 1608 is of the
view that 'tax structures are sufficiently complex and integrated with
national economic policy to make the judicial system an awkward
vehicle for the adjustments and compensations that can be negotiated
and incorporated in tax treaties'.
3. Stoel, at 678.
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not completely convincing point that 'there would be no unfairness to
the defendant in being forced to defend in a forum which he in effect
chose by failing to make himself available in the plaintiff state'.^
He continues: 'In the United States, at least, difficulties in defraiding
and proving facts could be considered according to the normal doctrine of
2
forum non conveniens.•
There may be certain 'procedural stumbling blocks'. For instance,
the procedures created for tax collection may not envisage or be able to
deal with extra-territorial enforcement. Thus the official charged with
the enforcement of a tax law may lack authority to sue extra-territorially.
However, problems of 1his sort 'do not go to 1he fundamental question,
because they can be all removed by any taxing state that sets out to do
3
so'. Again, 'the courts of the forum might find it difficult to hear
claims arising out of certain foreign revenue laws, 3uch as those intended
to be administered by a commission. But most claims could be fully
enforced by an ordinary trial raid money judgment, and where there was no
adequate machinery for enforcement the case could be dismissed under
1. Stoel, at 676; Leflar, at 218.
2. Stoel, at 677. This doctrine is also used by the Scottish courts.
3. Heflar, 217-18. In Sydney Municipal Council v. Bull-.[~19097 1 K.B. 7
it was held that the relevant tax legislation did not envisage or
provide for extra-territorial enforcement of the local tax obligation.
On an analogous situation see
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accepted rules.'^
Two minor matters should be mentioned before considering the next
argument. In this chapter revenue laws and judgments are dealt with
together. In some respects relevant to our present investigation, such
as ease of proof, they may differ, but, on the whole, I would submit it
is both appropriate and convenient to view them together in this way.
Then, some of the arguments put forward by certain writers in this field,
2 3
for example, Leflar and Stoel, are propounded in the context of the
enforcement of revenue laws and judgments as between sister States of a
federation. One must remember, in assessing such arguments, that the
case for enforcement within a federation is probably much stronger 1han
4
is the case fo~ enforcement as between independent States.
The fact that the non-enforcement of foreign revenue laws is a
5
universal practice save internally within federations and within similar
1. Stoel, at 677. See, too, Leflar, at 217-18,
2. Leflar, at 217-18.
3. Stoel, at 677. Scoles^ op. clt.«l608.
4. Leflar, at 222.
5. Weir v. Lohrs(l968) 65 D.L.R. (2d.) 717. On the internal position in
the United States, see Stoel, at 677 and Albrecht, at 463.
57
States founds three arguments against our courts enforcing these laws.
The first argument is that we should not enforce foreign revenue laws
unless foreign States are going to enforce ours; there must be reciprocity.
There is some force in this approach, but a start must be made somewhere
if a reform is to be introduced. The second is that there must be good
reasons for a rule of such universal application. Such an argument may
raise a presumption in favour of the rule, but it does not preclude its
rejection after a careful consideration of the reasons for and against the
rule in present conditions. An old rule such as the present one may be
quite inappropriate in modern circumstances, whatever sense it might have
made when first propounded. Then, last, it is said that there is no real
need to enforce foreign revenue laws, for a State, knowing the rule, can
take precaution to see that its tax laws will not require external
enforcement. Thus, for instance, local incomes can be taxed at source,
taxpayers can be refused permission to leave the country without tax
clearance, and taxes such as import duties or local rates can be secured
against the property, moveable or heritable, to which they relate. The
rule of non-enforcement, then, will encourage States to enaot effective
tax laws and tc create efficient tax collection systems. This may be
true, but in modern conditions it is very difficult to prevent tax
evasion,^ and. this last argument should not be given much weight.
1. Leflar, at 216.
58
An argument for non-enforcement, supported in its more sophisticated
form by that respected American Jurist, Judge Learned Hand/ is based on
public policy. This is a complex argument or group of arguments and has
not always been understood by those referring to it.
The rule on revenue laws and Judgments is thought to owe its origin
2
in England to hostility to foreign tax laws that inhibited free trade.
The enforcement of such laws could be said to be contrary to public
policy, but in modern conditions, with the welfare State, many feel that
3
public policy requires that persons pay their taxes. Some foreign taxes
will, no doubt, prove objectionable, but they could be denied enforcement
4
as being against public policy. This would, however, involve the courts
1. Hoore v. Mitchell .(1929) 30F. (2d) 600 at 604.
2. Kahn, at 275s Kingsmill Moore, J. in Peter Buchanan, supra, at 100}
Evershed, M.R. in Re Delhi Electric Supply^ supra^t 145°; M. Mann^
op, cit.y472.
3. *It may fairly he said that there is a currently developing public
morality which considers the obligation to pay taxes validly imposed
to be as binding as the obligation to pay a private debt voluntarily
undertaken': Leflar, at 216. See, too, McFarland. supra, at 473«
It has been suggested by Evershed, K.R. in Re Relhi Electric Supply,
supra, at 145 'that 'Justice* requires the non-enforcement of all
foreign revenue laws. In reply Albrecht at 462 has asked: 'What
Justice is there in facilitating fiscal evasion by itinerant taxpayers?*
Then at 463 1 states: 'The effect of the present rule can hardly be
said to have produced "Justice" in any of the leading cases.'
4. Albrecht:at 462-3.
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in distinguishing between those foreign tax laws that are acceptable as
not contrary to public policy and those -that are not. But designating
foreign tax laws as contrary to public policy could offend a foreign
Government, embarrass our own Government and damage relations between
them. To disrupt our country's good relations with other States is,
itsolf, contrary to publio policy, a concept wide enough to cover moral,
political and economic interests. Again, for the courts to get involved,
even indirectly, in international politics may be thought to be usurping
the function of the executive. The courts must not, it is argued, involve
themselves in such matters but must leave them to the executive, as they
do, for instance, in the matter of the recognition of new Governments and
States. The only safe approach for the courts, then, is universal rejection}
they must refuse to enforce all revenue laws. The matter of the enforcement
of these laws must be left to Governments to settle by treaty, as is done
with extradition.^
This 'embarrassment approach' is not without its critics. 'One com-
1. 'Nor is modern history without examples of revenue laws used for
purposes which would not only affront the strongest feelings of
neighbouring communities, but which they would view counter to their
political aims -nd vital interests. Such laws have been used for
religious and racial discrimination} for the furtherance of social
policies and ideals dangerous to the security of adjacent countries}
and for the direct furtherance of economic warfare. So long as these
possibilities exist, it would be equally unwise for courts to permit
the enforcement of the revenue claims of foreign States or to attempt
to discriminate between those claims which 1hey would not enforce.
Safety lies only in universal rejection': per Kingsmill Hoore, J. in
Peter Buchanan, supra, at 107. See, too, Kahn, at 277-8.
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mentator has suggested that nations will resent a refusal to hear the
case because the judgment is one for a tax as much as a refusal on
•j
public policy grounds.' But, in the view of Stoel, ' Ltjhe rebuttal
is that only in the latter case is there an element of discrimination
among nations, and it is precisely this element which is likely to have
2
foreign policy repercussions'. A very rough analogy could perhaps be
drawn with the approach to political offences in extradition. Here,
too, safety has been sought in a general approach that denies extradition
in all political crimes, whether the offence has our disapproval or our
approbation.
It may be felt that this argument is overstated and that many,
perhaps most, States are not as sensitive as is suggested. Then, as
already noted, not all tax laws and decrees would be enforced. Rules
would have to be devised determining the proper sphere of foreign tax
legislation. Objectionable tax laws could sometimes be excluded by
these rules without the necessity of invoking the public policy rule, in
the same way that objectionable expropriation laws, claimed to have extra¬
territorial effect, can sometimes be rendered inapplicable by the use of
1. Stoel, at 678, referring to h. Mann, op. cit. supra, at 470-71
note 102. harm's views are shared by Leflar, at 217.
2. Stoel, at 678.
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the fule that title to property is governed by the lex situs.^ Judges
who hesitate to condemn foreign laws as contrary to public policy could
perhaps sometimes find refuge in the already existing practice of
2
designating such laws penal; though this type of semantic malpractice
3
is not to be encouraged, whatever the motive.
The argument that the application of foreign revenue laws would
involve the courts in this task of developing miles defining the
legitimate scope of foreign countries' tax laws and that this would
impose an njustifiable burden on the courts, has already been noted.
It has also been averred that this task would lead to fine distinctions
being drawn between enforceable and unenforceable tax laws and that this
4
could disrupt good relations with foreign States. This is not a new
1. See, for example, Government of the Republic of Spain v. The
national Bank of Scotland Ltd., 1939 S.C. 413. See also Dicey
& Morris.op.cit. supra, 558.
2. Dicey & Morris, 73.
3. Calling laws penal when they are in fact contrary to public policy
in the international sphere can cause confusion, for foreign penal
laws are denied external enforcement but are not refused recognition
as operative within their territory)while foreign laws contrary to
public policy may be denied all recognition, internal and external.
See p.93 infra.
4; Stoel, at 678-9.
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point, but merely another aspect of the public policy argument just
discussed at some length.
A further possible argument on the same lines is that it may prove
very difficult or even impossible for the courts to create satisfactory
rules to operate in this sphere. that taxes should our courts recognize
a foreign State as being entitled to impose? In respect of which
assets and persons should it have this power? These are real problems,
but they do not seem to be insoluble, and I know of no judge or jurist
who has suggested that they are.
As we will s$e' later foreign penal laws are not enforced,1 and
support is drawn from thia rule for the rule relating to foreign revenue
2
laws and decrees. In certain respects these two types of laws are very
3
different, and this has been pointed out on a number of occasions.
However, it is argued that penal laws and revenue laws are analogous in
that they are both branches of public law enacted and enforced by a State
by virtue of its sovereign power. Ihis view is stated in even wider
terms in Dicey and Morris where it is said that foreign tax laws are not
1. See chapter3. ut
2. KcFarland, supra, at 473; Kahnfat 277; Albrecht, at 463; Leflar,
at 219.
3. See the authorities cited in the previous footnote.
6J
enforced, in conformity with the general rule that English courts refuse
to enforce any claim which is 'a manifestation of a foreign State's
sovereign authority'J It is obvious that what we are here faced with
is, in fact, the sovereignty argument that has already been considered.
No new point is being made. This proposition of Dicey and Morris is
2
given further consideration later in this work.
These, then, are the arguments for the non-enforcement of foreign
revenue laws and decrees. It is suggested that they are not convincing.
There are strong moral reasons for enforcing at least some foreign revenue
laws and decrees, and no really nund reasons have been propounded why they
should not be. On the moral position one can do no better than to quote
Leflar:
'The unreasoning and anti-social sympathy which in the past and
even today is often semi-publicly expressed for those who seek
to evade the demands of the tax gatherer cannot stand up under
intelligent analysis. The tax burden is a tolerable thing only
as it is fairly distributed. Complete evasion by some inevitably
increases the burdens of others. An attitude which unnecessarily
fosters and preserves this inequality is indefensible. As the
total tax burden steadily increases by reason of the ever-broadening
areas of governmental activity, the private incentive for avoidance
1. Dicey & Korris, 76; K. Mann, at 469.
2. See p.99 infra.
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and evasion likewise increases, and legal ingenuity coupled with
private trickery tends to keep pace with the incentive. This
very fact is naturally producing some change in public attitude
towards evaders; the demand for fair and scientific allocation
of tax duties is coupled with some demand for thorough and
efficient enforcement of the duties imposed. It may fairly be
said that there is a currently developing public morality which
oonsiders the obligation to pay taxes validly imposed to be as
binding as the obligation to pay a private debt voluntarily under¬
taken. If this be true, it is then also true that legal loop¬
holes permitting evasion of validly imposed tax duties should not
be permitted to continue except insofar as genuinely substantial
reasons require their continuance.'
The exception to the rule of non-enforcement which has developed in
the case of interstate enforcement within a federation suggests that the
traditional rule is not viable where countries are very closely linked.
However, it is interesting to note in this context that English or Scottish
tax judgments will not be enforced in Jersey, Guernsey or the Isle of
Man, nor will such decrees of the courts of these islands be recognised
2
in England and Scotland. There is, of course, reciprocal enforcement as
between the constituent elements of the United Kingdom. Again, the
Convention of 27 September i960 on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Civil
1. Leflar, op. cit.a2l6.
2. North., op. cit„ 668. 669.
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and Commercial Judgments, designed, among other things, to facilitate
the enforcement of decrees of courts of countries in the European
Economic Community in other member states of the community, does not
apply to tax decrees.1 These instances perhaps suggest that 1he evasion
of tax liability in fact resulting from the non-enforcement rule does
not present a problem to States, however inequitable individual instances
of such evasion may seem. Against this, it is true that a significant
2
number of conventions providing for external enforcement do exist,
though thfcxr popularity seems to be on the wane. It is generally agreed
that the only practical way of now providing for the enforcement of foreign
revenue laws and decrees would be by legislation, preferably based on
bilateral or multilateral international agreements. These could ensure
reciprocity and could be specially adopted to fit the requirements of
particular situations - it may be desirable to vary the degree and type
of recognition afforded as between different States, as is done in
extradition. As in so many fields of private international law, one can
only await future developments with keen anticipation.
In conclusion, I would like to deal shortly with the characterisation
problem that arises in these cases concerned with foreign revenue laws.
1. These are excluded as not being decrees obtained in civil and
commercial matters. See Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co.
Kg. v. hurocontrol, [1977/1] C.K.L.H. 88 (European Ct.). See
infra.
2. (1950) 50 Columbia L.R. 491.
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It has already been observed that the question whether or not a law is
a revenue one is a matter for the lex fori though the relevant law should
be viewed in the context of its own system.* It has also been noted that
2
many different mlcs requiring payment have been designated revenue laws.
3
Dicey and Morris lists the following types of laws requiring payment as
having been held to be revenue laws: rules imposing an income tax, a
customs duty, a stamp duty, a succession duty, a municipal contribution,
a capital gains tax, a profits levy and a compulsory contribution to a
state insurance scheme. The conclusion in Dicey and Morris is that,
although a revenue law has not been specifically defined in this context
by the courts, it "would appear to be a rule requiring a non-contractual
payment of money or kind in favour of the State or some department or
subdivision thereof."'* However, "exchange control regulations, moratorium
laws and rules abrogating gold clauses, which do not provide for the
collection of money but merely for the protection of its value, have not
5
been so treated."*^
1. See p«43> supra.
2. See P«43, supra.
3. Dicey and Morris, op. cit. supra, 78.
4. Dicey and Morris, 78.
5. Dicey and Morris, 78. On the proper approach to foreign exchange
control regulations see also Re Lord Cable (deceased). L1976U 3 All
E.R. 417, 422-3, 433-4; Sing Batra v. Kbtahim. "The Times" May 3,
1977, C.A., [1977 ] 5 C.L."3&n "
67
This definition in Dicey and Korris of revenue laws may be stated
in rather broader terms. What must be distinguished are pecuniary
claims by a state* based on ordinary private law grounds, the sort
of claims that can arise between private individuals in fields like
contract, delict, unjustified enrichment or succession, and these other
pecuniary claims which can only be brought by the state. The first
category may be called private law claims, the second category, public
law claims. It is clearly only this second category of pecuniary claims
2
by the e ate that can be designated revenue claims. Even within this
category it is arguable that certain claims should be allowed. These
are state claims, in this category, for payment for a specific service
rendered to die debtor. These claims may be analogous to enrichment
3
or other private law claims, but they are clearly public law claims.
The point that these state claims should perhaps be allowed has been
4
made by North who states:
"It may even be questioned whether such a decision as that reached
in Municipal Council of Sydney v. Bull accords with the grov?ing practice
1. The position in respect of claims by a state to specific property has
been discussed in the section of the chapter on penal laws which deals
with expropriatory laws.
2. Some of the claims ostensibly falling into the fijjst category may still
be revenue where they are, in fact, disguised revenued claims. See
U.S.A. v. Harden, referred to at p.43 of this work.
3. In Scots law, and certainly in some, perhaps many, other systems, an
enrichment claim is a residual claim; it can only be brought where
the law does not provide some other remedy. Thus, in these systems,
where a state has an exclusive claim provided by legislation, there is
no possibility of die state bringing any private law enrichment action
in respect of that same claim. Yarney (Scotland) Ltd. v. Burgh of
Lanark, 1976 S.L.T. 46; F.C. Finance Ltd. v. Brown & Son. 1969 S.L.T.
(Sh. Ct.) 41.
4. North, op. cit, supra. 136.
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of States and their subordinate bodies to furnish services in return for
payment. The distinction is not obvious between, say, a claim for unpaid
water rates and a claim by a state owned railway to recover the charge
•j
due for goods carried."
I should, perhaps, add that in Municipal Council of Sydney v.
2
Bull the claim designated revenue in nature was claim by a local
authority for a compulsory contribution to the costs of improvements to a
street inst the owner of a house within the improvement area.
3
F.A. Kann makes this same point. He postulates two general
exceptions to the non-enforcement of these foreign public law claims.
Of the first he says:
"The first case occurs where a foreign State has made payments or
conferred benefits under its social security legislation or otherwise
rendered services and by the terns of the legislation is entitled to
repayment. In 3uch a case the original payment or other benefit may be
said to have been received on the footing of the statutory terms, i.e.,
on terms which contemplate repayment and which are in the nature of what
1, North here is obviously of the view that this claim for carriage charges
would not be classified as a revenue claim but this is not necessarily
the case - see p.74, post.
2. u19093 1 K.B. 7. It is not clear from the report to what extent the
owner benefitted from the improvements.
3. (1971) I Hague Recueil 115 at 173.
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one may almost describe as an implied, condition. If the foreign
State enforces the terms of the payment, it can hardly be said to do so
.jure im erii, by virtue and in the form of a sovereign command. The
claim is rather of a quasi-contractual nature and for this reason ought
to succeed."''
inann's argument here is certainly a tenable one although he has rather
overstated his case. There is now a decision supporting this approach.
2
It is the Canadian case of Weir v. Lohr. In this case it was held
that rules, legislative in origin, entitling a province to recover medical
expenses, incurred in respect of a compulsory contributor to a state
health scheme, from the contributor where he has recovered from the
3
wrongdoer, are not revenue laws. Here, as was noted in the case, the
province's claimfcunded on a legislative provision of public law is closely
analogous to that arising in favour of an insurer where an insured,
indemnified by the insurer, is also compensated for the same loss by the
wrongdoer. The province's claim here would clearly fall within the wide
1. At 173. Harm gives examples at 173-4 of the type of claim he has
in mind.
2. (1968) 65 D.L.R. (2d.) 717.
3. There was an alternative ratio: the rule on the non-enforcement of
foreign revenue laws does not apply as between the provinces of a
state.
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definition of revenue laws considered earlier. However, some adjustment
of the traditional approach to exclude claims like this one from the
definition of revenue laws would, perhaps, be an improvement,
F.A. Mann's second exception "arises where the plaintiff State has
not made a payment to the defendant, but discharged one of his liabilities"^.
An example Mann gives of such a claim is that available to a state, against
a husband who has failed to support his wife, in respect of a refund of
2
social security payments made to her by the state. Mann feels that this
exception is a more doubtful case than the first but again argues that this
is not really a public law claim. One can, at least, concede that there
seems no reason in principle why the two types of cases should be distinguished.
Mann believes that there is substantial Continental authority supporting his
second exception though there would not appear to be cases from the English-
speaking world in favour of this exception.
Distinguishing between claims that fall into these exceptional
categories and those which are properly designated revenue claims is not
easy. This is illustrated by the Scottish case of Metal Industries (Salvage)
3
Ltd. v, b.T."Earle". F.A. Mann comments on this case as follows:
Mann, op. cit. supra. 174. All the references to Mann in this
paragraph are to this article of his at 174-5*
2, If a husband has no duty to support his wife but is still liable under
statute to reimburse the state for doing so, the situation ihat arose
in Iman Din v. National Assistance Board. ^967j 2 Q.B. 217, then,
presumably, this state claim would not be covered by Mann's second
exception.
3* 1962 S.L.T. 114.
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"...no difficulty arises where the foreign State claims the
payment of contributions to statutory schemes providing health, un¬
employment, old age, family or similar benefits. Such contributions
due from nationals or residents of the foreign State are in the nature
of taxes and, in principle, cannot, therefore, be recovered extraterritori¬
ally. This was, indeed so decided in a Scottish case. A French ship
was sold in Scotland. The proceeds were paid into Court. Part of them
was claimed by the French State in respect of contributions due from the
owners of the ship as employers under State schemes for health, insurance
and family benefits. Lord Cameron held that these were "nothing more
nor less than taxes or at least charges or impositions of a like nature
and that the sums so levied form part of the revenue of the State".
Accordingly they were held to be irrecoverable. The decision merits
respectful approval."^
The contrary view is also tenable. Mann, as we have already seen,
is of the view that a state's claim to be reimbursed by those benefitting
from social security services rendered to them is not a revenue claim,
but he views claims for contributions paid in advance for such benefits,
contributions rather like insurance payments, as being revalue in nature.
The distinction is surely not sound.
If some of these public law claims are not to be treated as revenue
1. F.A. Mann, op. cit. supra, 173.
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in nature, it does not follow that all such claims will he enforced by
our courts. It will have to be determined in what circumstances such
a claim by a foreign state will be viewed as legitimate and thus
enforceable in our courts.^ A similar problem arises in respect of
2
State claims to moveable property. We will see later that such claims
are characterised as relating to title to moveable property, a juridical
category governed by the lex situs at the relevant time. It is only
where the claimant state's expropriatery law is part of the lex situs
at the relevant time that it will be applied. Again a claim by a
foreign state to take moveables on intestacy as the ultimus heres has,
3
in one controversial case, been characterised as being an intestate
succession to moveables claim available only where the government claiming
is that of the deceased's last country of domicile. How then are these
non-revenue public law claims to payment to be characterised? Presumably
by finding the private law claims to which they are closest in nature
and giving them the same characterisation. A difficulty here is that
t, A similar problem which would arise if foreign revenue claims were
enforced was discussed earlier in this chapter. Seep. 54. supra.
2. See pp.88 - of this work.
3. In re haldonando (deceased), L1954)P.223. In this case the approach
was adopted that characterisation of the rule of foreign law in
question was a matter for the foreign lex causae. See Anton, op.
clt. supra, at 517.
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many such, claims will be found to be similar to claims based on unjustified
enrichment and as there are a large number of different enrichment situations
spread throughout the private law field, the choice of law rules on this
topic are far from settled.
A recent decision of the Court of Justice of the E.E.C. provides no
support for the view that certain claims by public law bodies which are not
private law claims but are analogous to them, should not be treated as
revenue laws. In this case, the Eurocontrol case,1 the European
Organisation for the safety of Air Navigation claimed payment from an
air transport firm of charges which the organisation had levied for the
use of its facilities by the firm. The pursuer had obtained a decree in
his favour in the Belgian courts and then sought to have the decree
enforced in Germany under the provisions of the Jurisdiction and Judgments
2
Convention of 1968. Whether this could be done depended on whether
the claim and the subsequent decree fell within the category "civil and
commercial matters" because the convention only applied to such matters.
been the court
In Belgium it had.-,ruled that the convention was applicableAholding that
1» Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. Kg. v. Eurocontrol, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R.
Sl (European Gt.). An interesting aspect of this case, not relevant
here, is that it provides a rare example of characterisation by
autonomous concepts.
2. The Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement
of Civil andjCommercial Judgments.
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"the determinative factor must be that the payment of the charges is
ascribable to operations which must be described as commercial."^ The
Court of Justice reached a contrary conclusion. It ruled: "Although
certain judgments given in actions between a public authority and a
person governed by private law may fall within the area of application
of the Convention, this is not so where the public authority acts in the
exercise of its powers. Such is the case in a dispute which, like that
between the parties to the main action, concerns the recovery of charges
payable by a person governed by private law to a national or international
body governed by public law for the use of equipment and services provided
by such body, in particular where such use is obligatory and exclusive.
This applies in particular where the rate of charges, the methods of
calculation and the procedures for collection are fired unilaterally in
relation to the users, as is the position in the present case where the
body in question unilaterally fixed the place of performance of the oblig¬
ation at its registered office and selected the national courts with
2
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the performance of the obligation."
t. At 91.
2. At 101. On this approach it would seem possible to argue that charges
levied by nationalised industries in the United Kingdom for providing
gas, electricity, postal and telephone services are not to be viewed
as "civil and commercial". Whether if they fall outwith this category
they are necessarily revenue claims is not clear although there are
some indications in the report of the case that this would be the
position.
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Multi-national corporations and other powerful commercial
organisations may also have this power to dictate terms to their
customers hut their claims will, presumably, not be treated as revenue
claims unless they are public bodies. Independent states, states and
provinces of federations, regional, district and other local government
bodies, international and multi-national organisations set up by states
and departments and agencies of all these will, no doubt, be designated
public bodies and, presumably, statutory bodies set up to run nationalised




"A penal rule is merely a rule which it is contrary to English
» 2
public policy to apply,...
The rule that foreign revenue laws and decrees will not be
enforced was considered in the last chapter. There is a similar
closely related rule that denies application to foreign penal laws and
decrees and its consideration is the subject of this chapter.
Significantly different foreign laws and decrees are characterised as
penal and it is intended, in this chapter, to identify and to assess the
significance of these various categories of penal laws and decrees.
The leading authority on the proper approach to foreign penal laws
is the Privy Council case of Huntington v. Attrill (1893)» an appeal
from Canada. In this case the appellant lent money to a New York
company of which the respondent was an officer. Subsequently he sued the
respondent in a New York court for the unpaid balance of the loan founding
4
his claim on section 21 of a local statute on companies which provided
1. On these generally see: Anton, Private International Law (1967) p.89
and pp.583-4; North, Cheshire's Private International Law (9th ed.,
1974) pp.137-148; Dicey and Morris. Conflict of Laws (9th ed., 1973)
PP.73-78, 82-83, 231-233, 1037, 1038, 1041; Morris, Conflict of Laws
(1971) pp.332-339, 509, 512-515? Graveson, Conflict of Laws (7th ed..
1974) pp.177-178.
2. M. Maim ,(1956) 42 Tr. Grotius Soc. p.133 at p.146.
3. r1893J A.C. 150. For the parallel United States case, see 146 U.S.
657 (1892).
4. Cap.611 of 1875, New York State.
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that*
"If any certificate or report made, or public notice given, by
the officers of any such corporation, shall be false in any
material representation, all the officers who shall have
signed the same shall be jointly and severally liable for
all the debts of the corporation contracted while they are
officers thereof.^
His action was successful and he was awarded $100,240. Having failed to
recover payment in New York State, he sought to have the decree enforced
in Ontario by its High Court. He was unsuccessful, it being held that
the legislation was penal and thus unenforceable in the courts of a foreign
State. However, although his appeal to the Appeal Court was dismissed by
a majority, he was successful on appeal to the Privy Council it being there
held that the provision was not penal.
Their Lordships in their opinion, delivered by Lord Watson, advised
that the decision whether or not a law was penal was for the lex fori and
2
not for the legal system of the state in which the cause of action arose.
The rule to be applied, they held, was that "..... crises, including in
that term all breaches of public law punishable by pecuniary mulct or
otherwise, at the instance of the State Government, or of someone representing
the public, are local in this sense, that they are only cognizable and
t• Huntington, at 153.
2. At 154-155* Justice Barton had reached a contrary conclusion in
the Appeal Court, Their Lordships* conclusion is in accord with the
generally accepted approach that characterisation is for the lex fori.
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punishable in the country where they were committed. Accordingly no
proceeding, even in the shape of a civil suit, which has for its object
the enforcement by the State, whether directly or indirectly, of punishment
imposed for such breaches by the lex fori, ought to be admitted in the
Courts of any other country."^ The expression "penal actions", so often
used in this context is inaccurate as it " may embrace penalties for
infractions of general law which do not constitute offences against the
State; it may for many legal purposes be applied with perfect propriety
to penalties created by contract; and it therefore, when taken by itself,
fails to mark that distinction between civil rights and criminal wrongs
2
which is the very essence of the international rule." "All the provisions
of Kunicipal Statutes for the regulation of trade and trading companies
are presumably enacted in the interest and for the benefit of the community
at large; and persons who violate these provisions are, in a certain
sense, offenders against the State law, as well as against individuals who
may be injured by 1heir misconduct. But foreign tribunals do not regard
these violations of statute law as offences against the State, unless their
vindication rests with the State itself, or with the community which it
1, At 156. A fine for entering into an agreement to restrict competition
or to fix prices contrary to article 85 of the E.E.C. treaty is a
penalty under s.l4(l) of the Civil Evidence Act 1966 even though the
fine is recovered in civil proceedings - see Re Westlnghouse Electric
Corporation. [1977J 3 All E.R. 703 (C.A.) and Re Westinghouse Electric
Corporation (Mo. 2). 0.977J 3 All E.R. 717 (cXTI Such fines are
enforceable in the United Kingdom - Re Westinghouse. at 715•
2. At 156.
represents. Penalties may be attached to them, but that circumstance
will not bring them within the rule, except in cases where these
penalties are recoverable at the instance of the State, or of an official
duly authorised to prosecute on its behalf, or of a member of the public
in the character of a common informer. An action by the latter is
regarded as an actio popularis pursued, not in his individual interest
but in the interest of the whole community".^
If one may summarise, a crime is then a breach of public law
punishable at Hie instance of the state or its representative. Laws
creating crimes are penal in this sense and will not be enforced abroad.
Where a private individual institutes the proceedings enforcing the law
he must be doing so in the interests of the whole community as its
representative, even though, it would seem by implication from the use
of the common informer as an example, the penalty goes to him and not to
the state. On this approach it would seem that a law in the United
States of America that provides for a civil action for treble damages
by an injured party for breach of anti-trust laws is probably penal to
the extent that it allows more than single damages, for the extra
"damages" are a penalty for anti-social conduct not compensation for
loss actually suffered. In this situation, unlike that involving the
common informer, the action is not available to any member of the
1. At 157 and 158.
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public but only to the person injured or wronged, but this should not
matter provided the damages are, in whole or in part, a penalty for
anti-social conduct. On this argument exemplary damages in the English
i
law of tort are clearly penal, or part penal. Also clearly penal
would be fines imposed for breach of an interdict or injunction and the
2
forfeiture of the caution required in a case of lawburrows. Foreign
penalty clauses would, presumably, only be enforced to the extent that
they are genuine pre-estimates of the loss suffered, the characterisation
of a claim as penal or not being a matter for the lex fori. Presumably
too, the mere fact that a particular pecuniary claim is competent in
civil proceedings in the forum does not mean that an identical foreign
claim is not penal. Thus it would seem that a foreign award of exemplary
damages in tort should be viewed as penal, even by an English court, that
is, to the extent that it is penal and not compensatory.
This submission runs contrary to the views of two judges on this
matter expressed in the recent nglich case of .... Consortium General
1. On these damages see Rookes v. Barnard. [1964] A.C. 1129, Drane
v. ; vangclou. L1978J 2 All E.R. 437 and Hodgin and Veitch, (1972)
21 I.C.L.P. 119. Exemplary damages are not found in ;.;Cots law.
See Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland (1966) 466-467.
2. On lawburrows see Korrow v. Heil. 1975 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 65.
3. Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law. (2nd ed.f 1975) 613.
8]
Textiles v. ^un & hand Agencies ltd J In this case registration was
sought in ngland of a French judgment under the Foreign Judgments
(Reciprocal nforcement) Act of 1933. The judgment was principally for
the payment of the purchase price for goods sold and delivered plus
interest but, in addition, a sum of F# 10,000 had been awarded for
"resistance abusive" (abusive opposition). This is "a head of damage
which, in France, may be awarded where a defendant has unreasonably refused
2
to pay a claim." One of the defendant's arguments was that part of the
judgment could not be registered as it was penal and that section l(2)(b)
of the act prohibited the registration of any sum payable '"in respect of
a fine or other penalty". The exact nature of this head of damage does
not seem to have been clear to judges but all three judges in the Court
of Appeal held that this award for "resistance abusive" was an award of
compensatory damages and was consequently not a sum payable "in respect of
3
a fine or other penalty." However, Lord Denning, K.R., expressed the
view that "[t]he word 'penalty' in the 1933 Act, means .... a sum payable
to the state by way of punishment and not a sum payable to a private
4
individual, even though it is payable by way of exemplary damages."
1. L1978] 2 All E.H. 339 (a.B.D. and C.-.)
2. 8.A. Consortium Textiles, supra, 34-3-344.
3. At 355» 359 and 362.
4. At 354-355.
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Parker, J. in the court a quo considered that damages for "resistance
abusive" were not "a fine" nor could they be described as an "other
penalty". "They are no more a penalty of the type contemplated than
is interest on damages or indeed exemplary damages. In ny judgment the
penalties referred to are those recoverable for some public wrong and not
by an individual in a civil action for breach of a private right.
It is submitted that this reasoning is faulty. If a distinction
is to be drawn between decrees that are penal and those that are
compensatory, then it must be the purpose of the decree that determines
whether it is penal or compensatory and there is clearly a strong penal
2
element in an award of exemplary damages. The fact that the damages are
recoverable by a private individual against another in respect of a private
wTong does not mean that the damages are not penal.
To return to Huntington: two types of penal law as defined in
this case can be distinguished. The one type is the foreign rule that
is clearly "criminal" because it is recognised as part of the criminal
law. It is applied in criminal proceedings in criminal courts and
enforced by the application of penalties and processes recognised as those
appropriate in criminal matters. The other type of penal rule is enforced
in the civil courts of its country but the consequence of its infraction
is punishment for anti-social conduct not compensation for the injured
party. For such a law to be penal the sanction need not be invoked by
1. At 347.
2. That this is so is conceded by all the judges in Drane v. vangelou.
supra.
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the state nor exacted for its benefit provided that the individual
"pursuer" can be viewed as acting in the interests of the community even
where his motive may be self-enrichment as could well be the case with
the common informer.
To continue with Euntington: The provisions of section 21 were not
penal but gave "a civil remedy only to creditors whose rights the conduct
of the company's officers may have been calculated to injure, and which
is not enforceable by the State or the public".1 "The provisions of
section 21 are in striking <nntrast to the enactments of section 34, which
inflicts a penalty of $100 upon every director or officer of a corporation
with limited liability who authorises or permits the omission of the word
"limited" from its seal, official publications, or business documents. In
that case, the penalty is recoverable "in the name of the people of the
State of New York by the district attorney of the country which the
principal office of such corporation is located, and the amounts recovered
shall be paid over to the proper authorities for the support of the poor
2
of such country". This latter provision is thus clearly penal. The
decision then was that section 21 vaa not penal and that the judgment founded




on it could be accorded recognition in Ontario.
In this case their Lordships were primarily concerned with defining
the nature and scope of the rule on foreign penal laws and decrees.
The reasons for its existence received scant attention. On this one
is referred inter alios, to Story.^ The rule is declared to be
2 3
"international" and to relate to "the law of nations".' It will be
suggested later that this approach is crude and superficial. The fact
that international law accords sovereignty to a state only over its own
territory is, no doubt, good ground for holding that no state is obliged
by law to apply the laws, penal or otherwise, of another state. However,
the question is, not whether a state must apply foreign penal laws, but
whether it should, in certain circumstances, apply them. In other words,
the sovereignty argument begs the question.
There are a number of subsequalt cases in which the approach in
A




2. B.g., at 156.
3. E.g.,at I56.
4. E.g., A ttoraey-General for Canada v. William ^chulze and Co.. (l90l)
9 3.L.T. 4; Banco de Vizvaya v. Don Alfonso de Borbon y Austria [.19353
1 K.B. 140j Schemcier v. Property Resources Ltd.. [[1975] Ch, 273»
5. E.g. Folliot v. Ogden. (1789) 3 Term Rep. 726; Wisconsin v. The
Pellican Insurance Co.. 127 U.S. (20 Davis) 265.
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The prohibition, extends to indirect enforcement,^ and ancillary
2
claims, but the fact the penal laws will not be enforced does not mean
that they are denied all recognition, and the early formulations of the
3
rule are too wide. Thus, for example, a contract void for illegality
under the proper law will not be enforced, and this is so even where the
4
law rendering the contract illegal is penal. Then again penal laws will
5
be recognised as having effect within the territory of their own state,
subject to them not being contrary to public policy.** Foreign Penal laws
will not then be completely disregarded, but they will not be enforced
extra-territorially in another state at the instance of their state or its
representatives.
1. Banco di Viscava v, Don Alfonso de Bordon y Austria, supraj.
Folliot v. Ogden. supra.
2. E.g., expenses: Attorney-General for Canada v. uilliam Schulze and Co.. ,,
supra. But civil compensation awarded in a criminal case is not considers
a penalty: Raulin v. Fischer. £1911] 2 K.B. 43.
3. See for example the dictum in Folliot v. Ogden, supra, referred to in
North at 139.
4. North, supra, at 139? Kahler v. Midland Bank Ltd., Ll95Cfl A.C. 24;
Zivnostenska Banka National Corporation v. Frankman, [1950] A.C. 57?
Re Claim of Eelbert Wagg & Co. Ltd.. L19567 Ch. 323? Oppenheimer v.
Cattermole. '19761 A.C. 249.
5. Luther v. Sagor, 192l] 3 K.B, 532; Princess Paley Olga v. tteisz,
£l929] 1 K.B. 718.
6. This is discussed later in this chapter.
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An examination of the relevant cases discloses that the term "penal
law" is not always used in the sense attributed to it in huntington v.
Attrill. In some cases a foreign law is designated penal where it is
not "criminal" but where it penalises someone, that is, where it imposes
some discriminatory or other unjust disability or incapacity on a person.
No mention of this type of penal law is made in Huntington v. Attrill but
they would appear, as Dioey and Morris suggest,* to belong to a separate
category of penal laws. There are a substantial number of cases which
illustrate this second type of penal law - a survey of these oases can be
2
found in Dicey and Morris - but there is almost no judicial recognition
that a separate class of penal laws is involved. The only directly
relevant judicial comments I have been able to find are those of Romer, J.
*-n frankfurther where he said, "It is true that the legislation in Decree
Number 80 was not penal in the sense which was laid down by the Privy
1, At 73. This distinction does not seem to be made in the other
popular textbooks like North (Cheshire) and Graveson.
2. At 73. The cases there dealt with do not include relevant cases in the
field of expropriation. Those in this latter field are discussed later
in this chapter. A number of cases not in the field of expropriation
cited by Dicey and Morris in this context are of little or no relevance,
e.g., Re Metcalfe's Trusts. (I864) 2 De G.J. & Sm. 122; Sottomayor v.
De Barros. (No.2) (1879J 5 P.D. 94. Scott v. Attorney-General, (1885)
11 P.D. 128., is only relevant if one accepts the explanation of it
offest in Warter. (1890) 15 P.D. 152 at 155, an explanation which, it is
submitted, finds no support in Scott's case itself (See Dicey and Morris,
266). Then other cases cited, though illustrations of the principle in
question, are considered to have been wrongly decided. Cases in this
category are: Worms v. De Valdor. (1880) 49 J* Ch. 26lj Re Selots
Trusts. (l902_ 1 Ch.488; Re Langley's Settlement. (1962] Ch, 541* Oa
them see Morri.s, at 510 and 511. See too, Anton, at 283.
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Council in the cases of Huntington v. Attrill ..... But confiscatory laws
of this character though not strictly penal in the sense laid down by the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, ..... , are regarded here in the
1 2
same light as penal laws, as many cases show". Dicey and Morris suggest
that discriminatory penal laws in contrast to criminal penal laws, are
not enforced because it would be contrary to public policy in private
international law matters to do so and it is to this group of penal laws
that the quotation at the beginning of this chapter refers.
If these "penal laws" are not enforced because they are contrary to
external public policy, as would appear to be the case, a clear distinction
should be made between criminal penal laws and iscriminatory penal laws.
Indeed, the word "penal" could, with advantage, be avoided in the second
type — they oould simply be designated "discriminatory" and thus contrary
to public policy. This would prevent confusion between the two types of
penal laws, confusion which, as explained later in this chapter, can have
unfortunate consequences.
A large group of cases relevant to this field of penal laws ia that
3
relating to confiscatory and other expropriatery forms of foreign
1. Frankfurther v. Exner (W.L«) Ltd.. L1947] Oh. 629 at 656.
2. At 73. See too K. Kann, (1956) 42 Tr. Grotius Soc. 133 at 136 et seq.
3. Various types of expropriatery laws may be distinguished. See Horth,
supra, at 139 and Morris, supra, at 332.
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legislation. These oases will be considered here because, in many, foreign
expropriatory legislation has been denied effect on the ground that it is
penal. It is submitted that there are no private international law rules
dealing specifically and exclusively with expropriatery laws, but that
decisions in this field arc based on wider rules sucn as those on penal laws,
k rule applicable to these expropriation cases is that foreign
emropriatory rules will not bo enforced extra-territorially because the
acquisition end transfer of rights in property ie a matter for the lex situs.
Certain relatively recent cases1' support this proposition and eomo support
2
is to be found in older cases too. However, such laws will be given
3
internal effect, provided they are not penal, in the discriminatory smoe,
or otherwise contrary to public policy.^ Subsequent removal of the
c
properly doesn't affect vesting. In one case extra-territorial effect
1. .g., Tank voor Landel en :>choe va^rt N»V. v. -lateford, l1953jI 1 1 .B.
2461 <3abboux v. Custodian of Israeli Absentee Property. [19541 *
K.R. 145* Coo too, Dicey and I orris, at" 52^, 534, 556*
2. «g., Foillot, :upra. This waa the main ground for the decision in the
judgment ox xord . enyon in which .'.ahhurst, J. concurred and it finds some
slight support in the judgments of Grose, J. t>o, ee also In re
u: aian "ah-i for Foreign Trade. [1933j Ch. 7^5 at 767.
2. " uthcr. supra; rinse. •: ";-aloy PIga. supra; Ilelbert agg, supra, at 244
et sea.
rnmnmm MMHIS
4. '■/' Tallinna i-aevauhisxn;. (1947) BO LI. i • Rep. 99 at 109 and 111;
.TaWiAWt*. a 4- 1 C\*7 ♦ rVmV>©4 v_ +4*.«"rnnnT a V1 HTTK~J & _ f! _ PAQ_
5» Jabbour, supra# at 152; Luther# oupra; LrJLaccca raley Olga# supra#
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was given to legislation requisitioning ships on grounds of public policy,^
but the circumstances were unusual and the case was not followed in a later
2
case. The application of this rule that rights in property are governed
by the lex situs can be complicated by problems relating to the ascertainmenl
3of the situs of property, and by the rule that a foreign government in
4
possession, even illegally, cannot be impleaded.
This rule that transfers of property are governed by the lex situs,
subject to the limitations already mentioned, should suffice to settle
questions of the effect of foreign expropriatory laws. However, other
5
rules have been invoked in this context. One rule applied, or referred to,
in several cases^ may be formulated as follows: Foreign expropriatory laws
will not be enforced extra-territorially where it is not proved that they
are intended to have such effect. This is re-inforced by the rule that
1. Lorentscn, supra. This case was followed in O/Y asa Steamship Go. Ltd,
v. newspaper Pulp & Ifood "xport Ltd.^(1949) 82 11. L.R. 956.
2. Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart N.V.. supra.
3. Morris, 333.
4. North, 144. A good illustration of the application of this rule is
provided by Government of the Republic of Spain v. National Bank of
Scotland. 1939 3.C. 413.
5. These are discu.sed in the following pages of this chapter. A
further possible rule is diseased in Chapter 4 at p. 10].
6. B.g. Lecouturier v. Hey (l9l3 A.C. 262 at 263 and 267; The JupViter
(no .slT 11927J R122 and [l927jR251. lorcntzen v. Lydden & Co. Ltd.,
[1942J 2 K.B. 202 at 215. — "
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legislation is presumed not to be extra-territorial in operation/
This main rule is unnecessary in view of the rule that transfers of
property are governed by the lex situs. Under this rule exproprlatory
legislation claiming external operation can never have such effect. The
main rule's use is also contrary to the generally accepted approach of
our system to the solution of oonflicts. The usual approach to such
problems is to characterise the matter in dispute and then to ascertain
the lex causae by the application of the choice of law rule to which
juridical category selected as appropriate belongs. Whether property
has been expropriated or not should, if one adopts this approach, be
characterised as a matter of the transfer of property, governed by the
lex situs at the relevant time. The lex situs should be then applied
to the problem but subject to the rules of the lex fori that exclude
otherwise applicable rules of the lex causae. Here the process is being
short-circuited by the court holding that no extra-territorial effect can
be given to a foreign law that does not claim to have such an effect.
This is a very different approach to conflicts of laws problems and other
2
examples of it are not common. Indeed, it is far from generally
1. Jabbour (P & K) v. Custodian of Israeli Absentee Property. fl954] 1 All
E.R. 145 at 150 and the authorities there cited. The existence and
strength of this presumption should however, surely be a matter for the
lex causae?
2. In Municipal Council of Sydney v. Bull, C1909J 1 K.B. 7 it was held that
am alternative ground for refusing to enforce a foreign revenue law was
that the legislation on which the claim was based did not envisage
extra-territorial enforcement of the claim. See also Mount Albert
Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance etc. Society. £1938'] A.C. 224.
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established that a foreign lex causae will not be applied because it
considers itself inapplicable. Some support for this approach is,
however, found in the English •foreign court' theory and other theories
allowing renvoi. In terms of these the fact that the indicated foreign
system considers itself inapplicable and refers the matter to some other
system may be accepted by the forum. Another analogous approach is to
be found in the use, in America, of the idea of •false conflicts'.* The
approach here is that it may be found, on an examination of the policy
behind the relevant rules of the competing systems, that one of the systems
has no interest in governing the matter and that the other system's rules
should consequently be applied. However, this seemingly simple solution
to some conflict problems raises serious difficulties.
A further rule, and the one of considerable relevance in this context,
is that foreign expropriatory rules will not be enforced where they are
penal. A survey of the cases shows that both types of penal cases, the
Huntington type and the discriminatory type, are to be found. Each type
will be considered separately but first, two general points. A great many
of these cases could have been decided on the basis of rule that the
acquisition and transmission of rights in property is a matter for the lex
2
situs. However, they were not. Then, although the distinction can be
1. Korris, 542-546.
2. See e.g. Banco di Vizcaya. supra; Government of the Republic of Spain.




made between these two types of penal cases in this field, it has already
been pointed out that the distinction is rarely made in the cases them¬
selves.^ Indeed, the two types are treated as one, and as will be seen
later, the rule on penal laws is stated in cases on discriminatory lawB
in a form only appropriate where the foreign law in question is penal in
the Huntington sense.
A foreign expropriatory rule will not be enforced where it is penal
in the Huntington sense. The obvious example is the case Banco di Viscaya
2
v. Don Alfonso de Borbon y Austria. However, as already noted, it will
not be denied all recognition unless perhaps it is penal in the other sense
or in some other way contrary to public policy.
A foreign expropriatory law will not be recognised where it is penal
3
in the sense of being discriminatory. Views on the characteristics which
make an expropriatory rule penal in this sense have changed with the years
and consequently there is some conflict in the authorities.* Where an
1. Morris, 367.
2. I 1935 1 K.B. 140. Folliot, supra, can be explained on this basis in
that^plnal law there considered authorized confiscation of property
for treason.
3* Wolff, supra; In re Fried Krupp A/G. £3.917.] 2 Ch. 188; Government of
the Republic of ..pain, su.ra; Lorentzen. supra; Frankfurther, supra:
Hovello & Co., supra; The Rose I4ary1 (l953l 1LW.L.R.; 246. as explained
by Upjohn, J. in Re Ilelbert Wagg and Co. Ltd*s Claim ,[1956, Oh* 323 at
346 - see Morris, 566; Jabbour, supra; Helbert Viagg. supra.
4. In some cases it was suggested that expropriation without compensation,
or expropriation of foreigners* property without compensation, was
penal in the discriminatory sense. But see Helbert Wagg. supra, at
347 and 349,
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expropriatory law is penal in this sense it is sometimes designated
"confiscatory".1 This rule is thought to be based on public policy and
2
this finds some support in a dictum of Lord MacDermott in Kahler to the
effect that expropriatory rules will not be recognised if they are contrary
to public policy. If this is the true basis of these cases, then for them
the rule should not be stated in an extra-territorial f oim as a foreign
rule contrary to public policy will generally be denied all recognition,
3
not only extra-territorial effect. However, as mentioned earlier, there
is a tendency to confuse this type of penal case with the Huntington sort
and thus to state the penal rule in "discriminatory" cases in the extra¬
territorial form and to found it on sovereignty and international law
theories of territoriality.* This misunderstanding of the double nature
of the penal rule and the essential differences in the policy behind the
5
two applications of the rule could result in bad decisions.
1. Lorentz^n. supra: Hovello & Co., supra; The Hose nary, supra; Kahler
v. Midland Bank, j 195o"j A.C. 24 at 4&;" Jabbour. supra, at 157.
2. At 43-44.
3. This is subject to the "contacts approach" discussed in the chapter on
public policy.
4. See, for example, Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison in Government of the
Republic of Spain, supra,at 426. See also Frankfurther. supra, at
636-7 and 644.
5. M. Mann,(1956) 42 Tr. Grotius Soc. 133 at 137, et seq.
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Are these rules oil foreign penal laws satisfactory? As regards
the discriminatory type of law, it has already been suggested that
confusion can result from the designation of these as being "penal"
and that it would be better to refuse to apply them as being contrary to
external public policy. Subject to this, the basic approach to this
type of penal case seems sound, although, as already noted, individual
decisions may be questioned on their facts.
As regards the Huntington type of penal rule, a substantial list
of reasons justifying the refusal to enforce such a rule extra-
territorially can be given.1 In the cases, however, judicial authority
for the exclusion is usually reviewed without any real considerations of
the policy behind it. The main reason given in the cases for excluding
these rules is based on the territoriality argument which has, with
the other reasons suggested, been considered at some length in the chapter
of this work dealing with foreign revenue laws. These matters are not
dealt with here because the problems raised by the non-application of
foreign penal laws of a criminal nature have been solved, to a
substantial extent, by other techniques. Thus a foreign criminal may
be extradicted or refused entry or deported, while legislation may
1. See Stoel, "The Enforcement of Foreign IIon-Criminal Penal and.
Revenue Judgments in Kngland and the United States". 1967 (66)
I.C.L.Q. 663 at 668.
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provide that a citizen who commits a serious crime abroad may be
prosecuted for it in his own country and under its criminal law.^ It
may be said that, if these other techniques were not available, the rule
2
denying effect to foreign penal laws could not be maintained.
1. See, for example, seation 6 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act
1975.
2. Leflar, "Extra-state inforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims",
(1932) 46 Harv. L.ft. 193 at 201.
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CHAPTER 4
GENERALISATION OP THE RULES OK PENAL AND REVENUE LAWS
".... to present revenue laws, criminal laws, "political laws",
or public law in general as categories comparable to those where a
foreign rule of law, applicable in principle under the choice of law
rules of the forum, is excluded because it is found incompatible with
the "fundamental policy" of the forum is hardly logical. Firstly,
the legislation in every country includes tax laws, laws embodying
currency restrictions, "loi3 de police", penal codes, etc. These
public law rules are certainly looked upon by most governments as
justifiable and decent and part of the "fundamental policy" of any
civilised country, even if of en disliked by at least some of its
citizens. If similar foreign laws or legal rules are not being
applied, the reasons must be other than those evoked in support of
ordre public".^
In the first chapter we saw that it 1ms been claimed that the
rules on foreign revenue and penal laws, the rul^s denying them
extra-territorial effect, and certain other rules in the Conflict of
1. Hilding ek,(l973) II Hague Recueil 25
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Laws, are crystallisations of the public policy rule, that is the
rule denying application to foreign laws contrary to external public
policy.1 However, a rather different picture emerges from our
examination of these two rules in the last two chapters. It cannot
be said that many foreign revenue or penal laws are contrary to
external public policy, the forum has similar bodies of law often
with many similar if not identical rules, why then are these foreign
laws excluded? The short answer is that our courts have decided,
for policy and other reasons, in general to onforce foreign law only
in private law matters and to exclude certain foreign laws in the
public law sphere from enforcement unless otherwise instructed by
the government usually through legislation. As we have seen in the
previous two chapters, especially us regards revenue laws, a number
of separate factors have contributed to this widely adopted approach
and it is not intended to review them again here at any length.
As regards the rule on foreign revenue laws, we saw that,
although external public policy had played a vital role in the rule's
creation, it cannot be said to be a significant f'.ctor in the rules
continued existence, though those who accept the sophisticated forn
1. See p. 6» supra.
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of the public policy argument as propounded by Judge Learned Hand,
among others, will consider that it is still of substantial importance
in this context.
The rule on foreign penal laws again cannot be said to be
based on the external public rule, but some confusion has lbreen caused
in this regard by the courts sometimes designating foreign laws,
contrary to external public policy, as "penal" in the sense that they
discriminate unjustly against some person or group of persons. But
if one discounts this group of penal laws, improperly so called, the
objection to the enforcement of foreign penal laws, like foreign
revenue laws, is not that they are contrary to external public policy,
but that they fall within a sphere where the courts do not apply
foreign laws unless instructed oy their governments so to do. The
enforcement of foreign law is generally an extraordinary practice of
sophisticated legal systems and the courts move cautiously in this
field. They sec dangers and problems in the external enforcement of
foreign penal and revenue laws. Thus they only do this where so
instructed by the government. In the penal sphere, and to a lesser
degree in the revenue field, governments have acted in various ways
to fill the resulting gapsj
1. See PP. 57 and 94.
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A question this raises is the following: What is the extent
of this field in which the courts do not intrude save at the instance
of the government or legislature? Or, to put the question in more
specific form: Can the rules on the non-enforcement of foreign
revenue and penal laws and certain other like rules be generalised,
as is averred in Dicey and Morris^ into a rule that our courts will
not enforce, either directly or indirectly, a public law of a foreign
state? Such a general rule would appear to prevail on the Continent
but is it part of the law of Scotland and England?
A full answer to this question would be a very lengthy task and
it will not be attempted here. P.A. Mann has written at 3ome length,
2
and in some depth, on this matter. He argues strongly for generalisation.
However, there are some difficulties with generalisation and it is on
these that I would like to dw..?ll shortly.
Two points should be noted to place this matter in perspective.
The first i3 that, although the courts will not enforce foreign public
laws or, more accurately, certain categories of foreign public laws,
1. Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, (9th ed., 1^3) 75» Rule 3.
2. 'Prerogative Rights of Foreign States and the Conflict of laws',
(1954) 40 Tr. Grotius Society, 23: 'Conflict of Laws and Public
Law', (1971) I Hague Rec'ucil, 107-19^
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they are not denied all effect. It is said that they can be "applied"
in suitable circumstances even though they cannot be "enforced". I-iore
of this later.
The second point, and one made earlier, i3 that the courts'
refusal to enforce these groups of foreign public laws is, of course,
subject to legislation to the contrary - they will enforce such laws
if instructed to do so by the government, in appropriate form, usually
by legislation. The courts are not saying that all of these laws
should not be enforced, merely that it is up to the government to
decide which of these rules should be so treated and then to give effect,
in appropriate form, to such a decision. As F.A. Mann points out, the
government, but not the courts, has the opportunity of making reciprocal
arrangements for enforcement vi ,h foreign states.^
I submit that one should proceed with caution in the matter of
generalisation in this field - generalisation may be premature or,
indeed, unnecessary and undesirable. It should be noted that it is
2
writers who support generalisation and not the judges. It is true,
1. Mann (l97l), 168.
2. Rule 3 from Dicey and Morris was quoted by Goff, L.J. in S.A.
Consortium General Textiles v. Sun & Sand Agencies Ltd.. (.1978"]
2 All E.H. 339 at 359 (C.A.) who is apparently of the view that
it is declaratory of the common law. Eowever, the question of
generalisation was not in issue, the point in dispute concerned
foreign penal laws and it was in this context that the rule was
quoted.
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however, that reasons sometimes given by judges for the non-enforcement
of foreign revenue and penal laws are capable of a much wider application!
There are, 1 would suggest, too few individual rules to justify
such a generalisation and too many rules or cases that would not be
consistent with it. The rules on foreign revenue and penal may be
suitable material for generalisation but there are few other rules
capable of assimilation. The most important of such other rules,
according to Dicey and Morris, are those relating to expropriation of
2
property by foreign governments. One could adopt the approach that
such expropriatory laws are not enforced because they are public laws,
biit it is unnecessary to have this generalised rule for this purpose
for, as we saw in the last chapter, other adequate rules already exist
to deal with foreign expropriabery laws the most widely applicable,
in my view, being the rule that questions concerning the ownership of
property are referable to the lex situs at the relevant time. The
acceptance of a general rule on foreign public laws would not cause
this rule on ownership to disappear - it deals with all sorts of
transfers of property, not only transfers on expropriation.
1. See P.A. Mann (l97l)» 166-169. Of particular relevance here is
the sovereignty argument discussed in this work at pp. 49 - ^0.
2. At 79-SO.
See also P.A. Mann (1954), 35-37 and (l97l), 172.
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The few further examples of recognised categories of unenforceable
public laws given in Dicey and Morris are import and export regulations,
trading with the enemy legislation, price control regulations and anti¬
trust legislation.^ No cases are cited in Dicey and Korris on the
2
last two categories but P.A. Mann gives as authority for the latter
of these two, the case of British Nylon opinners v. Imperial Chemical
3
Industries. As regards trading with the enemy legislation, it is
conceded in a footnote in Dicey and Korris that there is important
4
authority inconsistent with this proposition and Mann considers that
5
thi3 category must, on present authority, be excluded. The category
of foreign import and export regulations also gives difficulty. Here
two important cases which ostensibly do not support the proposition
have to be distinguished though my view is that this can legitimately
g
be done. Further, the case most frequently cited in support of this
1. At 79.
2. Mann (l97l), 172.
3. D-953J Ch. 19. The later [195511 Ch. 37 report is not referred to
by Mann.
4. Footnote 8 on page 79.
5. Kaxrn (1971), 172. Cee also Mann (1954), 40-42.
6. Dicey and Morris, 79. The cases are Foster v. Driscoll. LI92911




category King of Italy v. De Medici provides little authority for
Dicey and Korris contrasts with foreign revenue laws certain
foreign laws that "do not provide for the collection of money but
merely for the protection of its value" and which are enforceable.
Listed are exchange control regulations, moratorium laws and rules
4
abrogating gold clauses. Why these should be exempt from the
general rule on the unenforceability of foreign public laws is not
5
made clear in Dicey and Korris. Ko doubt in all these categories
we are concerned with their civil aspects and not with their criminal.
1. See Mann (1971), 172 and Fann (1954), 34.
2. (1918) 34 T.L.R. 623. Dicey and Morris at 79 al3o cites King
of the Hellenes v. Brostrca, (1923) 6 LI.L.Rep. 167, 190 as
support for this category.
3. In this case Peterson, J. was asked to grant an injunction
prohibiting the disposal, pending the trial action, of documents
removed from Italy in contravention of an Italian law directed at
the protection of documents of historical importance. All that
the judge is reported as saying on this matter was the following:
"The question arose whether there was any probability, at the trial
of the action, that these documents, apart from the State papers,
would be ordered to be returned, to Italy. He did not think that
the Court would undertake such a burden".
The State papers were in a different category because they belonged
tc the Italian State.
4. Dicey and Morris, 78.
5. F.A. Mann (1971), 172 li3t foreign exchange control legislation
as unenforceable without referring, in this context, to Kahler v.
Midland Bank, D.950J A.C. 24, a case he had considered in his 1954
lecture at 39-40 as creating difficulties in this regard.
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F.A. Mann concedes that there are a number of cases difficult
or impossible to assimilate, that is, to bring within the generalised
rule.^ Those in the fields of foreign trading with the enemy
legislation and one concerned with foreign exchange control regulations
have already been mentioned but there are two cases in a further two
fields that are viewed by Harm as problem cases. One of these cases
2
is Emperor of Austria v. Day and Kossuth, which is about foreign
3
monetary laws, while the other is de Kaldonado? it deals with the
right of the State to take as ultimate heir.
Whenever generalisation of a broad field of law is attempted,
cases will inevitably be found that are out of step, that cannot be
assimilated, but it is all a question of degree. In this field of
foreign public laws, I would suggest, to repeat myself, that there
are too few individual rules like the foreign penal and revenue rules
to Justify generalisation in this very broad field of foreign public
laws and too many rules or cases that would be inconsistent with it.
V.;e have already noted that the various categories of foreign
public laws which are denied enforcement are not refused all recognition.
1. Mann (l97l), 172 and (1954),37-45.
2. (1S61) 3 De G.F. & J. 217. Mann (l97l), 172 and (1954),37-39.
3. C19543 F. 223. Mann (l97l), 172 and (1954), 42-44.
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The accepted terminology is that they may still be "applied" in
appropriate circumstances though they will not be "enforced." directly
or indirectly. Thus a foreign expropriatory rule will be applied
where it is part of the lex situs but will not be enforced abroad.
Again, although a foreign revenue or penal claim will not be enforced
extra-territorially, a foreign contract will be treated as void by our
courts if it is so rendered by a revenue or penal provision of tho
foreign proper law. We have also seen in the field of revenue laws
that the task of distinguishing application from enforcement,
particularly indirect enforcement, has proved a difficult one. Thus,
for instance, those not versed in this field but told of the rule on
the non-enforcement of foreign revenue laws must wonder at the decisions
in cases like Scottish National Orchestra Society Ltd. v. Thomson's
1 , .2
Kxecutor, and Re Lord Cable 'deceased), not that I suggest these cases
3
were not correctly decided. The borderlines between enforcement and
application in the various categories of foreign public laws are not
yet clearly defined and generalisation of all the categories into one
may be unwise at this stage. There is a wide diversity among foreign
rules that could be characterised as public and it may be that different
considerations will govern the drawing of the line between enforcement
1. 1969 S.L.T. 325. See p. 44 , infra.
2. [1976J 3 All E.R. 417 (C.A.). See p. 45 , infra.
3. Two other interesting similar cases gleaned from Dicey and Morris
are He Hollins, 139 N.Y.S. 713 (1913), 106 N.E. 1034 (1914) and
Re Reid. (1970) 17 D.L.R. (3d.) 199.
106
and application in the diverse categories of public laws resulting
in differing lines being drawn in different categories.
We have seen that considerable difficulties can arise in the
characterisation of revenue and penal laws. 'The adoption of the
generalised rule on foreign public laws would require even more
difficult characterisations$those of public laws and the contrasting
category of private laws. Although the basic ideas central to these
two contrasting concepts of public and private law may be easy to
grasp in the abstract, there are wide areas of uncertainty and ambiguity
between them making characterisations difficult. This is particularly
true in present times with the erosion of the distinction between public
and private law resulting from the constant expansion of state intervention
in once purely private law ma'tors for reasons of consumer protection,
security of employment, building control and the like.
A broad general rule based on theories of sovereignty rather than
cn practical considerations may be intellectually satisfying to some,
but it does not guarantee sensible decisions in individual cases. I
would suggest that generalisation in this very wide field should be
avoided not so much because it is premature but because subsequent
developments may well show it to be undesirable and that this field
should be covered by a number of separate rules differing in their
scope and field of application.
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chapter S
EXTERNAL PUBLIC POLICY AND 'HI . PI LD
CP OPERATION OP LAI; '
"Contracts contrary to Acts of Parliament. It has never been
held that an Act of Parliament is capable of yielding a principle of
public policy which an nglish court ould have to apply to a contract
not governed by : nglish law, unless the case was within the express
terms of the statute. The extensive application of common law principles
of public policy to cases not otherwise subject to nglish law has not
been accorded even to such statutes as might have been held to express
fundamental principles of justice and morality. This has led to
remarkable results. A contract for the sale of slaves governed by the
lav? of Brazil was held to be enforceable in England, the prohibition
against slave trading being embodied in a statute, while contracts in
restraint of trade and champertous contracts were considered as contrary
to universal justice. Why should a principle of morality have the
power to invalidate a foreign contract if it happens to have been ^
formulated by judges, but not if it was formulated by iarliament?"
How does one determine the field of operation of a law? In the
2
case of a common law rule, it will generally be assumed that it is to
have the sphere of operation designated by the relevant choice of law rule.
Thus a Scottish common law mile on intestate succession to moveables will
1. Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws (9th ed., 1973) 753. The
words are those of Kahn-Freund and have not changed since they first
appeared; that was in the 6th ed. (1949) of the above work at 607-60G.
He has expressed the same views more fully in his article, "Reflections
on Public Policy in the rnglish Conflict of Laws", in (1954) 39 Tr.
Grotius oc. 39. A more recent summary of his views on public policy
in Conflict of Laws is to be found in Kahn-Freund, General I roblems of
Private International Law (1976) especially at 280-285. This work will
be cited as "Rahn-Freund, General Problems", to distinguish it from the
1954 article.
2. The expression "common lav/ rule" is used to mean a judge-nade rule of
law as opposed to a legislative provision.
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be presumed to apply to all cases in which the intestate died domiciled
in Scotland. It will be assumed that the choice of law rule and the
related internal rules of law will be in harmony with, and will
complement, each other. Thus a ^udge-raade choice of law rule performs
two closely linked functions - it indicates the system of law applicable
to a particular category of cases and it delimits the field of application
of the internal common law rules of the lex fori falling within that
category. But what about a legislative provision? Thus, should there
be a legislative change in the Scots law on the domicile of married
women, to which wives will the new provisions apply? To all wives in
Scotland, to all wives domiciled in Scotland or to all wives wherever
they may be? Again if a Scottish legislative provision renders certain
gambling contracts null and vo..d, does this apply to all such contracts
entered into in Scotland, to all such contracts in respect of which Scots
law is the proper law or to all such contracts that are sued on in the
Scottish courts?; to name several of the possible fields of application.
In the case of some legislat.ve provisions the field of operation is
expressly defined, there is a particular "choice of law clause".^ Thus,
for example, section 1 of the Legitimation (Scotland) Act 19&8, which
t. On these clauses see Dicey and Morris, 754% Morris, fl94(5) 62 L.Q.R.
170 ; Unger, (l?67) 83 L.Q.R. 4271 Kann» (1972-3) 46 B.Y.B.I.L.
117.
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deals with legitimation by subsequent marriage, specifically states
thet the provisions of the section only apply where "the father of the
said person is domiciled in cotland at tho date of the marriage"J
However, in many instances, legislative provisions are silent as to
their sphere of operation. An example of such a provision is provided
by section 21 of the Betting and Lotteries ct 1934 which read: " ubject
2
to the provisions of this lart of this Act, all lotteries are unlawful".
This section did not render lotteries criminal, the related criminal
goffences were to be found in section 22. Vhat then was the sphere
1. The bill initially contained, in clause 5* a general choice of law
provision referring this matter of legitimation by subsequent marriage
to the law of the father's domicile at marriage, a law thought to
express the common law on this matter. That this is the rule has
since been confirmed by the decision in Eelly v. Marks, 1974 .L.T.
118 at 120. However, this provision was subsequently omitted from
the enactment, it being hoped that a wider rule might be developed by
the courts adopting the type of approach favoured in Indyka v. Indyka
[l969j 1 A.C. 53# In view of the particular choice of law provision
in the act using domicile of tho father as the connecting factor, this
seems unlikely and it would appear that the need for consistency between
particular choice of law provisions and the general choice of law rule
was not appreciated. (See, on all of this, the commentary to section
5 of the act in the Scottish Current Law Statutes.) I might add that
section 5 has been misunderstood by the Lord Lyon in Viscount Drumlanrig's
Tutor, letitioner, 1977 3,L.T. (Lyon Ct.) 16 at 17, who sees it as, inter
alia, a general choice of law provision enacting that "a person
legitimated under the law of another country by the subsequent marriage
of his parents will be treated as legitimate for the purposes of tho Act."
2. The section is now repealed. The current equivalent is s.41 of the
Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963.
3. See, now, s.42 of the 19&3 Act.
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of operation of this legislative provision? It applied to Great
Britain,^ hut did it apply only to lotteries held in Great Britain, or
to lottery contracts where the proper law was that of Scotland or
Mngland, or to all lotteries, wherever held, the subject of litigation
2
in Great Britain? This question came up for decision before the
3
First Division of the Court of Session in Clayton v. Clayton where the
relevant lottery was held in Eire. The majority ruled in effect that
the provision applied only to lotteries in Great Britain. Lord President
Normand held that "the locus of the lottery in this case was outside
the territory which is subject to the British Parliament, and this was,
therefore, a lottery which the British Parliament could not declare either
lawful or unlawful".'* Lord Loncrieff was of the same view. Referring
to section 21 he ruled that "Such an enactment, by reason of the limits of
the jurisdiction of Parliament can apply only to lotteries carried on
5
-within the realm".
1. See s. 33(3)•
2. These are some, not all, of the possible spheres of operation.
3. 1937 3.C. 619. See too Duncan v. Motherwell Bridge ■md Engineering
Co. Ltd.. 1952 S.C. 131 at 135. " " ~ "
4. At 628.
5. At 630. Lord Morison considered 1hat the section applied to all
lotteries whether held in Great Britain or elsewhere - see 629~630.
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Clayton's case is cited by Anton1 as illustrative of the important
presumption that United Kingdom statutes apply only to conduct within
2
the United Kingdom - the territoriality principle. Anton's general
formulation is the following: "The courts start from a presumption that
statutes are not intended to apply to persons, conduct or property outwith
the United Kingdom.""^ He adds: "The presumption is a common-sense one.
'auite often statutes by their literal terms would apply to conduct
anywhere".'1 The same view is expressed in Dicey and Morris where, in
the context of contract, it is said: "If the statute is silent, the
general rule of interpretation comes into play, according to which an
English statute is not to be deemed to have any extraterritorial operation,
unless such operation is required by the express terms of the Act or by
5
its "object, subject-matter or history".
Clearly some presumption is necessary to deal with such cases, but
1. Anton, irivate International Law (196?) 76.
2. On the vagueness of this principle, see Kahn-Fround, op. cit. supra,
at 60-61. -
3. Anton, at 75*
4. Anton, at 76.
5. Dicey and Morris, ojd. cit. supra. 75A*
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it must be doubted whether the vague territoriality principle is
appropriate in t)J.s regard at least where private law statutory provisions
are concerned. Surely the appropriate rebuttable presumption, stated in
the Scottish context, is that Scottish legislative provisions are part
of Scots law and apply where Soots law is the system indicated as
appropriate by Scottish choice of law rules. In other words, the same
basic approach should be adopted to the ascertainment of the field of
operation of legislative provisions as is adopted to the performance of
this task in respect of common law rules. Kahn-Freund has argued very
persuasively for this approach1 and there is some judicial authority for
2
it. On this approach, it would be assumed, for example that a Scottish
statutory provision on the age at which capacity to marry is acquired
would apply to all marriages in Scotland and to all marriages outwith
1. Kahn-Freund at 40, 59 and 60-65.
2. See, for example, two cases discussed later in this chapter at pp. I2<f
Saxby v. Fulton. 1909 2 K.B. 208, 226 and chrichard v. Lacon,
(1906) 22 T.L.R. 245. A relevant Scottish case is Knglish v.
Donnelly. 1958 L.C. 494. See too Dicey and Lorris, 755> footnotes
30, 31 and 32.
The unwise practice of formulating applicability provisions in
territorial terms supports the -unsatisfactory territorial approach.
It would, for instance, generally, be better to state "that an
enactment is part of Scots law rather than to declare that it applies
to Scotland.
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Scotland of persons domiciled in ocotland.^ This is because the
Scottish choice of law rule on capacity to marry invokes two systems,
o
the lex domicilii and the lex loci celebrationis. Then a statute on
domicile would be presumed to apply to all questions of the domicile of
a person that come up in Scottish litigation wherever that person is
resident or domiciled. This is because the interpretation of the
connecting factor domicile is a matter for the lex fori, in this context,
3 4.
Scots law. Again a Scottish legislative provision on "legal rights"
1. In fact there is no need to rely on a presumption in this case as the
current statutory provision on the age of marriage specifically
designates its sphere of operation. This provision, s.l of the Marriage
(Scotland) Act 1977, reads as follows:
"1 (l) Ko person domiciled in -cotland may marry before he attains the
age of 16.
(2) A marriage solemnised in Scotland between persons either of whom
is under the age of 16 <hall be void."
2. .Anton, 0£. cit. supra. 276-283; Clive and Wilson, The Law of Husband
and Wife in Scotland (1974) lj58. Both these works predate the Marriage
(Scotland) Act, 1977.
3» Anton, at 162-3. This is subject to minor exceptions. Thus the
forum may allow transmission or remission (renvoi) and there may be
legislative exceptions like that created by s.5 of the Recognition of
Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971.
4. Legal rights in t: e succession context in Scots Law are fights of
succession indefeasible by the deceased's mortis causa disposition.
See Anton, at 505»
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on death over moveables would be presumed to apply to all moveable
property, wherever situated, of a Scottish domiciliary the relevant
choice of law rule requiring the application of the lex ultiml domicilii.
Then, because of the "double delict rule",^ a Scottish legislative
prevision on delict would be presumed to apply to all delict cases coming
before the Scottish courts and not just to all delicts committed in
Scotland.
The position as regards the designation of the scope of legislative
provisions on contract is rather complicated. Here one would expect
the courts to assume, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary,
that a Scottish legislative provision was intended to apply to all
contracts governed by Scote law, this being determined by the application
as the relevant Scottish choice of law rules. However, the territoriality
approach has been adopted in respect of certain categories of contract
2
enactments. The position in this regard is set out in Dicey and Morris
and I will not repeat here what is said there. I believe that this
territoriality approach to the scope of statutory provisions on contract,
1. In Scots law the choice of law rule for delict requires civil
actionability under both the lex fori and the lex loci delicti commissi.




as illustrated in cases like Clayton v. Clayton^ and English v.
2
Donnelly is founded, to a large extent, on a misunderstanding of the
choice of law rules relating to contract. The misapprehension is that
contract is a field governed by the proper law and that the parties
are free to select a proper law. Thus, if legislative provisions on
contract, other than non-mandatory provisions, were to be applied only
where Scots law was the proper lav, then these provisions could easily
3
be avoided by the parties selecting some other system as the proper law.
However, the view that the selected proper law governs in contract is
not true; this proposition is subject to a number of important exceptions,
4
two of which we will now examine.
Although there is no real doubt that the first of these exists,
its ex^ct scope and nature still awaits judicial definition. On this
exception Dicey and Morris have this to say in the context of legality
1. 1937 5.C. 619.
2. 1958 S.C. 494.
3. This approach is well illustrated by the judgment of Lord President
Clyde in English v. Donnelly, at 494.
4. Another one is that not all matters in the field of contract are
governed by the proper law. Capacity to contract, for instance,
is probably governed by the lex loci contractus - see Anton, 199-202.
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of the contract:
"At first sight the rule that the legality of a contract is
determined by its proper law, appears to lead to the startling and
quite intolerable result that it is in the power of the parties by
a choice of law to give validity to an agreement which, but for 3uch
choice, would have been illegal and void. The theory that the parties,
by choosing a proper law other than the law most closely connected
with the contract, can contract out of the mandatory provisions of that
law, has met with the objection that it opens the door to law evasion
and to the frustration of attempts to unify the substantive commercial
law. In fact, however, it is submitted that these results do not
follow. In the first place they can be avoided by a bold and judicious
application of t e doctrine of evasion, indicated by Lord Wright. As
was pointed out above, a choice of law will be disregarded if it is not
bona fide, i.e. if it was prompted by the intention to evade any
provisions of the legal system most closely connected with the contract
which would have rendered the contract illegal."
The second relevant exception, an obvious one but less important
than the previous one, expressed in the Scottish context, is that the
Scottish courts will treat as illegal a contract that requires a
2
performance in Scotland illegal by Scots law. This is a separate rule
though, in many, but not all, cases where there is to be performance in
Scotland, Scots law will be the system with which the contract is most
1. At 778-9. See also 728 (Rule 146, Sub Rule l) and 730*
2. See Dicey and Morris, 756; Anton, 209. This is a much narrower
rule than that, for which there is some authority, that a contract
will be treated as illegal if it requires a performance illegal by
le* loci solutionis. See Dicey and Morris, 781. See too
Anton, 214.
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closely connected and the previous exception could well then apply.
If mandatory provisions on contract in enactments are presumed
to have the scope of operation of the proper law subject to certain
exceptions, basically the two set out above, then the possible dangers,
previously mentioned, of interpreting contract enactments as being
consistent with choice of law rules are overcome. However, as the
first exception is not as clearly established or defined as one would
wish and because of other difficulties, the consideration of which would
take us too far from the subject of this chapter, it is probably better
for legislation in the field of contract to contain specific choice of
law provisions.1
In conclusion, then, on this point of ascertaining the scope of
legislative provisions on contract where there is no choice of lav/ clause,
my submission is that -these should be interpreted as applicable where
the relevant choice of lav; rules so render them. Thus a Scottish
legislative provision that "all lotteries are unlawful and void" would,
it is tentatively submitted, be presumed to apply in the following
circumstances:
(a) where Scots law is the proper law of the contract;
1 . A recent example of these is provided by s.27 of the unfair Contract
Terms Act 1977.
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(b) where a system other than Scots law is the system selected as the
proper law, but Scots law would be the proper law objectively-
ascertained and the parties have chosen the other system in order
to evade the mandatory provisions of Scots law;
(c) where the contract is to be performed in Scotland.
It is submitted then that there should be a presumption that a
legislative provision in the private law field, like a common law rule
in that field, has the sphere of operation allocated to it by the
appropriate choice of law rule. The presumption is rebuttable and the
question arises whether public policy, particularly external public
policy, lias any roll to play in this regard.
In this context I wish first to examine the contention of Kahn-
Freund that certain common law rules, such as the lav; against restraint
of trade or that against trading with the enemy, have been given a wider
scope of application than that indicated by the appropriate choice of
law rule because these rules embody principles of external public policy.
There are thus, according to Kahn-Freund, two types of mandatory rules
in the common law of England, those that must be applied by the '^Jiglish
courts only where .nglish law is the system designated as applicable by
1. Kahn-Freund, at 40-42, 66; Dicey and Morris, 753 and 750-751
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English choice of law rules and those that must be given a wider sphere
of application, they cannot yield to choice of law rules, because they
are expressions of external public policy.
1
xamples of the first type of law are easily found, but instances
of the second type are rather rare. lahn-Freund, in the article, gives
only two examples of these rules which "have been held to yield an
international public policy and thus to be stronger than the ordinary
2
principles of conflict of laws", namely, as we have already seen, the
laws against trading with the enemy and against contracts in restraint
3
of trade. He gives as authority for this latter example the case of
4
Rouaillon decided in 1880. The dictum of Fry, J. on which this
submission is based is as follows:
"It has been 'insisted that, even if the contract was void by
the law of England as against public policy, yet, inasmuch as the
contract was made in France, it must be good here, because the law
1. Kahn-Freund, at 41.
2. Kahn-Freund, at 42.
5. Kahn-Freund, at 40 and 42. From his views expressed in Dicey and
Morris and in his General Problems at 283 it would seem that he
considers the case of Grell v. Levy, a case on champertous contracts,
dealt with in this chapter at p. 121 , also to fall within this category.
4* Rousillon v. Rousillon, (lS80) 14 Ch.D. 351*
] 20
of France knows no such principle as that by which unreasonable
contracts in restraint of trade are held to be void in bhis country.
It appears to me, however, plain on general principles that this
court will not enforce a contract against the public policy of this
country, wherever it may be made. It seems to me almost absurd to
suppose that the courts of tais country should enforce a contract
which they consider to be against public policy, simply because it
happens to have been made somewhere else.'"
Dicey and Morris, at pp. 749-750* support this interpretation of
this dictum giving it as authority for the proposition that "contracts
in restraint of trade and certain other contracts have been held
void by English courts although, on general principles of conflict of laws,
these contracts were governed in each case by a foreign legal system
according to which they would have been valid." But, at p.72, where an
almost identical proposition is stated, also based on -ousillon. it is
said of this case in the relevant footnote, "but the case does not amount
to a decision on the point. Would the principle apply to a foreign
2
contract in restraint of foreign trade?". The point here is that the
agreement, alleged to be in restraint of trade, although made in France,
applied to trading in England (and also in certain other places) and it
can be argued that all that the judge i3 saying is that the fact that an
agreement in restraint of trade was made in France does not mean that
certain of its provisions cannot be treated as void by an English court
as being in restraint of trade in England and thus contrary to English
1. Rouaillon, at 569 quoted in Dicey and Morris, at 749.
2. This point is also made by Kahn-Freund in his General Problems 283,
note 46.
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domestic public policy. This case does not deal with external public
policy but with internal public policy.^
This is rather like the position in respect of champertous
2
contracts. In the 1864 case of Grell v. Levy it was held that the
English rule against such contracts applied to foreign contracts where
the litigation was to take place in England. This English rule would,
it seems, not apply to foreign champertous contracts not involving
3
litigation in England. It could perhaps be said that both these cases
involve a rule of English law being given a wider scope of application
than that designated by the relevant choice of law rule probably, at the
time in question, that matters of contract are governed by the lex loci
contractus. But, surely, we merely have here an application of the
basic rule referred to earlier in this chapter, that the English courts
will treat as illegal a contract that requires a performance in England
illegal by English lav/1 Consequently, I would suggest that the
proposition in Dicey and Morris^ to the effect that foreign contracts
in restraint of trade and foreign champertous contracts have been held
1. North, Cheshire's irivate Intel-national Law (9 ed., 1974) 149,
note 6. See too Kahn-Freund, 65» note 23.
2. (1864) 16 C.B. (N.S.) 73.
3. Dicey and Morris, 72, note 24.
4. At 753. (The proposition is contained in the quotation at the
beginning of this chapter.)
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to be unenforceable in England, as being contrary to universal justice,
is clearly wrong.
Kahn-Freund*3 other example, that a contract which involves
trading by a British subject with an enemy alien is void, is a better
one. In the case (Dynamit Aktien-Gesellschaf t v. Rio Tinto Co. Ltd J)
which he cites as authority for this proposition Lord Atkinson commented
that ".... the public policy of this country prohibits trading with the
2
enemy by British subjects". Ihis rule can be vie»?ed as a crystallisation
of a particular application of the public policy rule into a specific
law which operates both in the domestic and the international spheres.
I might add that it would appear to be an independent rule and not merely
an application or consequence of the procedural rule that an alien enemy
3
may not sue in our courts.
A more recent example of a rule of common law considered to express
a rule of external public policy is to be found in the Southern Rhodcsian
case of Timms v. Kicol.^ In this case Goldin, J. held that the Roman-
Dutch common law rule that betting transactions are unenforceable applied
t. 1918 A.C. 292 (E.L.).
2. At 299.
3. Dicey and Morris, 137.
4. (196s) 1 S.A. 299 (R).
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to an action for the enforcement of a foreign betting contract valid
under its proper law. He said:
"In the case before me the rule of doaan-Dutch law that
gambling debts are not recoverable, is of an overriding nature
and is based on a fundamental principle of public policy and is
therefore applicable in all actions. Ho good reason exists for
the contention that it should not apply to contracts entered into
in another country."
Goldin, J. did, however, point out that there was an alternative
approach; the rule in question could be designated procedural and thus
2
applicable in all cases brought in that forum. He concluded:
"It is clear that I am concerned with a rule of procedure which
makes wagering contracts unenforceable and this operates in respect of
all contracts of this nature, irrespective of whether they were entered
into in this country or in anoti er country where such contracts are
enforceable,"
The sentence from the quotation at the beginning of this chapter
which reads, "The extensive application of common law principles of public
policy to cases not otherwise subject to English law has not been accorded
to even such statutes as might have been held to express fundamental
principles of justice and morality.^ seems to suggest that many common
1 . At 300,
2. At 300.
3. At 301.
4. This proposition has been convincingly criticised by P.A. Mann,
(1972-3) 4b 3.T.B.I.L. 117 at 138.
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law rules have been given a wide scope of application as they embody
principles of external public policy, but this is incorrect, this
approach is rarely adopted. In almost all cases where external
public policy is involved, the question is not whether the local law
should be applied because it embodies a principle of external public
policy but whether a foreign law, invoked by a choice of law rule of
the forum, is not to be applied because it offends against a principle
of external public policy of the forum. Take for example a case in
which the question whether a foreign contract allegedly induced by
force and fear (duress) is valid has come up for decision as occurred
1 2
in Kaufman v. Gerson. Two approaches are possible. The one
approach is to say that our common law rules on force and fear only
apply where Scots lav; is indicated as the appropriate system to govern
the matter by our choice of lav; rules. Thus they would not apply
where the contract, or purported contract, was governed by a foreign
proper law. However, even if the contract is valid under the proper
law, it may still be set aside as being contrary to the external public
policy rule in that it was induced by force or fear. The other approach
1. [1904H 1 K.B. 591.
2. A third possible approach put forward by bnger in the context of the
interpretation of legislative rules is discussed later in this
chapter, See
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would be to say that our own rules on force and fear give expression
to a principle of external public policy and must be given universal
effect, that is, must be applied in all cases.
As we saw in the chapter on public policy, this second approach
can only be adopted on rare occasions, most rules of our system cannot
be said to embody principles of external public policy and many are
surrounded by zones of tolerable deviation.^ The first approach is the
usual one and it has a number of important advantages over the second.
The main advantage of this first approach is that it retains the
flexibility of the external public poliqy rule. In the second approach
one is applying not the flexible doctrine of external public policy but
a rule of lav, albeit one embodying a principle of external public policy,
that must be applied to all cases that fall within its ambit. All
Kahn~Fround's objections to the crystallisation into individual laws of
instances of the application of external public policy are applicable
here. Two aspects of the flexibility of the external public policy rule
may be mentioned. These were considered in the chapter on public policy.
1. bee pp.14-16 of this work.
2. See P» 6 of this work.
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The first is that the use of this rule is. result—orientated, it is only-
used where the final outcome of the case requires Then its mse
i3 said to depend on contacts, that is, the more weighty the links
between the case and the country of the forum, the more likely the
2
courts are to apply the external public policy rule.
In the case of tho second approach, there is also, of course,
the difficulty of establishing that a rule of law embodies a principle
of external public policy and is not just to be given the sphere of
operation indicated by the appropriate choice of law rule,
iurely, then in all, or almost all, cases it would be better to
use the common law rule as evidence of the principle of external public
policy rather than as embodying it? The external public policy rule
could then be applied, but only if appropriate in the peculiar
circumstances of the particular case.
The same argument is, it is submitted, also valid where the law
in question is legislative in origin. Inless it is obvious that the
legislature intended a legislative provision to have some wider field
of application, the provision should be given the sphere of operation
1, See pp.24-25 of this work.
2, Another disadvantage of treating laws an embodying principles of
external public policy, perhaps only likely to be present rarely, is
that the chance cf replacing the foreign lex causae with some rule
other than that of the lex fori, is lost. See pp«36-39of this work.
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allocated to it by the appropriate choice of law rule of the forum.
This would not preclude the provision being viewed as evidence by the
court of a principle of external public policy. Thus enactments of
limited scope directed against slavery could provide evidence of a
general principle of external public policy against slavery.
If it was solely Kahn-Freund's contention that the English courts
have, on occasions, been slow to use enactments as evidence of principles
of external public poliqy,'' one could agree with him, but he goes rather
further than this. He argues that the court should as> about a
statute, "does it apply either by reason of one of the normal rules of
2
t e conflict of laws or despite those rules by reason of public policy?"
In other words certain statutory provisions should, he considers, be
given an extended scope of application because they embody principles of
external public policy."^ That this is his view is confirmed by his claim
that there was, when he wrote, or, more accurately, spoke, only one
English case "in which a statute was held to express a principle of public
4
policy capable of application beyond the scope of wording." The
1. This reluctance is illustrated in cases dealt with by Fahn-Preund at
66-68.
2. At 66.
3. This is also the view of Unger, (1967) 83 L. ,R. 427 at 431» 433 and
448.
4. At 40. This submission is made again in his General Principles,
253, note 51*
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judgment in question is apparently that of Morton, J. in the case In re
B.'s Oettlement^ in wliich the relevant statutory provision was section 1
of the Guardianship of Infante Act, 1925, which provided: "Where in
any proceedings before any court the custody .... of an infant .... is
in question, the court, in deciding that question, shall regard the
2
welfare of the infant as the first and paramount consideration." this
provision, says Kahn-Pround, "was applied to a case concerning a foreign
infant which, but for this provision, might have been governed by foreign
law. This provision is an example of a statute which the courts are
treating an ordre public international, but ihe wording almost compels
them to do so."1^
I can find nothing in the report of this case which suggests that
the court, in interpreting this legislative provision, were doing any
more than giving the words of the section their literal meaning. There
is no question of giving the provision a field of application beyond the
scope of its wording for reasons of public policy or for any other reasons.
In any case, it can be argued that this decision is not inconsistent with
what has been suggested is the correct approach to the determination of
1. 1940 Ch. 54.




the scope of application of a statutory provision, that is, that uch
a provision should be presumed to have a sphere of operation consistent
with the appropriate choice of law rule. here it could be argued on
the wording of the section that it is a procedural provision applicable
wherever nglish law is the lex fori.
The qi'otation which introduces this chapter is followed by the
sentence:
"The natter is one of continuing practical importance, because it is
this different treatment of judicial and parliamentary legislation which
serves as a justification for the refusal to give international force to ^
Acts of Parliament dealing with gaming contracts and with money-lending."
The case referred to in the context of gaming contracts is axby v.
2
Fulton in which it was held that .nglioh legislation forbidding the lending
of money for gambling did not apply to loans made in another country,
where gambling was not illegal, for gambling there. One ratio for this
d' cision, that given by Kennedy, L.J. in the Court of Appeal, was that
the legality of a contract was generally governed by the Ion loci
contractus and that the contract there in point was valid by that system,
3
the law of Monaco. This approach seems sound but in the quotation from
1. Dicey and Korrls, at 753. The words are again those of Kahn-Fround.
2. [1909] 2 Z.B. 208, 226.
3. At 231.
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Dicey and Morris it is claimed that these "n.-lish legislative provisions
should have been treated as embodying a principle of external public
policy and applied to all cases of lending money for gambling. It had
■i
been submitted in Saxby that even if the loan did not fall foul of the
legislative provisions, it was contrary to public policy. On this
Kennedy, L.J. had this to say:
"I entirely agree with Buckley, I.J.; the borrowing and lending of
money for the purpose of gaming i3 neither immoral nor unlawful at
cosiirion law. It is suggested that morality is advancing, and that this
is evidenced so far as to create a public policy by statutes which have
been parsed for the purpose of making some gambling transactions un¬
lawful; but the answer is that these statutes really shew that the
policy of the Legislature is to deal in a disciplinary fashion with
certain particular manifestations of the gambling spirit, and do not
establish a public policy which is contravened by any transactions
connected with betting or games of chance.""
This approach of Kennedy, L.J. seems sound. ./here is the
evidence that all transactions connected with gambling are contrary to
public policy in ungland? Even if there was such a principle of public
policy, it would seem that the legislation should be treated as evidence





3. bee pp. 124 - 127.
P.A. Mann, ££. cit. supra, at 138 also rejects this criticism in
Dicey and Morris of Saxby v. Fulton.
131
The case referred to in the context of money-lending is hrichard
1
v. iacon. here again the complaint is that the legislative provision
in question should have been construed as expressing a principle of
external public policy. In uhrichard the plaintiff company sued in
nglanu on a loan it lad made to the defendant in India and the question
arose whether the transaction could be reopened under section l(l) of
the Moneylenders Act, 1900, which provided for reopening "where
proceedings are taken in any Court" by a moneylender for recovery of
2
money lent. The judge, Mr. Justice Ridley, r lec that this statutory
provision applied only where hnglisb law was the system governing the
contract. In this case Indian law was the relevant system as it was
the lex loci contractus thus prima facia, the system selected by the
parties. As regards the relevance of the use in -litis provision of the
words "where proceedings are taken in any Court" his view was:
"The statute ought not to be construed more widely than if those words
ere not there. The words were simply inserted by way of convenience;
and it would be going too far to hold that by the mere U3e of that
phrase if was intended that the Act should have more than the usual
effect given to a statute. s to the other point, this was not a
matter of procedure, as it went to the merits of the ca?o, and therefore
the lex loci contractu-' must apply."




Here, then, the learned judge is arguing that the presumption
that an enactment is to have the scope of application allocated to it
by the appropriate choice of law rule is applicable to this particular
statutory provision and that the use of the words, "where proceedings
are taken in any court" does nothing to rebut that resumption.
P.A. ManrJ argues that this case is correctly decided but, following
2
the ap roach adopted in the case In re B.'s Settlement, it could be
arguod that the words "where proceedings are taken in any court" clearly
show that it was the intention of the legislature that the provision
should be applicable in all such proceedings coming before the nglish
courts - these words do rebut the presumption that the relevant scope
of application is that designated by the choice of law rule. But,
even if the case is wrongly decided, there is no need to maintain that
the legislative provision should be interpreted as giving expression to
a principle of external public policy. Our system requires only two
categories of laws, those that have the scope of operation designated
by the relevant choice of law rule, and those that do not have that
scope but some wider, or perhaps, sometimes, even a narrower, sphere
of application. There seems no need to categorise, nor any advantage
in attempting to categorise, any of the laws, legislative in origin
or not, in this second group as being d'ordre public
1. 0£. cit. supra, at 139.
2.' See this chapter at pp. 127 - 129.
3. Eek would call these laws of wider scope "preremptory laws". They
are the subject of his 1973 Hague lectures ((1973) II Hague Hecueil
1-73) and Kahn-Freund discusses them shortly in his General Problems
at 91-93. Because these rules are usually given their extended scope
for reasons of public policy in the wide sense, they are sometimes
referred to as "ordre public" laws, but this designation is, according
to kahn-Freund, at 92, occasionally inappropriate. A better designation
may be "laws of extraordinary application". On these laws see, also
F.A. Rann,(1972-3) 46 B.Y.B.I.L. 117 at 136.
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international. Indeed, as previously explained, there can be
disadvantages in such as designation.
Unger shares Kahn-Freund's vitftn that some legislative provisions
should be treated as embodying principles of external pu lie policy/
but his approach would seem to be rather different to Kahn-Freund's.
Lis view is that, where a legislative rule gives expression to a principle
of external public policy, this does not mean that die law in question
should be given some fixed wider scope (perhaps be treated as applicable
in all cases coming before that country's courts; out that the rule
should be applied to cases, otherwise governed by foreign law, only where
public policy so requires. On this approach of linger*s the flexibility
2
inherent in the external public policy rule would not be lost.
If Parliament instructed the courts by specific legislation to
adopt this approach to some legislative provision, then the courts would,
no loubt, do 30, but it seems an unlikely approach for our courts to
adopt otherwise. Low are the courts to discover that the legislature
wishes them to treat a particular legislative provision in this way,
unless there is some specific instruction to this effect? Such a
discretion could create uncertainty in the operation of a statute and it
could be argued that the courts were encroaching on the sovereignty of
1. Unger, ou. clt. supra, at 431, 433 and 448,
2. Unger, at 431.
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Parliament if they held that they had such a discretion unless it was
clear that Parliament had granted it to them. It would certainly he a
novel approach for the courts to hold, in these circumstances, that they
have a discretion, based on public policy, as to whether or not to apply
a statute. It would be bettor to view the statute as a specific illustration
of a principle of external public policy, rather than as embodying it.
although the general approach in ngland and Scotland to the
interpretation of statutes has been that the meaning of an enactment is
to be gleaned, from its provisions and not from any external source, it
has long been recognised that the purpose, or policy, of legislation has
some relevance in this regard. Where an enactment is given an inter¬
pretation influenced by its purpose it may, sometimes, be said to have been
given that meaning for reasons of public policy.^ In this chapter the
broad topic of when a law can be given a vider meaning because of its
purpose, a question relevant in all branches of the law and not only in
conflict of laws, has not been considered; this chapter has been concerned
with the narrower issue whether some rules of law can be said to embody
principle; of external public policy.
1. oe, for example, Graveson, Conflict of laws (7th ed., 1974) 101,
commenting on Boissc-vain v. Weil, Q95QJ A.C. 327. Kahn-Preund,




TH PROTECTION OP TIT INTf.R-.ST.- OP THH FORUM IN LITIGATION CONCERNING
PORTION DELICTS
Both the Scottish and the nglish courts, are strong-ly committed
to the application of the lex fori in cases concerned with foreign
delicts or torts.^ They do not, it is true, apply the lex fori alone
to these matters, the lex loci delicti also plays an important role.
However, though there has been some doubt in nglund, if not in Scotland,
about the relevance of the lex loci delicti - whether the wrong must
be actionable in tort or merely not justifiable, for example, entailing
2
criminal liability, under that system - there has been no doubt, in
either country, that civil actionability under the lex fori is a requisite
1. Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, (9th ed., 1973) 933 and 939;
Anton, Private International Law, (1967) 2J8-250; Kahn-Freund,
Delictual Liability and the Conflict of Laws (1968) II Hague Recueil
l-l6<~>, especially at 1-35*
Lven in some jurisdictions applying the lex loci delicti alone as the
general rule, the lex fori still plays an important roll - see
Kahn-Freund, 12-20.
2. This doubt has arisen from the two interpretations given in Tngland to
that part of the rule in hillips v. yre ((1T70) L.R. 6 .B.l.)
requiring that the conduct complained of such be "not justifiable" by
the law of the place of the_wrong. The controversial meaning given it
in llachado v. Pontes (£1897J 2 ,B. 231.) has never been part of Scots
law, it wan specifically rejected in iic Iroy v. McAllister (1949 S.C.
110 at 118), and there is a widely held view, propounded, for example,
by Dicey and I orris (933 and 943)» by Morris (The Conflict of Laws,
(l97l) 26s) and by North (Cheshire's .rivate International Law l'(9th
ed., 1974) 273) that Machado was overruled in this respect by the House
of Lords in Boys v. Chaplin (}197lJ .C. 356). This is not so. Those
who support this view have to rely on certain obiter remarks made by
Lord Guest prefaced by the statement, "The difficulties arising from ....
Ihilli; s v. yre .... 1" prefer to leave .... to those of your Lordships
who are more familiar with this aspect of .nglish Law." (Lord Guest
at 381.) Lord Guest's views on the choice of law rule in tort were
obiter, because- he had ruled that the matter in issue was procedural
thus governed by the lex fori. - See Lord Guest at 382-583*
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for success.
ven on those rare occasions where a proper law type approach
may he said to have been adopted in these courts, the result has been
to allow the application of the lex fori and to deny effect to the
foreign lex loci delicti.^ Again that the place of the delict may
2 2
be "fortuitous or ambiguous", factors which have led some to favour
the application of the proper law rather than the lex loci delicti,
have also been treated by ethers as justification for requiring
3
actionability by the lex fori.
Then it has recently been decided by a Scottish judge that the
liability in delict of the employer for the death of a diver Killed
while working beneath the North Sea in the Norwegian sector of that
sea, but not in Norwegian territorial waters, should be determined
solely by the lox fori on the basis that, to quote from the newspaper
Boys v. Chaplin, supra, the judgments of Lords Eodson and Vilberforce;
Soutar v. Peters, 1912, 1 S.L.T, Ill (Anton, pp. cit. supra, 246-247;
Morris, 0£. cit. supra, 286).
2. The meanings of those terms in this context arc explained by Kahn-
Freund, jor. cit. supra, 27-28.
3. See tor example, Mitchell v. IlcCulloch, 1976 S.L.T. 2 at 5 where
Lord McDonald said,
"It [my conclusion that heads of damages claimed must be available
both under the lex loci delicti and the lex fori" recognises what I
consider to be a realistic tendency to pay more regard to the lex
fori in international questions of this sort. In a rapidly developing
world it may not always be simple to point to the country in which a
delict is supposed to have occurred. A delict committed on a
hijacked aircraft provides a ready example."
For comments on this case see Leslie, 1976 S.L.T. (News) 149 and
Thomson, (1976 ) 25 I.C.L. :. 873 at 891. J,K. Thomson's article
provides an interesting and detailed survey of the Scottish cases on
delict in Conflict of Laws.
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report, "it [the delict] was admitted to have taken place on the high
seas, where every country was entitled under common law to apply its
own legal system"
This determination of the courts to apply the lex fori to foreign
delicts seems strange to the conflicts lawyer in view of the willingness
of the courts to a .ply a foreign lex causae alone in so many other fields
2
of Conflict of Laws. Indeed delict is the only field in which the
lex fori is invoked in addition to the foreign lex causae, in this case,
the lex loci delicti. ome other double rules do exist, thus, capacity
to marry is governed, according to Scots Private International Law,
3both by the lex domicilii and the lex loci celebrationis, but the lex
fori is not used as a connecting factor in these other double rules.
Some writers have suggested that this requirement of actionability
by the lex fori i3 an example of crystallisation of a rule of public
1. Lally v. Comex (Diving) Ltd., The Scotsman, May 19, 1976. The
newspaper report is appended at the end of this chapter. On the
face of it this would seem an ideal situation in which to apply
the proper law even though it may well be Scots law, also the lex
fori.
2. Kahn-Freund, at 12.
3. See Anton, at 276-283, and the Marriage (Scotland) Act, 1977,
sections 1, 2, 3 and 5« This is the general rule, a possible
exception is discussed in this work at p. 28 .
1J8
1 2
policy. The source of the rule is The Kalley and of this case
Kahn-Freund has said, "That case was not understood (as I think it
should have been) as based on the non-application of Belgian law and
the application of hglish law by reason of the incompatibility with
English policy of the shipowner's liability [[under Belgian law'!] for
the compulsory pilot. It was treated as if it had established a cast-
iron rule that no tort can be successfully sued upon Unless it is
3
actionable according to English municipal law".
What are the reasons for this insistence on applying the lex
fori?
Judges and other lawyers prefer to work with their own local
(I
1. See, for example, Kahn-Freund, 12-14; Kahn-Freund, Reflections
on Public Policy in the English Conflict of Laws* (1954) 39 Tr.
Grotius Society 59 at 45-53 (in this chapter this article will be
referred to as "Kahn-Freund, Public Policy", to distinguish it from
his Hague lectures on delict). See also Holder, (1968) 17 I.C.L.Q.
926 at 949.
2. (1868) L.R. 2 P.C. 193.
The decision is neatly summarised by Kahn-Freund, oj). cit. supra,
at 13 as follows: "The English Court held that a British shipowner
was not liable for the consequences of a collision between his ship
and a Norwegian vessel in Belgian territorial waters which occurred
as a result of the negligence of a compulsory pilot, it being the
law of England that a shipowner was not liable for a compulsory
pilot, whilst according to Belgian law he was".
3. Kahn-Preund, Public Policy, at 53.
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system which they understand, usually admire, and know their way about.
Proof of foreign law can be difficult, expensive, time consuming and
inconvenient. This is, of course, true in all private law fields,
not only in delict.
n important reason, though perhaps more so in the past than now,
is that rules relating to delictual liability often express important
rules of social or public policy which the courts are reluctant to see
displaced by foreign rules.^ Ko doubt, in these situations, the closer
the links between the case and the country of litigation, the more the
court feels obliged to apply its own law. This leads us, I believe,
to the heart of the matter. The main reason for the application by
the- courts of the lex fori the real or imaginary defects of what
was thought to be the alternative approach, that is, the application of
the lex loci delicti alone. In many cases the invariable unqualified
application of the lex delicti would seem to produce unsatisfactory
results and it was sought to combat this problem by requiring the
application, as well, of the lex fori. In this way the local defender
could be protected against the idiosyncrasies and excesses of foreign
systems. This approach could be viewed as particularly apt where the
pursuer too was local. The position was less satisfactory where he
1. Kahn-Freund, 26-27.
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was foreign. However, there was the argument, unsound though it nay,
on occasions, be, that the foreign pursuer should litigate in the
country where the delict was committed if he seeks the remedies
provided by its laws.^
Many of the problems inherent in the application of the lex
loci delicti as the sole system in delict can be overcome by the adoption
2
of a proper law type approach as is now widely advocated.
In simple terms the proper law of a delict may be said to be
the system with which the wrong is most closely connected or the
system vrith the greatest interest or concern in the case. A far more
sophisticated and complicated approach, but still on the same lines,
3has been adopted in the Second Restatement. Much greater flexibility
1. See Anton, 239» note 12 and this chapter at p. 150.
2. See, Dicey and Morris, 955-937. Morris, 259-261, 268-270, 278-283;
Anton, 244-245* Anton favours the proper law with a presumption
that it is the lex loci delicti. Another approach is that adopted
in the first two paragraphs of the novr abandoned main delict article
(then Article 10) of the K.M.C. Preliminary Draft Convention on the
Law Applicable to Contractual and 11on-Contractual Obligations, as
set out in the Consultative Document of the Law Commission and the
Scottish Law Commission of August 1974, which read as follows:
"Non-contractual obligations arising out of an event which has
resulted in damage or injury shall be governed by the law of the
country in which that event occurred.
However, if, on the one hand, there is no significant link between
the situation arising from the event which hat resulted in damage or
injury and the country in which that event occurred and, on the other
hand, the situation has a closer connection with another country,
then the law of that other country shall apply."
It has also been suggested that the personal law has a roll to play
in delict - see Articles 31 and 32 of the Report on Private International
Law of the Private International Law Committee, Civil Code Revision




is provided by multi-element connecting factors like the proper law
than by single-element connecting factors such as the locus delicti.
Uncertainty and difficulty of prediction are said to be the penalties
for the use of such connecting factors, but even single-element
connecting factors like the locus delicti can provide considerable
problems of ascertainment.^ This proper law approach offers a
sensible if not easy solution to situations where the place of the
delict is "fortuitous" or "ambiguous" or indeed, where there is no
2
legal system in force at the place of the delict. Where there are
close links between a delict and the forum, the lex fori can be
designated the proper lav; of the delict, or the proper law of some
aspect of the delict.
I wish now to consider what means would be left to the judges
to safeguard the interests of the forum in cases including foreign
delicts if they were to abandon the double delict rule in favour of
a proper law type approach. I consider that a major obstacle to
reform in this area is the belief that if the requirement of
actionability by the lex fori is abandoned, insufficient means will
1. Dicey and Morris, 968-978; Morris, 285-6; Anton, 245-7;
Kahn-Freund, 28-29.
2. As was technically the position in Lally v. Comcx (Diving) Ltd..
supra.
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be left to protect the interests of the forum. To what extent this
fear is misconceived is a matter best left until we have considered
the means available for the protection of these interests.
An obvious point here is that in some cases concerning delicts
t-
committed abroad, the proper law of the delict will be found to be
the lex fori. In such a case no problem arises as regards the
protection of the forum's interests. Again the courts could, where
this is clearly the intention of the legislature, give a legislative
provision on delict some wider scope than to apply it only where
Scots law is the proper law of the delict. Hopefully, such instances
would be rare.
In some cases the important links between a delict and a foreign
country may seem to preclude the application of the lex fori as the
proper law. Sven in this situation certain approaches are available
which can ensure an important roll for the lex fori. The first is
that of depecage.^ The idea here, considered in the delict context,
5
is that a dispute in the field of delict may raise two or more
separate issues, all within the broad field of delict, and that,
whereas one legal system may be the proper law on one or more issues,
another or other systems may govern, in this roll, in respect of other
1. On depecage see Morris, 544.
b
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issues. Thus where a local wife is injured in a road accident abroad
allegedly by the negligence of her husband, the driver of the vehicle
she was in, the issue of whether he was negligent night be thought to
be appropriate for determination by the ley loci delicti, if that was
considered to be the moat closely connected system on that issue,
whereas the question of heads of damages claimable by her from him
should, it could be argued, be governed by their common personal law,
the proper law on that issued In this situation among the reasons
why the lex loci delicti may be thought appropriate to determine whether
there was negligence is the relevance to this issue of local traffic
laws on topics such as precedence of traffic, restrictions on the speeds
of vehicles, safety precautions and the like. However, even where
laws in force at the place of the delict like these are relevant, another
system, perhaps the lex fori, could bo applied as the roper law and the
2
traffic laws of the locus delicti were treated as "data" in deciding
1. This depecage approach was adopted by lord I ilberforee in Boys v.
Chaplin, 'lappa, at 391-392, and by /.Id, J. in the famous American
case ef b ock v. Pack on. C19637 * Tloyd' :op. 286. Tho
relevant remarks of the latter Judge are act out in orth, op. cit.
supra, at 266. Depeoage is not without its difficulties. To
a ly different legal systems to different aspects of the same
delict could produce some strange results. The same difficulty
arises in contract - ecu Anton, !?■'. and Perth, 240-243. i)4"&cage
is a useful tool but one that must be used with care.
2. On this idea sea Dicey and Morris, 951; Korrio, 545-546j Kahn-
Preund, 92-99.
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whether there was negligence according to the proper law. Here the
traffic laws would he viewed as factors potentially relevant to
negligence as would facts like the condition of the road surface,
visibility and traffic density at the place of the accident at the
relevant time, but whether the overall situation discloses negligence
remains a matter for the other system, the proper law.
It has been noted that a delict case may involve a number of
separate delictual issues to which different legal systems may be
applied. Relevant here too is the fact that issues may also arise
in a delict case that need not be characterised as delictual and to
which the choice of law rule on delict need not be applied. Thus
some claims may be available in either delict or contract.^ Then
cases of liability or immunity in delict within the family such as
parental liability or interspousal immunity could be treated as family
2
matters governed by the personal law and transmission on death of
1. Dicey and Morris, 937, Kahn-Freuna, 130-141; Collins, (l6) 1967 _
l.C.L. . 103-144, ayers v. International Drilling Co. M.V..C1971J
3 All .R. 163 especially at l66-l67. Brodin v. -/e 1.1an. 1973 S.L.T.
198. "
2. . ahn-Frcund, 64-68 and 104-106.
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delictual claims and liabilities could be viewed as matters of
1
succession.
In this way a foreign system that would be applied if the matter
were characterised as delictual may be avoided. This is not to suggest
that the use, or misuse, of characterisation as a means of avoiding
defective choice of lav; rules is to be encouraged but obviously some
issues arising in a delict case may be characterised, legitimately,
as falling outwith the juridical category of delict for the purposes
of Conflict of Laws.
In this context the rule that matters of evidence and procedure
are governed by the lex fori is of substantial significance. A number
of important matters in delict are characterised as procedural thus
governed by the court's own laws. For instance, a court can only
2
award remedies available under its own system. Again, quantification
1. Kahn-Freund, 110-113.
There are further examples. Thus claims between joint wrongdoers
can be characterised as quasi-contractual. See North, 284.
2. nton, 86 and 548; Dicey and liorris, 1099. Boys v. Chaplin, supra.
Lord Pearson at 394.
".... when a court is required, to go beyond merely determining the
rights of the parties and to proceed to enforce those ri :hts, it can
scarcely proceed in a manner for which its organisation and powers
make no provision." - The Consultative Document of August 1974 of
the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission on the L.F.C.
Draft Convention on Obligations, 11.2.3.
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of damages is for the lex fori1 - a useful safeguard against inflated
claims based on a foreign lex causae.
Then certain laws, those that render the obligation unenforceable
or require special methods of proof, in contrast to those that extinguish
the obligation, are considered to be procedural, Such prescriptive
law? of the lex fori will be applied, even to foreign delicts while those
2
of foreign lex causae will be ignored. This position is hardly
substantive for Conflict of Laws purposes.
It will be observed from vjhat has been said about prescriptive laws
that the rule that procedural matters are governed by the lex fori
operates as a two edged sword. Not only does it require the application
1. Anton, 249; Dicey and Morris, 9^5; Boys v. Chaplin. supra, Lord
Ilodson at 379, J ord Guest at 381 and Lord VJilberforce at 392-393.
In contrast heads of damages and remoteness of damage are matters
of substance - see the authorities listed in this note. Thus even
if the heads of damages of the proper law are recognised, the amount
awarded under each head will be a matter for the lex fori to determine.
The courts, in these circumstances, may find themselves having to
quantify damages in respect of heads of damages unknown to the lex
fori.
2. Anton, 545~546 and 226-228 (since Anton wrote the important
Prescription (icotland) Act, 1973» has been enacted); Dicey and
1 orris,^1103-1106.
and perhaps all prescriptive laws should be treated as
3. Anton 227. a recent case, unsatisfactory, in y view, in this
regard, is Alack-Clawson v. .,aldhof-Aschaffenburg. fl975J A.C. 591*
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of the procedural rules of the lex fori but it denies effect to the
procedural rules of the foreign lex causae. This illustrates a
general characteristic of choice of law rules. Where such a rule
indicates a foreign system as applicable on a particular issue, it
only so renders such laws of that lex causae as fall within the
juridical category of the choice of law rule. Laws that fall outwith
that category are not applied unless the category to which they belong
also falls to be governed by the same lex causae. Thus, if we are
to apply French law as the domiciliary law in respect of an issue
involving intestate succession to moveables, only such rules of French
law are relevant as fall within the juridical category of 'intestate
succession to moveables". Characterisation of a rule of law, as in
the case of characterisation of a matter in dispute between the parties
to a case, is generally considered to be a matter for the lex fori
though a foreign law should, we are told, be examined, for this
purpose, in the setting of the system to which it belongs.^ Giving
ultimate control in this way to the lex fori provides protection against
unsound foreign characterisations.
It is claimed that there has been a tendency in the past for
1. Anton, 49-52; Dicey and Morris, 30-53;
Scottish national Orchestra ociety Ltd. v. Inomson's Executor,
1969 .L.T." 325 at 328; Metal Industries Ltd. v. Owners of - .T.
"Harle". 1962 S.L.T. 114.
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courts to give a rather broad meaning to the category "procedure" and
thus too wide an application to the lex fori. The line between
matters of procedure and those of substance in not easily drawn. Thus
it can be argued - that certain "procedural" rules on presumptions of
law and burden of proof are so closely connected with substantive
matters that they should be treated as natters of substance governed
by the lex causae appropriate to such matterr and not as natters of
procedure governed by the lex fori. To refuse to do 30 could well
undermine the substantive right granted by the lex causae. It would,
arguably, be wrong for a court in country A to require a pursuer in a
delict case to which it was applying the law of country E, to prove the
negligence of the defender where an applicable presumption of this
negligence, available under the law of country B, has no equivalent in
the internal law of country A. However, changes in the positions of
the parties as regards burden of proof and presumptions, of the type
1
illustrated in Gibson, brought about by the pleadings of the parties,
must surely remain questions for the lex fori. An attempt to formulate
this approach in a rule of law is to be found in the first paragraph
of Article 19 of the S.'.C. Draft Obligations Convention in its 1974




"The existence and force of rresumptions of law, together
with the burden of proof, shall be determined by the law which
is applicable to the legal relationship. However, the consequences
to be drawn from the conduct of a party in the course of the
proceedings shall be determined by the law of the forum."
another weapon available to the courts in their attempts to
exclude offensive foreign laws, delictual or other, is the external
public policy rule discussed in Chapter 1, This is a useful weapon
but its application can generally only be justified in extreme cases
where the claim is clearly objectionable.
Also relevant here is ihe rule excluding foreign penal laws again
discussed in an earlier chapter (Chapter 3)» 'here there are penal
elements in the damages available under a foreign system this rule could
be used to reduce the damages to a sum that reflects the actual loss
suffered by the pursuer. A claim under an English proper law for
exemplary damages could be rejected by a Scottish court on this basis.
I have not yet managed to think of a possible application in the
field of delict for the rule that foreign revenue laws will not be enforced.
1 • The E.IO.C. Preliminary Draft Convention on the Law pplicable to
Contractual and I?on-Contractual Obligations, as set out in the
Consultative Document of the Law Commission -rd the cottish Law
Commission of August 1974. This draft convention seems to have lost
its non-contractual provisions and is now known as the Draft
Convention of the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations.
Article 19 has been redrafted but it is still basically to the same
effect.
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When it is sought to litigate in respect of a foreign delict
in Scotland, the doctrine of forum non conveniens may be of relevance.
The idea here is that, even where a Scottish court has jurisdiction,
it may decline to exercise it, usually at the instance of the defender,
on the ground that the just determination of the case requires that
it should be heard in some other forum which also has jurisdiction.^
That the case involves questions for determination by the internal
law of ^the other, foreign, court is clearly a fact relevant to whether
the plea should, or should not, be sustained but too much weight
2
should not be attached to this factor. In this connection one should
remember too that the mere fact that a foreign court also has
jurisdiction does not mean that its decree will be recognised in
Scotland. Thus where the defender's assets are all in Scotland, the
refusal by the Scottish court to hear the matter could mean that the
pursuer is deprived of an effective remedy.
All in all, then the courts would have a number of useful ways
1. See Anton, 148. This doctrine is found too in the American
legal system. It has been said not to be part of the isnglish
legal system, see, for example, Korris, 82, but see Mac-ihannon
v. Rockware Class ltd.. (M978J 1 Ml .R. 625.
2. See Anton, 151 and 259 footnote 12.
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of protecting the interests of their own system if they were to apply
the proper law in delict.^ My main rmrpose here has been to list
these methods; the extent to which they will be effective requires
further consideration, but I would think that they go a substantial
way towards providing the protection required. There is an attendant
dangers some of the methods, perhaps most, have a potential for
misuse - there is a temptation to use them to unjustifiably expand
2
the sphere of operation of the lex fori.
To return to the efficacy of the methods of protecting the lex
fori which have beon listed, this must be viewed in the light of the
consideration that there are substantial disincentives to litigate
3
in Scotland in foreign law, particularly for the foreign pursuer.
1. I have not discussed the possible use of remission (renvoi) in
this context as I think situations where it could assist are hardly
likely to arise. The idea here is that a Scottish court may
refer a delictual matter to the system it considers the proper law
merely to find that that system would apply Scots law. In these
circumstances the cottish court could apply its own system. This
remission could also occur where the forum applies the lex loci
delicti and the foreign forum the proper law,or even the lex loci
delicti ascertained in a way different from that used in the forum.
2. Indeed many of these methods or processes are condemned by the
American writers of the "Policy- valuation" school as being devices
improperly used to keep an archaic Conflicts system in operation.
3. The main problems are expense and inconvenience. In Scotland a
foreign litigant may be required to sist a mandatary - see Anton,
552-554 and the case of Pink, v. Armstrong. The Scotsman, November
5, 1977 in which it seems to have been overlooked that the Scottish
decree could, perhaps, be enforced in the Netherlands under the
arrangements reciprocal to those provided for the recognition of
Dutch decrees under the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal nforcement)
Act 1935. A copy of the report in The Scotsman is appended at the
end of this chapter. The heading to the report is somewhat mis¬
leading. In England the foreign litigant may be required to give
security for costs. See, for example, Landi Den Hartog B.V. v.
5towns. [1976J 2 C.H.L.R. 393 (ft.B.D.).
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Thus no pursuer will averr foreign law unless this is very clearly to
his advantage - in the absence of averments of foreign law a Scottish
court will apply its own system, even to delicts that have occurred
abroad.^ These disincentives inhibit the bringing of litigation in
delict in Scotland involving foreign law and this reduces the incidence
of these potentially troublesome cases.
A fear of Scottish judges has been and, no doubt, still is, that,
if they abandon the lex fori as a system applicable to foreign delicts,
2
they might have to award damages for a wrong not known to Scots law.
To end this chapter we will look at such a situation and see if it
would really involve such undesirable consequences. The situation
here is that a foreigner (Mr. a) sues a local resident (Kr. 3) in a
3
Scottish court for adultery which is no longer a delict in Scotland.
1. Fryde v. Proctor and Gamble. 1971 S.L.T. (Motes) 18; Bonnor v.
Balfour Kilpatrick. 1974 S.L.T. 187.
2. See for example, the remarks of Lord Thomson in Kch'lroy v. McAllister.
supra, at 117 set out in Anton, at 239 and those of Lord McDonald
in Mitchell v. KcCulloch. supra, at 5»
3. The Divorce (Scotland) Act, 1976, s.10,abolished the aggrieved
husband's delictual claim against his wife's paramour. This
provision did not deal with the wife's action against a woman
committing adultery with her husband as there is no known case of
this action being brought in Scotland. On this see Clive and
Wilson, The Law of Husband and Wife in Scotland, (1974) 277.
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If a foreign law under which adultery is civilly actionable is the
proper law - perhaps Mr. and Mrs. A live in a country where adultery
is a delict and the wrong took place when Mr. B was on holiday there -
then that law should be applied and damages granted. But, quantification
of the damages would be a matter for Scots law find no penal damages
would be awarded. This solution hardly seems objectionable. However,
if Scots law is the proper law, as could be the case ere Mr. and Mrs.
A on holiday in Scotland at the time of the adultery, then no action
should be available to Mr. A. .-nother example where Scots law could
be the proper law is where all the parties involved in an adultery
were Scots on holiday in the foreign country.
A difficulty arises where the delict cannot be said to have
substantial and predominant links with any one country, including the
country where the delict was committed, as to justify the application
as that country's law as the proper law. This could be the case
where Mr. and Mrs. were holiday visitors to the foreign country
whore the adultery took place from some country other than Scotland.
In such a case there may be a predominant solution to the problem
even if there is no predominant system. Thus, in this last version
of our example, all the parties may havi their homes in countries
where adultery is not civilly actionable. Another solution would
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be to apply the most closely connected system even if the connections
with it are only slightly less tenuous than those with other involved
systems. However, in a situation like this where no foreign system
or solution has any real claim to prevail, the court could as vrell
apply the lex fori.
1. Ferhaps this is the situation that Lord KcDonaid had in mind in
the quotation from his Judgment in Fitchell v. IlcCuXloch, supra,
set out earlier in this chapter at p. ]36, note 3.
WEDNESDAY, MAY 19
LqJlij V, CoMex )




Though a North Sea diver died
in an accident while working
from an oilrig in the Norwegian
sector of the continental shelf, |
claims for £41,000 damages '
arising from his death have been \
allowed to proceed in tin Court j
of Session.
Lord Stott rejected a plea by j
Comex (Diving) Ltd.. the inter- j
national diving concern with ,
offices at Bucksburn, Aberdeen,
who are being sued, that the case |
was irrelevant in Scotland and
that Norwegian law should be
applied.
The judge said the action was
by certain relatives of the diver,
who was employed by Comex.
It was common ground that if
it had .happened in Norwegian
territorial waters Norwegian law
would have been relevant.'But it
was admitted to have taken place
on the high seas, where every
country was entitled under
common law to apply its own
legal system.
' NO CHANGE'
Comex argued that this
common law situation had been
modified by international agree¬
ment. Reference was made to the
Continental Shelf Act, 1964,
which enabled effect to be given
to certain provisions of the Con-!
vention on the High Seas, 1958, i
relative to the North Sea con- j
tinental shelf and also the Con- !
tinental Shelf Jurisdiction Order, j
1965.
Lord Stott said it was plain
that the measures related solely |
to an extension cf rights by fhe !
UK to what was called the UK 1
sector of the shelf. He took it I
that so far as the law applicable
in Che Court of Session was con¬
cerned, there had been no altera¬
tion in the common law position.
The claims, which will now be
heard in Fldinburgh are by the
mother, Mrs Elizabeth Lallv, 6
Hutchison Road, Edinburgh, and
two children of the dead man.
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(Lally v. Comex)
Judge refuses to delay
widow's damages claim
By GEORGE SAUNDERS, Our Chief Law Reporter
A judge has refused to
delay a claim for damages of
£42,000 by the family of a diver
drowned in the North Sea, to
enable them to pursue a claim
for $1.2 million in the U S.
The decision is expected to
have far-reaching legal implica¬
tions in claims against multi¬
national concerns such as oil
companies and airlines, when the
actions can be raised in more
than one country.
Thomas Lally drowned in the
Norwegian sector when diving to
230 feet off an oilrig in March
1971.
His widow, Mrs Elizabeth Lally,
of Hutchison Road, Edinburgh,
sued Comex (Diving) Ltd., of
Crombie Place, Aberdeen, for
£2000 in the Court of Session and
also claimed £20,000 for each of
her husband's two children, Mark
I.ally (11), of Hutchison Road,
Edinburgh, and Elin Olsen, of
Stavanger, Norway. Evidence in
the case is due to be heard in the
Court of Session on May 10.
In May last year, Lord Stott
rejected a plea by Comex that
the case should be dealt with
according to Norwegian law. He
said it was agreed that if the
accident had happened in Nor¬
wegian territorial waters Nor¬
wegian, law would have applied.
But it happened on the high seas
where every country was entitled,
under common law, to apply its
own legal system.
This week, the judge was asked
by the widow to delay the Scot¬
tish proceedings to allow her
claim to be heard instead in
America. Lord Stott was told that
she had raised an action in
America for $1.2 million against
three companies-Ocean Drilling
and Exploration, Philips Petro¬
leum, and Comex Marine Services
Inc., an associate company of
Comex (Diving).
The judge was also told that
the American court would debate
the issue of jurisdiction in Sep¬
tember and he was asked to delay
the Court of Session case.
Damages, if awarded, would be
very much higher in the U S than
any award in Scotland or the UK.
But if the case was decided or
settled in Scotland then the
American action would have to
be abandoned, the court was told.
Lord Stott refused to delay the
hearing on May 10 and said that
the family should have made up
their minds long ago in which
court they would bring proceed¬
ings. I
Correction (April 29): Mrs. Lally is the
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! DIVING ^accidents in the
; North Sea have become big
business for several Ameri¬
can lawyers who are
exploiting the provisions
of an American law to Seek
massive damages in the
States.
There are 20 cases pending
in the United States, all
related to deaths or injuries
which were suffered in the
British sector of the North
Sea.
Some of the actions are for
more than $1 million, and all
are for far greater sums than
would be likely to be awarded
by British courts. The Ameri¬
can interest in diving mishaps
has developed to such an
extent that the Law reform
Committee at Lloyd's is pre¬
paring to fight test cases in
the US, in an effort to estab¬
lish that what happens in the
North Sea is outside the jut i»-
diction of the Americitt
courts.
At present, ^ne most
tenuous connection between
the employing company and
the US is sufficient justifica¬
tion for American courts to
be involved. This, at least,
is the lawyers' interpretation
of the Jones Act, which states
that any marine structure
anywhere in the world which
is owned in any part by an
i American corporation is
: under the jurisdiction of
American law. That definition
covers just about every piece
of hardware involved in North
Sea exploration.
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There is plentiful evidence
that the American lawyers
are actively canvassing for
business in Britain, and that
'ambulance chasers' are re¬
tained by them to reach
injured divers or the depen¬
dants of dead divers as'soon
after an accident as' possible
in order to persuade them to
authorises the lawyer to
pursue the case.
The scale of the business
and the techniques used were
highlighted last week by the
BBC Scotland programme' Current Account. Mrs
Irene Lally of Edin¬
burgh, mother of a diver who
died, said she had been
visited bv two lawyers who
told her they were ' doing all
the divers ' cases' and could
get $1 million for her son's
two children.
Mrs Lally has now re¬
ceived a £30,000 settlement
in the British courts, but the
case is still being pursued in
the US—and American
lawyers are trying to have
other cases settled in Britain
re-opened in the States.
Mr Derek Bannister of Ux-
bridge, who is paralysed for
life from the waist down¬
wards as a result of an acci¬
dent in which another diver
died, said that his financee
and parents were approached
while he was still in hospital.
An agent for a Houston
lawyer offered ' unreal '
amounts of money of which
the lawyers would take 30
per cent.
Mr Michael Payne, chair¬
man of the Lloyd's Law Re¬
form Committee, said yester¬
day: 'We are trying to stop
the law from being misused.
There are a number of
American attorneys actively
involved in rounding up
plaintiffs and persuading
them to make claims against
British employers in the US
courts.
In addition to pursuing the
test cases the Lloyd's Com¬
mittee are asking the Lord
Chancellor to take action to
'
stop the toutting for busi¬
ness by unscrupulous Ameri¬
can lawyers.'




A Court of Session judge has
ordered a German woman suing
for damages of £5000 arising
from a road accident, to appoint
a mandatary to conduct her claim
in Scotland.
Lord Dunpark said he did so
because there was iiu argreement
to which the UK was a party
providing for reciprocal enforce¬
ment of judgement of courts in
different countries of the EEC.
The Treaty of Rqpie made provi¬
sion for this but the convention
in 1968 did not include the UK.
Miss Ingrid Einke, of Schale
Dorfstrasse, West Germany, is
suing the Rev. Raymond Arm¬
strong, of St John the Baptist's
vicarage, Broughton. Fulwood,
near Preston, for injuries which
she claims she sustained when
she was struck by a car driven by
him in High Street. Fort William,
in August 1973.
RECIPROCAL
At a preliminary hearing, the
judge ordered her to appoint a
mandatarv who would be respon¬
sible for conducting her litigation
in Scotland and granted her
leave to appeal aeainst the deci¬
sion. But in a later decision the
iudge said he refused leave to
appeal after examination of
authority on the question.
The move to appoint a manda¬
tary was opposed, he said, on the




the effect of making judgments
of the West German courts and
the Court of Session mutually en
forceable. He took the view that
a mandatary should be appointed
who would be personally respon¬
sible for conducting the litigation
in Scotland. He said he granted
leave to appeal in the belief that
the courts of the two countries
were bound bv recinrneit enforce¬
ment provisions of EEC legisla¬
tion.
However, on examination of the
provisions, he was now of the
opinion that^there wa- not yet any
EEC provisions of that kind




UNRECOGNISED GOVERNMENTS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS:
a review of the recent cases with special reference to the Rhodesian
situation.
"If it be in the interests of high policy, it is not in the interests
of justice." - Lord Denning.
The unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith government
in Southern Rhodesia in 1965 and the events that followed resulted in
a flood of legal literature.^ These writings have been mainly concerned
with the implications for international law or constitutional law of
U.D.I, and its consequences. In this chapter the material is to be
approached from a different angle - the principal concern here is with
the conflict of laws aspect or, more accurately, with the rules of
English law on the enforcement of the laws and acts of officials of
unrecognised governments in the field of private law. The consequences
of U.D.I, have illustrated very clearly the limitations of the traditional
approach in this field and have resulted in some significant development
of the rules by the courts and, in so far as Southern Rhodesia is
concerned, their significant amendment by legislation. It is these
1. See, for example, the writings listed in footnote 2 of H.R. Hahlo,
"The Privy Council and the 'Gentle Revolution'" (1969) 86 S.A.L.J.
p.419.
160
developments that are to be reviewed in this chapter.1
2
Before the Carl Zeiss case came to the House of Lords in 1966,
the courts tended to the view that, where a government is unrecognised,
its legislation and the acts of its officials could not be given any
effect, even in the field of private law, and even where the unrecognised
3
government is not a party to the dispute. In this case it was argued
that, as the United Kingdom government had not recognised the East German
government, the letter's acts could not be enforced. This argument was
rejected, it being held that although the United Kingdom recognised the
Soviet Union and not the East German government as the governing authority
in East Germany, the acts of this latter government would be given effect
in the United Kingdom "... because they are acts done by a subordinate
4
body which the U.S.S.R. set up to act on its behalf." In this way the
problem of the effects of non-recognition in the sphere of private law
was avoided, but this way out will not always be available. Where it is
not, the consequences of non-recognition will be very serious. Lord
1• The distinction between de facto and de jure recognition is of little
significance in the context of this chapter. On the distinction see
Starke, Introduction to International Law (8th ed., 1977) pp.162-8 and
Dicey and Morris. The Conflict of Laws (9th ed., 1973) p.560.
2. Carl Zeiss Stlftung V. Rayner & Keeler Ltd. (Ho. 2), [1967J 1 A.C. 853
(H.L. ).
3. See, for example, Luther v, Sagor.Pl921j 3 K.B. 532 (C.A.) and
Carl Zeiss Stlftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd. (No, 2), 1965] Ch. 596 (C.A.)
4. Lord Reid at 907.
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Reid made this point in Carl Zeiss in relation to the position that would
exist if the East German government could not be recognised in this indirect
way, as follows:1
"Counsel for the respondents did not dispute that in that case
we must not only disregard all new laws and decrees made by
the German Democratic Republic or its Government, but that
we must also disregard all executive and judicial acts done by
persons appointed by that Government because we must regard
their appointments as invalid. The result of that would be
far-reaching. Trade with the Eastern Zone of Germany is not
discouraged. But the incorporation of every company in East
Germany under any new law made by the German Democratic
Republic or by the official act of any official appointed by its
Government would have to be regarded as a nullity, so that any
such company could neither sue nor be sued in this country.
And any civil marriage under such new law, or owing its validity
to the act of any such official, would also have to be treated
as a nullity, so that we should have to regard the children as
illegitimate. And the same would apply to divorces and all
manner of judicial decisions whether in family or commercial
questions. And that would affect not only status of persons for¬
merly domiciled in East Germany but also property in this
country the devolution of which depended on East German Law."
But Lord Reid felt that there may be a way out of this difficulty if the
English courts could adopt certain doctrines which had found some support
in the United States of America, though he expressed no view on whether
1. At 907.
162
this would be possible as it was unnecessary for tie decision of that
particular case. Difficult questions had arisen in the United States
with regard to acts of administration in the Confederate States during the
Civil War and again out of the delay in recognition to the Soviet Union,
and these doctrines were developed by the American courts to solve these
problems.^
On this issue of the legality of East German legislation all the
other Judges in the House of Lords agreed with the views of Lord Reid or
v
adopted a similar approach. Of these only Lord Wilberforce considered
independently the question whether there could be any exception to the rule
that non-recognition of a government meant non-recognition of its legis¬
lation. He, like Lord Seid, pointed out the unsatisfactory results that
2
would flow from the application of the rule. For instance, he says:
"By logical extension it seems to follow, ... that there is, for
many years has been and, until the c+titude of Her Majesty's
government changes, will be, in East Germany a legal vacuum;
subject only, it may be, to the qualification that pre-existing
German law, so far as it can continue to be operated or have
effect, may continue in force. Whether in fact it can continue
to be operated to any great extent if its operation depends on
administrative or Judicial authorities act up by the non-existent
"government" must be doubtful."
If this were the result of the accepted approach then, he felt, its




"My Lords, if the consequences of non-recognition of the East
German "government" were to bring in question the validity of
its legislative acts, I should wish seriously to consider
whether the invalidity so brought about is total, or whether
some mitigation of the severity of this result can be found.
"In the United States some glimmerings can be found of the
idea that non-recognition cannot be pressed to its ultimate
logical limit, and that where private rights, or acts of every¬
day occurrence, or perfunctory acts of administration are concerned
(the scope of these exceptions has never been precisely defined)
the courts may, in the interests of Justice and common sense,
where no consideration of public policy to the contrary has to
prevail, give recognition to the actual facts or realities found
to exist in the territory in question. These ideas began to
take shape on the termination of the Civil War ..., and have been
o
developed and reformulated, ..., in later cases."
Lord Wilberforce conceded that no trace of this doctrine was to be
found in English law but suggested that there was nothing in the relevant
cases that would prevent its adoption. It was not then necessary to
decide the point but he was of the view that whether and to what extent
3
the doctrine could be invoked remained an open question.
This problem has, in general, been neglected by the textbook writers




4. A.E. Anton, Private International Law (1967) pp.82-5. See too K.
Lipstein, "Recognition of Governments and the application of Foreign Laws"
(1950) 35 Tr. Grotius Soc. p.157, and D.W. Greig, "The Carl Zeiss Ca3e and
the Position of an Unrecognised Government in English Law" (1967) 83 L.Q.R.
p.96.
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strict approach and points out the injustice which its application can
cause. He refers with approval to the possible exception to the strict
approach mentioned in Carl Zeiss. He submits that the main reason for
applying foreign law choice of law rules is to do justice to the individuals
concerned - it is not because comity between nations requires it. The
factors relevant to the granting of political recognition of states for
public international law purposes and those concerned with recognition for
private international law purposes are different, therefore there is no
valid reason why political non-recognition should be accompanied by non-
recognition for private international law purposes where the rights of
private individuals are concerned.
"If our courts gave effect in matters of private right to the
law of Germany while in a state of war with Britain, why should
it not give effect to the legislation in matters of private
right of countries whose governmex are not recognised by the
United Kingdom?"1
This then was the state of the law on this topic of recognition of
governments in private international law when the legal consequences of
U.D.I, in Rhodesia came before the courts. This declaration was made on
November 11, 1965. On the same day the Governor declared U.D.I, un¬
constitutional and notified the Prime Minister and the other ministers
2
that they no longer held office. Shortly thereafter the United Kingdom
1. At p.85. Enemy aliens, of course, cannot sue in our courts.
2. Hadgimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke. £19693 A.C. 645 at 714 (P.O.).
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parliament re-a3serted the authority of the United Kingdom government over
Southern Rhodesia in the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965. This Act also
authorised the United Kingdom government to legislate in respect of
Rhodesia by Order in Council.^ It was immediately followed by the
2
Southern Rhodesia Constitution Order which, inter alia* deprived the
legislature in Southern Rhodesia of legislative competence rendered
any new legislation by it void and of no effect.' One should perhaps
add, as it is of relevance later, that the Governor in his statement of
November 11, 1965 dismissing his ministers also said:* "it is the duty
of all citizen to maintain law and order in the country and to carry on
with their normal tasks. This applies equally to the Judiciary, the armed
services, the police, and the public services,"
In fact, Southern Rhodesia has, since U.D.I., been under the effective
control of the Smith government though no recognition, in the international
sense, has been accorded it by the United Kingdom or any other government.
In certain respects the situation was inauspicious for any relaxation
by the English courts of the rule that political non-recognition meant
non-recognition of laws and acts of officials of the government concerned.
A major reason for this was that here one of the competing governments
1. Kadzirabamuto, at 715*
2. S.I. 1965/1952.
3. Kadzimbamuto, at 715-6.
4. Kadzimbamuto,at 714—5• This directive was repeated on November 14 —
Kadzimbamuto,738. For one view of its subsequent fate see Adams v,
Adams. f;i97riP.188 at 204-5.
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was the United Kingdom government itself. Not only did it not concede
any loss of sovereignty over Rhodesia but it was making strenuous efforts,
short however of military action, to re-establish its control over the
colony. To this end it had adopted a sanctions policy against the
Smith government although this course would, if realised, necessarily
cause some injustice to individuals. It also, as already noted,
deprived the Southern Rhodesian parliament, by legislation, of its
legislative competence and re-stated its own legislative authority over
the territory.
However, in addition to the three main cases here relevant that
came before the English courts, there were two other important cases.^
The first of these, Hadzimbamuto. was a Privy Council appeal from Rhodesia
and the approach there adopted was the approach thought appropriate, not
2
for an English court, but for a Rhodesian court. The second, Bilang.
was heard by the Hi^i Court of New Zealand. All these courts applied
English law as the constitutional law of Southern Rhodesia but, as will
be seen later, their approaches varied significantly.
1. A further case from Germany in 1his field is summarised by H.R. Hahlo
in "The Privy Council and the 'Gentle Revolution'" (1969) 86 S.A.L.J.
419 at 426.
2, For example, see Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke. JjL96?~J J.C.
A.C. 645 at ?23 et seq. (p.c.).
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In 1968, in Madzimbamuto.^ the Privy Council had to decide whether
the appellant's husband was lawfully detained in Southern Rhodesia under
emergency regulations as had been held by the Rhodesian courts. This
detention could only be lawful if the court was able to give effect to
certain legislation of the Smith government. This case was not concerned
with private international law but it must be dealt with as it is relevant
to later cases concerned with such matters.
2
Lord Reid, delivering the opinion of the majority of the Board,
held that the nature of the sovereignty of the Queen in the Parliament
of the United Kinguom, over Southern Rhodesia, must be determined by the
constitutional law of the United I ingdom. Under that law Parliament is
sovereign. Thus the Southern Rhodesia Act and the Southern Rhodesia
Constitution Order in Council, both of 19*>5» could have, and did have,
3
full legal effect in Southern Rhodesia.
Beadle C.J., in his judgment in the Rhodesian Appellate Division,
had said that a substantial measure of sovereignty had been granted to
Rhodesia and that it was certainly arguable that such a grant could not
1. See note 2 on p.166 for the citation of this case.
2. Which included Lord Wilberforce.
3. At 721-2.
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be revoked by legislation.* However, he thought the point of little
relevance and did not pursue it. Nonetheless, Lord Reid felt it necessary
to make the point that, in the view of the majority, nothing in the
relevant enactments, including the 1961 constitution, showed any intention
Southern 2
to transfer sovereignty to the,.Rhodesian government.
Lord Reid then turned to the question whether the Smith government
3in Southern Rhodesia could be regarded as a lawful government. He
considered that the courts of a country where there had been a successful
usurpation of government must recognise the new government if it is in
effective control and without any rival in the sense that the legitimate
4
government is not trying to regain control. Presumably if this had been
the state of affairs in Southern Rhodesia then the courts there would be
bound to apply the laws of the new regime, disregarding the United Kingdom
5
legislation. However, he held, that was not the position in this casei
"The British government acting for the lawful Sovereign is
taking steps to regain control and it is impossible to predict
with certainty whether or not it will succeed. Both the judges
1. Kadzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, 1968 (2) S.A. 284 at 334. (R.,A.D.).
2. At 722-3.




in the General Division and the majority in the Appellate
Division in Southern Rhodesia rightly still regard the 'revo¬
lution* as illegal and consider themselves sitting as courts of
the lawful Sovereign and not under the revolutionary Constitution
of 1965. Their lordships are therefore of opinion that the
ustirping Government now in control of Southern Rhodesia cannot
be regarded as a lawful government."^
Lord Reid then turned to the doctrine of necessity and discussed
its possible application in this case at some length. The argument was
2
that "... when a usurper is in control of a territory, loyal subjects
of the lawful Sovereign who reside in that territory should recognise,
obey and give effect to commands of the usurper in so far as that is
necessary in order to preserve law and order and the fabric of civilised
3
society." There was no English authority, but there was a series of
United Etates decisions relating to the rebel status in the Civil War and
some juristic authority, notably the views of Grotius. After reviewing
A R
this authority Lord Reid concluded:"^
1. Beadle, C.J., looking at the situation at a later date, held that
the test was then satisfied. See Ndhlovu v. The Queen. 1968 (4)
S.A. 515 at 523 and 528 (R.,A.D.). ~
2. At 726.
3. Save for the statute of 1495 (ll Hen. 7, c.l) which the majority felt
did not support any general proposition that a usurping government in




"It may be that there is a general principle, depending on
implied mandate from the lawful Sovereign, which recognises
the need to preserve law and order in territory controlled by
a usurper. But it is unnecessary to decide that question
because no such principle could override the legal right of the
Parliament of the United Kingdom to make such laws as it may
think proper for territory under the sovereignty of Her Majesty
in the Parliament of the United Kingdom."
The legislation in question was specifically directed at 1he situation
created by U.D.I, and must be given effect. It renders void the
legislation of the Smith government including that under which the
appellant's husband is detained.
The argument here, I would suggest, is not that the Privy Council
is an English court and thus bound by Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament,
however ineffective, but that the doctrine of necessity cannot be invoked
where its application would clearly conflict with the legislation of the
lawful government. No mandate can be implied where it conflicts with the
clear intention of the lawful government as expressed in legislation.
Lord Pearce in his dissenting opinion* agreed that Southern Rhodesia
remained a British colony and that the Smith government was illegal.
But he felt that the doctrine of necessity was here applicable. This
1. At 731-745.
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doctrine he described as follows:^
"I accept the existence of a principle that acts done by those
actually in control without lawful validity may be recognised
as valid or acted on by the courts, with certain limitations
namely (a) so far as they are directed to and reasonably required
for ordinary running of the State, and (b) so £ar as they do
not impair the rights of citizens under the lawful (l96l)
Constitution, and (c) so far as they are not intended to and do
not in fact directly help the usurpation and do not run contrary
to the policy of the lawful Sovereign. This last, i.e., (c^, is
tantamount to a test of public policy."
Lord Pearce, too, found support for this proposition in a number of
authorities including Crotius and the United States cases on the situation
2 3
arising from the Civil War. The substance of his opinion continues:
The judges appointed under the 1961 Constitution have continued to sit
after U.D.I. - this is an uneasy compromise adopted by both sides primarily,
no doubt, due to the reasonable and humane desire of preserving law and
order. The illegal government has clearly indicated its acceptance of
this position and the approval of this compromise by the lawful government
is clearly shown by various factors. There is, first, the Governor's
directive to the judges, issued twice and never countermanded, calling on
1. At 732.
2. At 733.
3. At 737 et seq.
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them to maintain law and order in the country and to carry on with their
normal tasks. No provision has been made by the lawful government to
pay the judges, it has been left to the Smith government to pay their
salaries. Lastly, in 1967 when the Chief Justice had to be absent from
Rhodesia, an acting Chief Justice was appointed by the lawful government.
This message of the Governor then was a mandate to the judges to do what
they have done, and the message, and also the general acceptance of the
situation by the United Kingdom government which it illustrates, provides
sufficient evidence of implied mandate for the doctrine of necessity to be
operative in this situation provided, of course, the position in Southern
Rhodesia warrants it, which it does. "The necessity relied on in the
present case is the need to avoid the vacuum which would result from a
refusal to give validity to the acts and legislation of the present autho¬
rities in continuing to provide for the evciy day requirements of the
inhabitants of Rhodesia over a period of two years."The lawful
*
government has not attempted or purported to make any provision for 3uch
matters or for any lawful needs of the country, because it cannot. It
has of necessity left all those things to the illegal government and its
Ministers to provide. It has appointed no lawful Ministers. If one
disregards all illegal provision for the needs of the country, there is
2
a vacuum and chaos."
1. At 740 quoting Pieldsend, J,A,in the court a quo.
2. At 740.
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Thus, "[i]a my view, the principle of necessity or implied mandate
applies to the present circumstances in Rhodesia"* subject to the three
necessary qualifications already mentioned, which do not apply here. Nor
does the application of the doctrine of necessity here conflict with
either the Act or the Order in Council of 1965. I believe that the
contemporaneous governor's directive must be used in construing the Act
and the Order in Council. The Act gives ihe widest powers to govern
by Order in Council but it does not effect this argument for the application
of the doctine of necessity. While
"... the relevant part of the Order was simply directed to
prohibiting ary improper use or manipulation of the 1961
Constitution by those in control of Rhodesia, and to preventing
that Constitution being taken over and used as a speciously
lawful government by those who did not intend to obey its limits
(as has been done on occasion elsewhere) - in short to make it
2
clear beyond argument or subterfuge that this was rebellion."
"Moreover, for the present argument it makes no difference
if an Order in Council expressly made acts illegal and void,
so that instead of being plainly illegal and void as contrary
to the lawful Constitution and lawful Government of Rhodesia
they also become illegal and void as contrary to an Order in
Council. They were still subject to the principle of necessity




down in the Governor's directive. There is no indication in
the Order in Council that it is intended to exclude the doctrine
of necessity or implied mandate by enjoining (inconsistently with
the Governor's directive) continuing disobedience to every act or
command which had not the backing of lawful authority. Even had
it done so, I feel some doubt as to how far this is a possible
conception when over a prolonged period no steps are taken by the
Sovereign himself to do any acts of government and the result
would produce a pure and continuous chaos or vacuum. And even
apart from the Governor's directive I would certainly not be
prepared to infer such an intention where it was not expressly
stated,"^
This then was the approach of Lord Pearce,
To turn now to the general implications of the opinions in the Privy
Council, it would seem that the doctrine of necessity, based on the public
policy of the lawful government and its implied mandate, may be inadequate
to deal with the problems facing a court in the area under the control of
a usurper. Here the need to avoid a legal vacuum is the predominant
factor: whether there is or is not an implied mandate from the lawful
government is largely irrelevant. Beadle^C.J, in his judgment in the
2
lihodesian Court of Appeal, realised that what was needed was some doctrine
that would permit the provisional and limited recognition by the courts
in Southern Rhodesia of the laws and acts of the Rhodesian government at
the stage where that government was clearly in control of Southern Rhodesia
1. At 745.
2. Kadzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke. 1968 (2) S.A. 284 at 290-361 (R., A.D.).
See too H.R, Hahlo, "The Privy Council and the 'Gentle Revolution'"
(1969) 86 S.A.L.J. 419 at 427.
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but did not yet have that degree of permanence or security that would
justify its recognition as the de .lure government by the courts of that
territory. Even Fieldsend J.A. ^ who held in the Rhodesian Court of
Appeal that the 1961 Constitution was still in force but that the
doctrine of necessity was applicable, based his decision on the factual
situation in Southern Rhodesia and not on any implied mandate from the
lawful government. However, where the validity of laws and administrative
acts of a revolutionary government come before the courts of other
countries for determination whether they can be recognised in those
countries for private international law purposes, then the idea of implied
mandate may be more appropriate. In this respect the approach adopted
by the Privy Council may be considered more appropriate to an English
or Hew Zealand court than to a Southern Rhodesian. This will be
considered again later.
In the United Kingdom, after the decisions in Nadzimbamuto and
2 ;
Ndhlovu. it was assumed that the acts of officials, judicial and other,
appointed by, or even perhaps also continuing to act under, the Smith
government were void. Thus for instance, marriages, adoptions, decrees
of divorce or nullity and appointments of executors by these officials
3
were considered ineffective. The question whether this was the correct
\
1. Kadzimbaruuto. (R.,A.D.) at 422-444.
2» v. The Queen. 1968 (4) S.A. 515 (R., A.D.).
3. See for example, Adams v. Adams (Attorney-General intervening), [I97lj p#
188 at 197 and 204, and 1970 S.L.T. (JUBUa) 84.
«
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approach finally came up for decision in England in 1970 in Adams,1
heard by Sir Jocelyn Simon, P. in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty
Division of the High Court. The question for decision in that case,
stated in a particular rather than a general form, was whether the fact
that the Judge who granted a divorce in Southern Rhodesia had been
appointed by the Smith government after U.D.I., was fatal to the validity
of the decree and thus precluded its recognition in England, though it
was otherwise acceptable as a decree of the court of the domicile.
The court here was in a very different position from the Privy
Council in Itadzii baiauto: it was an English court, bound to give effect
to United Kingdom legislation on Southern Rhodesia, whether or not that
legislation was in fact effective in that colony. United Kingdom
legislation, in this instance the 1961 ^.hodesian Constitution as amended
in 1964, provided the procedure for the appointment of a Judge in Southern
Rhodesia. This procedure, in particular that part of the procedure
relating to the oath of allegiance and the Judicial oath, had not been
followed, therefore, the argument went, there was a fatal defect in the
appointment of the Judge in question. As he was not a Judge, the divorce
decree he granted was void and could not be recognised in England. This
argument was considered decisive, but the point was also made that, as
the United Kingdom government had not recognised the Smith government,
1. See the previous note for the citation of this case.
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it was not possible for this court to adopt the view of the Southern
Rhodesia Appellate Division in Ndhlovu that the Smith government was
the government de .jure and that its donstitution, under which the judge
was appointed, was the only valid donstitution.1
Sir Jocelyn Simon did consider whether the doctrine of necessity
could in any way mitigate the harshness of this position. He considered
the authorities previously dealt with as relating to necessity under the
two heads of "the doctrine of necessity," and "validity of acts of a de
facto judge." The separation of the two categories of necessity seems to
have been influenced by an article of Owen Dixon, later Chief Justice of
2
Australia, published in 1940 and called "De Facto Officers." Sir Jocelyn
Smith accepted the approach to the doctrine of necessity adopted by the
majority in Madzimbamuto and agreed that in the case of Southern Rhodesia
the doctrine could nots
"... override the legal right of the Parliament of the United
Kingdom to make laws for such a territory; and that no puiw
ported law made by any person or body in Southern Rhodesia,
no matter how necessary such law might be for preserving law
3
and order, or otherwise, could have any legal effect whatsoever."
1. At 206.
2. Res Judicata. Vol. 1 (Kelboume 1940) 285-292. Adams. at 211.
3. At 210.
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However, basing his remarks on a dictum in the majority opinion in
Kadzimbamuto. he went on to make the point that the requirements of the
doctrine were not, in any case, met by the then existing circumstances,
in Southern Hhodesia. Thus recognition under this doctrine after a
rebellion is over is very different from recognition while the usurping
government remains in power:
"... public policy is the very essence of the doctrine, whether
one calls it •necessity* or 'implied mandate' or anything else.
All that I have been told of the political and legislative history
of the I'D! affair, coupled with the scope of the argument for the
Attorney-General in the instant case, suggests to me that I am
concerned with, so to speak, a legal blockade as a counterpart
of the economic blockade. The essence of the blockade of a
usurping regime is to cause it to capitulate by bringing pressure
on citizens within the territory of usurpation. Innocent
private individuals, even children, may be caused undeserved
hardship in the process. If this is a just parallel, there does
indeed seem to be all the difference between according legal
recognition during the usurpation to executive, judicial or
legislative acts of the usurping regime and doing so after
capitulation; just as there is all the difference between
allowing blockade-running during a rebellion and lifting the
blockade after the capitulation."^
Then he thought that the use of the fiction of implied mandate may
be necessary where it is the only means of abating the rigour of the law;
1. At 210-211.
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for instance, where legislative powers are limited by a constitution as
in the United States. But it is "... less necessary when sovereign
parliaments are in continuous session and able to express their wishes
legislatively (particularly when legislation can be enacted by Order
in Council)."^ Indeed here to imply any mandate might well, he felt,
be contradicting the real intention of the lawful sovereign. Thus:
" Tnhe doctrine of •necessity* is intimately connected with
concepts of public policy, a sphere in which courts of law
are rightly chary of intrusion. Where one has a sovereign
legislature continuously in session, it seems to me in every
way preferable to leave it to the Wueen in Parliament to decide
how far recognition should be accorded to executive, judicial
or legislative acts of organs of governments which are non de
jure."
Sir Jocelyn Simon then turned to the question of the validity of
3
the acts of de facto officers including judicial officers. His approach
here is as follows: the doctrine of the validity of acts of de facto
officers is part of English law and is based on public policy and necessity.
It applied to situations where a not properly appointed but putative





protection of the rights of persons affected by the "official acts."
It can thus have no place where the legal defect is notorious. It has
never been applied during a rebellion to the acts of officers of the
usurping power - indeed this common law doctrine has never been applied
to the prejudice of any right of a sovereign. Then again:
"... it would be a constitutional anomaly for our courts to
recognise the validity of the acts of Hacaulay J. the Rhodesian
judge as a de facto judge while the executive acts by those
appointing him (which must include his very appointment) are
refused recognition de facto by the executive here."^
"For the judiciary here to recognise the efficacy of the acts
of such an appointee on the ground that he was exercising his
office de facto would indeed involve the State in speaking "with
2
two voices"."
So, under this doctrine too, no recognition could be given to this divorce.
Although it was unnecessary for the decision of this case, but as
a guide to marriage officers and as ihe point had been argued, the
President expressed the view that decrees of judges appointed before
U.D.I, but pronounced after U.D.I, were valid. His reasoning here is
not convincing and the validity of the distinction in this context between
judges appointed before U.D.I, and those appointed after was denied by
3
all three judges in the Court of Appeal in the case In re James, a case
1. At 214.
2. At 214.
3* In re James (an insolvent) (Attorney-General intervening), [1977] Ch.
41 at 65-6, 72 and 77-8 (C.A.).
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discussed later in this chapter. I would submit that it is best seen
as a concession aimed at mitigating, to some extent, the rigour of the
rule on non-recognition.
There is a later English case on this topic, M. v. R.,^ decided
in 1971 but in it Adams is merely followed - the law is not further
developed.
2
The next case of relevance here is Bilang v, Rigg heard in the
New Zealand Supreme Court in March 1971 but not published in the reports
until late 1972. The plaintiff in this case sought a writ of mandamus
to compel the Registrar of the Supreme Court of New Zealand to reseal a
grant of administration made in Southern Rhodesia. The grant of the
Rhodesian High Court was made by Mr. Perry an additional assistant master
of that court. He had been appointed after U.D.I., but the legislation
in terms of which he was appointed and under which he had made the grant
had been enacted before U.D.I. The Registrar was obliged by New Zealand
legislation to reseal grants made in Commonwealth countries including
Southern Rhodesia, but it was argued that the grant here was invalid
because Kr. Perry had been appointed by a de facto Minister of Justice,
a member of the unrecognised Smith government who was not, by reason of
1. The Times. December 7, 1971.
2. 1.1972] N.Z.L.R. 954.
] 82
United Kingdom legislation, qualified to act as such. In short the
question wast "... if a Southern Uhodesiai Court applied its own law
correctly, ought it to recognise the grant notwithstanding the de facto
lack of qualifications of the Minister of Justice who purported to make
the appointments
Mr. Justice Henry who heard the case reasoned as follows: the
doctrines based on necessity and considered in Kadzimbamuto and Adams
are here applicable. Here
"Cilt is sought to enforce the existing law on matters which rise
from day to day concerning the property of those citizens who
are unable to exercise such a right. To do so, I think,
comes directly within the directions given by the Governor
and, I think, is the presumed intention of the United Kingdom
Government in the circumstances set out in particular by Lord
2
Pearce."
3So following Re Aidridge^ and Lord Pearce in Padzimbamuto, "... unless
the United Kingdom legislation expressly forbids the act of Mr. Perry,
A
his grant is competent," and it does not. Mr. Perry in exercising a
valid statutory power was neither "acting or supporting actions in
5
contravention of the Order in Council." Thus ! r, Perry's grant is
t. At 950.
2. At 961.




good and must be resealed. "This ... does not conflict with Kadzimbamuto's
case because there the exercise of the sovereign power forbade the
legislation under which the prisoner was held."^ "Here this court is
reviewing that area of activity in respect of which their Lordships (in
2Hadzimbar.uto) were at pains to state was not in issue."
3On Adams he concluded:
"I have some difficulty in distinguishing the case of Adams
v. Adams. It did not, as I read it, rely upon the lack of
4
qualification of the appointing authority, but relied upon the
failure of the Judge to qualify under the only valid constitu¬
tion. Perhaps, more oorrectly it was an appointment under
a statute (constitution) declared by the United Kingdom legis-
. lation to be invalid. In so far as Adams v. Adams may con¬
flict with He Aldridge (if it does) then I propose to follow the
latter case because I think it binds me on this question unless
the United Kingdom has expressly declared the act of Mr. Periy
to be void...."
So at last, one finds the doctrine of necessity actually applied,
with what one may describe as positive consequences, to the Hhodesian
situation. All the law, however, is not to be found in the law reports
1. At 961.
2. At 960; and see 956.
3. At 961.
4. This same point is made at 958 and at 960. It is not completely
correct. See Adams at 214.
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and the volumes of legislation; it is interesting to note that althou^i
the South African government has not recognised the Smith government, in
practice the letter's legislation, administrative acts and court decrees
are recognised as valid in South Africa. Indeed the matter has not even,
as far as I can ascertain, specifically come up for the decision in South
African courts in the twelve years since U.D.I,^ I do not doubt that,
if it did, they would apply some doctrine of necessity though I do not
think that they would necessarily adopt an implied mandate approach.
The most recent English case on the Rhodesian situation is In re
2
Jame3 (an insolvent) (Attorney-General intervening) heard in 1976. A
debtor was sequestrated by the High Court of Rhodesia and the Chief
Justice of that court issued letters of request to the bankruptcy court
of the English High Court, invoking s.122 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914,
asking the English High Court to assist in collecting the debtor's
3
English assets. This assistance in terms of s.122 could only lawfully
1. There is one case of slight relevance: S. v. Oosthuisen, 1977 (l)
S.A. 823 (n). For discussion of this case see Fugard, (1977) 94
S. .L.J. 127 and Rudolph,(1977) 94 S.A.L.J. 131.
2. D977] Ch. 41 (C.A.).
3. In re James at 364.
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be given if the High Court of Rhodesia was a "British Court". ^ The
majority (Scannan and Geoffrey Lane, L.JJ.) rule that, although the High
Court of Rhodesia was undoubtedly a court functioning in a British
territory, and although certain of its decrees could perhaps be recognised
uider^he doctrine of necessity, it was, nonetheless, not a "British Court".
Ecarman, L.J. held:
"I do think that in an appropriate case our courts will recognise the
validity of judicial acts, even though they be the acts of a judge not
lawfully appointed or derive their authority from an unlawful government.
But it is a fallacy to conclude that, because in certain circumstances
our courts would recognise as valid the judicial acts of an unlawful court
or a de facto judge, therefore the court thus recognised is a British
court. In my judgment those doctrines do not solve the questions raised
1. The background to the case, and I borrow here from Lord Denning, was
that the debtor, a lawyer in Zambia, made off with some £160,000
belonging to his firm or it's clients. His partners caught up with
him in Southern iiodesia and obtained judgment against him there.
It was not satisfied and he was made insolvent in Southern Rhodesia.
It was thought that he had salted away a substantial amount of the
money in England and thus letters of request were directed to the
English court, as already related. The English Registrar in
Bankruptcy acted on these letters by appointing an English receiver.
The latter needed to obtain information about the insolvent's assets
in England and, to this end, summoned the insolvent's brother who
lived in Bromley to appear before him. The brother objected claiming
that the Rhodesian High Court was not a "British Court" and was thus
not entitled to the assistance it was receiving. His objection was
overruled by the Registrar in Bankruptcy and he then appealed to the
court. Before the matter was heard, the Attorney General applied to
be made a party to the appeal and this was allowed. "At the hearing
it was the Attorney-General, through his counsel, Mr. Blom-Coopen who
launched the main attack on the Rhodesian courts. It was he who asked
us to give no recognition whatever to what the Bhodesian courts had done.
He said that we should give no help whatever to get in the money or
property of David James - so as to restore it to the rightful owners.
It was, he said in the interests of high policy. All I would say about
his argument is this. If it be in the interests of high policy, it is
not in the interests of justice. I see no justice whatever in letting
David James get away with his ill-gotten gains and letting the rightful
owners go away empty-handed" - Lord Denning, M.R. at 59-60.
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bytxis appeal. That question is simply: Was the High Court of Rhodesia
in 1974 a British court?" ^
Geoffrey Lane, L.J. expressed it as follows:
"... I find it impossible to accept the proposition that a judge who is
measured and considered terms states that he is sitting as a "Rhodesian"
court under a constitution avowedly in rebellion against -the Queen is
nevertheless sitting as a British court. The doctrines of implied mandate
and necessity do not, as I see it, affect the question whether the court
2
can properly be called British or not."
His answer to the question is:
"While I can accept that the High Court of Rhodesia is a "court" .... I am
not prepared to interpret a statute of the British Parliament as including
within the category "British" a court which in no way appertains to, or
recognises, the authority of the British sovereign in the territory where it
administers justice, and which has been established by a constitution
introduced in defiance of the Queen in Parliament. In my judgment the
High Court of Rhodesia is not a British court: section 122 is not available
3
to it; nor has the English Court jurisdiction to aid it under the section."





perhaps too much emphasis on whether the Rhodesian court recognises the
authority of the British government - a more important question is whether
the British government recognises the authority of the Rhodesian court
and, applying the doctrine of necessity, it could be said that it does.
This brings us to the remaining judgment in In re James, that of Lord
Denning, K.R.
Lord Denning in his dissenting judgment held that the High Court of
Rhodesia was a "British Court" for the purposes of s.122 of the Bankruptcy
Act 1914. He reviewed the relevant facts and concluded that:
"... during the ierregnum the courts of justice in Southern Rhodesia
were lawfully exercising jurisdiction over matters coming before them -
under a mandate, implied in that behalf, from the lawful sovereign -
provided always that they applied to those matters the laws as they existed
on November 11, 1965» the date of U.D.I, and not on the laws passed by
the unlawful regime".^ The exercise of jurisdiction in insolvency in this
case by the Rhodesian court met this test; this was a lawful exercise of
jurisdiction. There remained, however, the question: the High Court of
Rhodesia was clearly a court but was it a "British Court"?
Lord Denning's answer was:
"To my mind the decisive factor is that they are courts sitting in a
British colony. They are administering the laws of insolvency as enacted
in the days of the lawful sovereign and still in force with the authority
1. At 63
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of the lawful sovereign. When properly administering those laws, they
may properly be described as 'British courts'."^
This judgment is interesting and the basic argument i3 again a
tenable one. However, the judgment has some serious defects.
It has already been noted that whether or not a rebellion has
ended has been held to be relevant to the possible application oi the
doctrine of necessity. Throughout his judgment, given in October 1976,
Lord Denning speaks as if the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia should be
3
treated, for practical purposes, as already over, though this is not the
case even now and may still not be the position for some time. If the
"legal blockade" is required by public policy as a companion to the
economic one, then it was clearly still then too early to dismantle it.
There are other minor complaints - por example, in my view, Lord
4
Denning has misunderstood what was decided in Hellova. and, more serious,
the whole basis of his decision that the doctrine of necessity is
applicable in the Rhodcsian situation is undermined by his imposition of
the limitation that it does not apply where the law concerned was enacted
1. At 63.
2. See this chapter at p. 178.
3. See, for example, 6l and 67.
4. Ndhlovu v. The Cueen, 1968 (4) S.A. 515 (R., A.D.).
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in Rhodesia after U.D.I. The reason for imposing this limitation is the
imperative nature of the provisions cf the Southern Rhodesia Constitution
1 2
Order 1965. However as seen earlier, Lord Fearce in Hadzimbamuto
argued that this limitation did not flow from the order and Lord Denning
does not even mention, let alone discuss and specifically reject, this
argument.
Khat conclusions can one draw then from these cases on the English
law in this field? First, the English doctrine of necessity based on
public policy and implied mandate can be used in three different situations
where a court has to decide on the lawfulness of laws ana administrative
acts of revolutionary governments:
1. where the court is operating in an area under the control
of the revolutionary government (Madzimbamuto);
2. where the court is operating in an area under the control
of the lawful government (Adams; Janes);
5. where the court is operating in a neutral area the government
of which reci rises the previous, not the revo'', 'ionary,
government (Bilang).
/■ o regards the first situation, the doctrine cf necessity is only
relevant vhere it cannot yet be said that the revolution has succeeded
because the recognised government is still effectively opposing the rebel
1. See this chapter at P«165 . Lord Denning's interpretation is to be
found in In re James at 62 and 65.
2. This chapter at p. 175.
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government. Where the revolution has clearly succeeded, the courts in
the territory under the control of the rebel government must give effect
to the laws and acts of officials of the new government.^ However,
where this is not the case, where the rebellion cannot yet be said to
have succeeded, the doctrine of necessity is potentially applicable,
provided, as already stated, that the doctrine of necessity is* part of
the legal system of the lawful government. In this situation I have
2
already argued that the emphasis should be on the necessity of the
situation rather than on any idea of implied mandate and this argument
may have some relevance also in respect of the other two situations, or
3
at least in respect of the latter of them.
Then, as regards the private international law aspect, the relevant
rule of English law is not the following: when applying the law of
another covin try the laws and administrative acts of an unrecognised
government of that country will not be given effect to subject to the
exception based on necessity. It is clear from the cases, particularly
4 5
Adams and Bilang. that the correct approach is: when applying the law
1. See this chapter at p. L68.
2. At p. 174.
3. See the discussion at of this work.
4. At 207F.
5. "In short, if a Southern lihodesian Court applied its own law correctly,
ought it to recognise the grant notwithstanding the de jure lack of
qualification of the Minister of Justice who purported to make the
appointment?'' - 958.
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of another country the laws and administrative acts of an unrecognised
government of that country will only be given effect to in so far as is
permitted by the laws of the recognised government of that country.
Or again: when a court refers a matter under its private international
law rules to the law of another country, the reference is to the laws of
the recognised government of that country. Those laws may allow effect
to be given to the laws and administrative acts of an illegal government
or to some of them, but that is a matter for the laws of the recognised
government to determine. The doctrine of necessity does not fall within
that part of English law known as private international law; it is an
internal doctrine. Whether, in any situation, the laws of an unrecognised
government can be given effect to in an English court is a matter referred
to the law of the recognised government. It may have a doctrine like
that of necessity, or it may not - it is a matter of the content of the
law of that government. One's own government has ultimate control though;
it can always extend recognition to the revolutionary government, and the
courts, too, may be able to exercise some discretion in the matter by the
use of the doctrine of public policy, that is, their own public policy.
It is interesting to note that remarks in Carl Zeiss, that the
doctrine of necessity might be used to recognise laws of unrecognised
governments where the circumstances warranted it, have been shown by
subsequent developments to be somewhat inaccurate. The English law
doctrine of necessity, it would seem, can only be invoked where the law
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of the recognised government in this field is English. In the present
state of the law the question in the Carl iss situation should bej
to what extent are the laws and acts of the East German government
recognised by the Soviet government?
On the English law of necessity I would suggest that the approach
of Lord Pearce in Madzimbamuto is to be preferred to that of the majority
in that case and to that of Sir Jocelyn Simon in /■ dams. and this now
finds some support in Eilang and in the judgment of Lord Denning in James.
The position on the recognition of legislative and administrative acts in
Southern Rhodesi; as set out in Adams has not proved acceptable to the
United Kingdom government which has had to deal with the situation by
legislation. This does not necessarily mean that the courts have failed
in their duty - it may be, as suggested in Adams. that these are matters
of policy best left to the government to deal with by legislation,
especially where this can be done, as in this case, by order in council.
On the other hand, one could argue that it is only because the courts
adopted a restrictive attitude towards the application 01 this doctrine
of necessity that such legislation was required. Then the legislation
is not wholly satisfactory - it deals with the more obvious cases? but
equal injustice, though perhaps to fewer persons, can occur in situations
not covered by the legislation.
These legislative provisions of particular relevance here are
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contained in two orders in council. The earlier, that of late 1970,^
gives the appropriate courts in England and ,ales and Scotland jurisdiction
to hear divorce and nullity proceedings in certain circumstances where
either spouse is domiciled or resident in Southern Rhodesia.
2
The other order, that of late 1972, is substantially more extensive
in its provisions. It validates Rhodesian marriages and divorce, nullity
of marriage and certain other status decrees of Rhodesian courts which
would otherwise have been void because of U.D.I. Courts outside the
United Kingdom adopting the nglish approach to the recognition of
legislation ana acts of unrecognised governments can now give effect to
the laws and acts of the Smith government to the extent that these are
recognised in this order. This would be on the basis that these laws
and acts have been recognised as valid by the lawful government.
U.D.I, in Southern Rhodesia then has provided some interesting
developments in private international la.w as it has in certain other
branches of the law. The law relating to the legislative and admin¬
istrative acts of unrecognised governments in now much clearer than it
was, but I think it fair to conclude that Anton'3 complaint still holds
good; there is a tendency to give inordinate weight to state interests




is to some extent the result of a failure to distinguish between the
public law and the private law aspects of the situation and a consequent
misguided insistence on consistency where this is inappropriate - what is
the correct approach in the field of international relations nay be quite
inappropriate in the sphere of the private rights of individuals.
Two matters remain for consideration. First, I wish to consider
the views of Lord Denning on the subject of the laws of unrecognised
governments set o^t in Hesperides Hotels v. Aegean Holidays Ltd.. \19T7j
5 W.L.R. 656 (C.A.).^ The unrecognised government in question is that
of the North of Cyprus, the only government of Cyprus recognised by the
British government is that set up for the whole of Cyprus by the i960
2
Act of the United Kingdom Parliament. Lord Denning considered that
there were two views on the correct approach in laxf to the laws and acts
of unrecognised governments. The one is that, as stated by Lauterpacht in
1. The basic facts, ta'ren from the headnote of the case, were as followst
"Two companies registered under the law of the Republic of Cyprus
[the recognised government] owned Greek Cypriot Hotels in Kyrenia when
it was occupied by troops from Turkey invading the north of the island
in 1974. They issued a writ in 1977 against an English travel company
and an individual purported to represent in London the "Turkish
Federated State of Cyprus" the unrecognised government , claiming
damages and on injunction to restrain the defendants from conspiring
to procure, encourage, or assist trespass to the hotels by circulating
brochures and by inviting tourists to book holidays in the hotels.
They also moved the judge in chambers for an interim injunction in
terms of the writ. Hay J., .... granted an interim injunction....
The individual defendant appealed."
2. Hesperides Hotels, at 66l.
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a work published in 1948. "... no juridical existence can be attributed
to an unrecognised government and ... no legal consequences of its purported
factual existence can be admitted.... The correct and reasonable rule is
that both the unrecognised government and its acts are a nullity." The
2
other view, to which Lord Denning himself subscribes, is that "... the
courts of this country can recognise the laws or acts of a body which is
in effective control of a territory even though it has not been recognised
by Her Lajesty's Government de jure or de facto: at any rate, in regard
to the laws which regulate the day to day affairs of the people, such as
their marriages, their divorces, their leases, their occupations, and so
forth: and furthermore that the courts can receive evidence of the state
3
of affairs so as to see whether the body is in effective control or not."
1. Recognition in International Law (1948) 145 et seq. quoted in Besperides
Hotels, at 662.
2. Although Lord Denning prefaces his remarks quoted here with the intro¬
ductory qualification, "If it were necessary to make a choice between
these two conflicting doctrines, I would unhesitatingly hold that...",
it is clear from his judgment that he is, in fact, applying the approach
which he believes to be the correct one.
3. At 663. It is surprising that this can be put forward as a tenable
view in the current state of the law, but not as surprising as the opinion
of Roskill, L.J. in Kesperides Hotels that there has been no further
developments in this field since Carl Zeiss. He says, at 672, "... having
regard to the observations of their Lordships in the Bouse of Lords in
"fche Carl Zeiss case (I967J 1 A.C. 853, and in particular to those of Lord
Reid and Lord Wilberforce, it is clear that at some future date difficult
questions may well arise as to the extent to which, notwithstanding the
absence of recognition, the nglish courts will or may recognise and give
effect to the laws or acts of a body which is in effective control of a
particular area or place." It seems that he has, perhaps, been mislead
in this respect by the passage he quotes from 5^0 of the current edition
(the 9th, 1973) of Dicey and Rorris which reads: "However there is high
authority for regarding as open the question whether the courts can
recognise the laws or acts of a body which although it does not satisfy
either of the foregoing tests" (those tests being concerned with recogn¬
ition) "is nonetheless in effective control of the place in question."
The only judicial authority given in Dicey and Korris for this proposition
is the dicta of Lords Reid and Wilberforce in Carl Zeiss quoted in the
early pages of this chapter. Both the passage and footnote appear in th
previous 1967 edition and these have received no revision in the 1973 edit¬
ion definite the fact that Madzimbamutn. Adams and Bilano- had all been
196
Lord Dennin^s approach then is not that which has emerged as the
correct one from the cases considering the Southern Rhodesian situation.
As we have seen these cases suggest that the correct approach to the laws
and acts of officials of an unrecognised government is only to give effect
to these if this is possible under the legal system of the lawful government.
As regards the doctrine of necessity, this can only be applied where the
legal system of the lawful government contains this concept; this doctrine
2
is not part of nglish private international law. Lord Denning here
&*•
seems to be adopting a very different approach. He seems to be saying
that the laws and acts of officials of an unrecognised government will be
given effect if two requirements are present. First, that the rebel
government is in control of the territory in question, and, secondly, that
the relevant laws or acts are necessary for the maintenance of law and
order within that territory. In applying these two tests he would not
seem to consider the attitude of the recognised government to the laws and
acts of officials of the unlawful government to be in any way relevant.
Then, it would seem that, to him, implied mandate is, in this context, a
pure fiction; it is here better described as "irrebuttably presumed mandate".
This approach of Lord Denning*s raises a number of points. The
3. decided in the intervening years.
1. See this chapter at p. 189.
2. See this chapter at pp. 190 - 392.
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first I wish to make is that, though his views in this regard are part
of his ratio, there is no support for this approach in the rationes of
the other two judges of the court, Roskill and Scannan L.JJ. Eoskill,
L.J. , in the dictum quoted earlier in this chapter clearly rejects what
2
may be called the Lauterpacht view, but that does not mean that he
supports Lord Denning's view on the current law on this matter. It is,
indeed, 3trange that Lord Denning nowhere considers the approach adopted
in the cases on the Southern Hhodesian position as being a rival approach
to his. He obviously does not consider these cases irrelevant because
3 4he quotes from his own remarks in James on the subject of unrecognised
governments. Surely it is the view put forward in these cases on Southern
Rhodesia that is the rival to his views rather than the Lauterpacht view
which predates the decision of the House of Lords in Carl Zeiss? It
may, technically, be possible to distinguish the English cases on the
Southern JRhodesian situation from the position in Hesperides Hotels on
the grounds that what was being considered in the first group of cases
was the approach that should be adopted by the courts in the lawful
1. See p. 195 footnote 3.
2. On this view see pp. 194 - 195.
3. Hesperides Hotels, at 663.
In re James, ]~1977j Ch. 44 at 62.
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government's territory to the laws of the rebel government, while in
Hesperides Hotels the forum was neither that of the lawful government nor
that of the rebel government but that of another state. However, Lord
Denning does not draw this distinction in Hesperides Hotels - indeed as
already noted, he quotes from In re James, and, in any case, it is not
clear that this distinction is valid. Again Bilang^ cannot be distinguished
on this ground as this is a New Zealand case, but there is no mention of
it in Hesperides Hotels.
There is little support for Lord Denning's approach in the authority,
2
he cites as favouring his view of the law. The first of these, which he
state to be the most authoritativ , is that of Lord Lilberforce in Carl
Zeiss to the following effect:
".... where private rights or acts of everyday occurrence, or perfunctory
acts of administration are concerned... the courts may, in the interests
of justice and common sense, where no consideration of public policy to the
contrary has to prevail, give recognition to the actual facts or realities
found to exist in the territory in question."
This excerpt, as quoted in Hesperides Hotels, is misleading. If the
fuller quotation of the relevant passage, set out earlier in this ohapter
1. This case is discussed earlier in -this chapter at pp. 181 - I83.
2. He sets _out these authorities on 663.
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at P«lfc>3 , is read, it will be observed that the reference is to Amerioan
I*v not unglish Law as Lord Denning*s extract suggests. It is true,
however, that Lord Wilberforce though it might be necessary for the
English courts to adopt the American approach if the appropriate
situation arose though he did not decide the point as it was not then
relevant. Similar obiter remarks were also made by Lord Reid^ in Carl
Zeiss but these are net referred to by Lord Denning. Although these
dicta by Lords Reid and Wilberforce are critical of the Lauterpacht
approach, it is doubtful whether any real authority for Lord Denning's
particular approach, as opposed to the approach in the cases on Southern
Hhodesia, can be found in these very cautious and rather general remarks
clearly designated as obiter by their authors. Certainly Lord Denning'8
apparent abandonment of the view that the existence of the implied mandate
required for necessity requires proof or can be disproved, runs contrary
2
to Lord Reid's approach to this matter in Madzimbamuto.
The second authority cited by Lord Denning^ in support of his
4
version of the law is an article by Professor Lipstein published in 1950
5
and cited in Dicey and Morris. Apart from claiming that the article
1. See this chapter at p. 161.
2. See this chapter at p. 169 • Lord Reid's opinion was that of the
majority of the Board including Lord Wilberforce.
3. At 663.




supports his view, he makes no further reference to it save for quoting
its concluding sentence, which is, in fact the tenth and last of Lipsteinfe
conclusions. It reads:
"The regulations of foreign authorities which have not been recognised
may be applied as the law of the foreign country if they are in fact
enforced in that country, notwithstanding that the authorities have not
been recognised by Great Britain."*
This valuable, if now dated, article dealt with many other matters
2
than that directly in point here - it has already been pointed out that
the above quotation from Lipstein is the tenth and last of his listed
conclusions. This last rule of his, despite its positive form is, in
fact, a statement of what he thinks, or perhaps, thought, the law on this
topic should be. In view of this and the developments in this field
since he wrote, little support for Lord Denning's views in Hesperides Hotels
can be found in this article.
The third authority cited is Lord Denning himself, or, more accurately,
part of his judgment in the case In re James. This reads:
"When a lawful sovereign is ousted for the time being by a usurper, the
lawful sovereign still remains under a duty to do all he can to preserve
law and order within iiie territory: and, as he can no longer do it himself
1. Lipstein,at 188.
2. The article commences at 157 but the portion of relevance here is 183-8.
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he is held to give an implied mandate to his subjects to do what is
necessary for the maintenance ox law and order rather than expose them
to all the disorders of anarchyj..
If this judgment is read in its context, that of the Southern Rhodesian
situation, and if this excerpt is read in the context of the whole
judgment, there is nothing in either that deviates from the generally
accepted approach in the cases about Southern Rhodesia•• Indeed, the
quotation is preceded by a long discussion of whether or not it is implicit
in the conduct of the lawful government of Southern Rhodesia, the British
Government, that they wish the courts in that colony to continue to apply
the law - the conclusion is that it wa3.
Lord Denning cannot suggest, with any justification, that his new
approach in Hespcrides Hotels was in any way foreshadowed in his judgment
in James and his fatrth and final authority, the general approval of his
2
observations on necessity in James by Scarman, L.J. in that same case
and the remark of Scarman, L.J. that:
"I do think that in an appropriate case our courts will recognise the
validity of judicial acts, even though they be the acts of a judge not
lawfully appointed or derive their authority from an unlawful
3
government."
1 • In re James, at 62 quoted in Hesperides Hotels, at 663.
2. At 70.
3. In re James, at 70 quoted in Hesperides Hotels, at 663.
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cannot be construed as providing any support for Lord Denning's new
approach in Hesperides Hotels. That there has been a fundamental change
j
in Lord Dennings views of the law on this matter is well illustrated in the
change in his approach to the relevance of the attitude of the lawful
government to the laws and acts of officials of the unrecognised government.
In James he considers this matter at length and is clearly of the view that
in the Southern Rhodesia situation there is positive evidence of the mandate
required for the operation of the doctrine of necessity. He, however,
goes on to say that even if the evidence does not support express mandate,
the required mandate is to be implied, presumably in the absence of sufficient
evidence to the contraryJ However his investigations in his judgment
in Hesperides Hotels into the current situation as regards the government
2
of Cyprus is not directed at ascertaining the attitude of the recognised
government to the unrecognised government but is undertaken, it would seem,
for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Government of the Worth "is in
3
effective control or not" - The attitude of the lawful government has
become irrelevant.
Although this judgment of Lord Denning;is of poor quality, the basic
approach he adopts is not without merit. The other approach in its
t. At 62.
2. At 663 et seq.
3. Lord Denning in Hesperide3 Hotels at 663.
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primitive form, or in the more sophisticated form it has taken in the
cases on Southern Rhodesia, gives precedence to state interests over the
interests of the individuals concerned. As we have seen* this has been
criticised as being inappropriate in cases involving private international
law, a branch of private law. Lord Denning made this point in Hesperides
Hotels taking as his starting point the often expressed view that the
executive and the courts should speak with one voice on this matter of
recognition. He said,
"But there are those who do not subscribe to this view. They say that
there is no need for the executive and the judiciary to speak in unison.
The executive is concerned with the externa1 consequences of recognition,
vis-avis other states. The courts are concerned with the internal
✓ 2
consequences of it, vis-a-vis private individuals."
The approach adopted in the cases on Southern Rhodesia, perhaps we
may call it the sophisticated sovereignty approach, means that no
recognition can be given to the laws and acts of an unrecognised
government unless this is possible under the laws of the recognised
government. In some cases it will be possible to give effect to such
laws and acts and we have noted three situations where this is possibles
where the recognised government has set up the unrecognised government,
1. At pp. 16J - 164.
2. At 662.
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where the recognised government has provided by legislation for effect
to be given to the laws and acts of the unrecognised government, and
where the doctrine of necessity is part of the legal system of the
recognised government. However cases will still arise where the
application of this sophisticated sovereignty approach will not enable
the laws of an unrecognised government to be applied in circumstances
where the court feels that they should be applied. linless the court
solves this problem by using the public policy doctrine, what is it to
do?^ Cn the other hand Lord Denning*s approach, although safeguarding
the interests of the individuals concerned, takes no account whatever of
the state or international interests involved in the matter. The point
surely is that, in this field of the enforcement of the laws of unrecognised
governments, state and international interests legitimately intrude, even
where the matter in issue involves private rights. Both the Denning
approach and the sophisticated sovereignty approach err in that thqy take
extreme positions; what is needed is a flexible approach that allows the
due weight, appropriate in the particular case in question, to be given
to both state and private interests. This could also perhaps be realised
by subdividing the field, that is, by adopting different approaches to
1. See the penultimate line of the quotation from the judgment of Lord
Pearce in Kadsimbamuto set out at p. 174.
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different situations falling within the general field. The three categories
set out earlier in this chapter at P«189 , could be relevant in this regard.
Then, again, the two approaches could be com- t-.ed. My conclusion then is
here
that,Aas in so c many other fields of conflict of laws, notably contract
and delict, the tradition. 1 approach has been defective in that the rules
have been too inflexible and the juridical categories too broad.
.
I would suggest that where a court is continuing to operate in
territory under the effective control of a rebel government then it must
apply the laws of that government. Where the rebellion has not yet succeeded,
the court should, if this is a practical proprsition, only apply such laws
as are necessary to the maintenance of law and order - a cynic may view
this as an "investment" lest the revolution fail. This is basically the
approach set out in liadzimbamuto thou^i here, I would suggest, the application
of rebel laws should not necessarily be dependent on the implied mandate
of the lawful sovereign, although, if the decision to apply rebel laws can
be based on implied mandate, this further safeguards the judge should the
rebellion ultimately fail.
Where the court is operating not in rebel territory but in tide
territory of the lawful government then, I would suggest, it should only give
such recognition to the laws and administrative acts of the rebel government
as its own government considers appropriate. Where the lawful government
has legislated specifically on the matter, then there is no problem,
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provided the case in question falls within the field of the legislation.
Where the legal system of the lawful government recognises some doctrine
like that of implied mandate, then that too can be applied. If this
leads to results that the lawful government does not like, either because
rebels laws are being enforced or because they are not, it can always
deal with the matter by legislation. In this context, that is, where
the court in question is that of the lawful government, it would seem
inappropriate for the court to adopt a Denning type approach in which
attitude of the lawful government is considered irrelevant.
In the third situation, the position where there is a real conflict
of laws problem/), Lord Denning's approach is more relevant. Here the
court in question operates not within the rebel territory nor within that,
if any,cartrolied by the previous government, but within the territory of
another s tate which recognises this latter government. Thi3 is the situation
that existed in Bilang and al30 in Hesperides Hotels. In this situation
the approach of Lord Denning in Hesperides Hotels may be thought appropriate.
Here the lawful government is not that of the country of the court so there
is not this compelling reason to allow enforcement of rebel laws only
insofar as they are enforceable under the system of the lawful government.
But some concession is made in this approach to the fact that the rebel
government is not recognised for only its laws essential to the maintenance
of law and order or to the continuance of ordered living are to be applied.
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The question arises: does this approach give sufficient weight to State
interests? What if the recognised government wishes to impose a legal
as well as an economic blockade and the government of the country of the
forum ia sympathetic to this? The answer may be that, in these
circumstances, the government should act by passing appropriate legislation.
This 3eems a mofe viable proposition than the alternative of the court3
adopting the sophisticated sovereignty approach and the government
legislating where this creates undesirable results. One reason for
this is that Parliament is unlike y to legislate unless the matter is
of substantial national importance and the fact that a few foreigners
are not getting justice in our courts because a rebel governments laws
cannot be enforced is hardly likely to produce corrective legislation.
It is true such legislation, if only partial in application, has been
passed in relation to Southern Khodesia but the circumstances there were
unusual in that one of the United Kingdom's own colonies was involved.
The second matter which remains for consideration is the position
as regards the Transkei. In 1976 South Africa purported to grant
independence to a part of its territory known as the Transkei but no
member of the United Nations save South Africa has recognised the new
State or its government.^ The United Kingdom considers the Transkei
still to be part of South Africa and thus falling under the authority
1. A further South African Bantustan, Bophuthatswana, was declared
independent on the 6th December 1977. At this date it was announced
that it had been recognised only by South Africa and the Transkei.
Press reports state that Rhodesia offered recognition but that this
offer was not favourably received.
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of the South African government. Here we would again appear to have
the kind of situation that arose in the Cart Zeiss case. There it will
be remembered, it was argued that, as the United Kingdom government had
not recognised the East German government, the letter's acts could not
be enforced. This argument was rejected, it being held that although
the United Kingdom recognised the Soviet Union and not the East German
government as the governing authority in East Germany, the acts of this
latter government would be given effect in the United Kingdom "... because
they are acts done by a subordinate body which the U.S.S.R. set up to act
on its behalf."^
This presumably, is the correct approach to adopt in respect of the
Transkei though there has been no case, as yet, on the point to my
knowledge. The enactments of its legislature and the acts of its officials,
such as decrees granted by its judicial officers, will be recognised by
our courts as being instances of the exercise of authority delegated by
the recognised government, that is, that of South Africa.
I presume, however, that our courts will only recognise such
exercises of authority by the Transkeian government and its officials
as are consistent with their basis in delegated authority: acts that
1. Zee this chapter at P* 160.
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involve express or implied claims of independent sovereignty for the
Transkeian government will not be recognised. This seems a necessary
limitation in these cases of unacceptable regimes set up within part of
a territory under their control by recognised governments although I
have not found any authority in the cases to support it.
It seems most likely that the Scottish courts, if faced with this
problem of the laws and acts of unrecognised governments, would follow
these cases on English law. There seems, indeed, to be a dearth of
authority on this topic in Scots law; the only authority from this system
cited in these cases is Hume on necessity in the field of criminal law.
It is interesting to note that Stair in his apology has this to say of
his appointment and service as a judge under the Protectorate:
"To show how little I have been a changeling or time-server,
it is commonly known, and there are hundreds can witness,
that I was excluded from the Bar for not taking the Usurper's
tender, engaging to be faithful to the Commonwealth of England
without King or House of Lords, and never appeared again until
that tender was laid aside; and though thereafter I was made
a Judge, supposing I would be as acceptable to the nation as
any, yet I did not embrace it, without the approbation of the
most eminent of our ministers that were then alive, who did
wisely and justly distinguish between the commissions granted
by usurpers, which did relate only to the people, and which
were no less necessary, than if ihey had prohibited baking or
brewing but by their warrant, and between these which relate to
councils for establishing the usurped power or burdening the
people; and therefore, though I was much invited, I never
embraced a commission to any of their pretended Parliaments or
Councils of State; and I know that the King allowed his friends
to accept such commissions as were necessary for preserving his
people, and therefore, when he was restored, I was one of the
Senators of the College of Justice in the first nomination."
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A note on Hesperides Hotels
This case has now come before the House of Lords - see C1976Q
2 All E.R. 1168 (H.L.(E)).
The House of Lords did not go into the question of laws and
acts of unrecognised governments which was dealt with by Lord Denning
%
in the Court of Appeal. It was held, however, that the ruling that
the court had no jurisdiction in the matter, which was based on the
rule in the Kocambique case,did not apply to the claim for conspiracy
to effect trespasses to tlie contents of the hotels and that the action
could proceed in this respect.
